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Rethinking Nation-Building: A Christian Socio-Ethical and Theo-Political Task for Appropriating the Common Good

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LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

RETHINKING NATION-BUILDING:
A CHRISTIAN SOCIO-ETHICAL AND THEO-POLITICAL TASK
FOR APPROPRIATING THE COMMON GOOD

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
PROGRAM IN THEOLOGY

BY
ARTEMUS W. GAYE
CHICAGO, IL
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Freedom without moral responsibility is like a vehicle without brakes.

—Borbor H. Gaye

PREFACE

Why Engage in Nation-Building? An Overview

The world we live in is interconnected and globalized. No nation or society can afford to advocate a domestic or foreign policy of isolationism from the rest of the world. Therefore, it is imperative that in the midst of the crises of failed states--the breeding grounds for terrorism, insecurity, wars, disease, and poverty--we must seek a collective and realistic agenda that promotes the (re)building of collapsed nations so that they can become healthy, civil, and eventually prosperous.

In this effort, nation-building seeks to create a strong national identity that recognizes the diversity and historical narratives of its entire people. When a nation is divided on ethnic, religious, and racial lines, there is always an unhealthy lingering of tensions and lack cohesiveness for growth and development, as various groups become skeptical and resentful of each other. Additionally, nation-building requires local people to be available to take over most of the tasks of government. Therefore, the task of nation-building must be a wholistic one in embracing reforms that affect security, economic wellbeing, institutional development, and democracy. It must also include a commitment to transitional justice. This task demands us to be socio-ethical and theo-political!

In chapter one, I will address the problem of failed states as an emerging key global crisis and also a religious and moral challenge. A working definition of failed state

shall be developed, mainly articulated by Noam Chomsky. He perceived failed states as the wanton abuse of power by leaders who also fail to protect their people. Later, we shall present a historical account of failed states as informed by Jared Diamond, Lester Brown, and others. Furthermore, we shall make the case for genuine nation-building as the needed response to this grave problem of failed systems of social integration. Because the problem of failed states has only become recognized and discussed in any sustained way in the last 30 years it is not surprising that the Christian Churches in general and Christian ethicists and theologians in particular have not given much sustained attention to, or reflection upon, these challenges. My contention is that the Churches and their theological communities must engage these problems because they are so grave and are the sources of massive amounts of raw human suffering. Where human suffering occurs the Churches' attention should be fixated.

In chapter two, I will examine the case against international failures to attend to the needs and suffering caused by failed state conditions and why such negligence has continued for so long. First, I begin by analyzing the historical impact of imperialism and colonialism from 1492-1960. I draw on John Henrik Clarke's important account of the impact of the Trans-Atlantic Slave trade and how it shaped the world forever. Second, I attempt to locate the rise of the failed state problem historically by situating it in an examination of the general contours of the 20th Century. Specifically, I examine in broad strokes the impact of World War I and II, the post-war efforts of Colonial liberation from the colonizing powers, and the Cold War that structured and reordered the International System by a superpower conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective circle of allies, the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) countries

and the Warsaw Pact Countries of the Soviet dominated Eastern Europe. Moreover, I will also examine the significance of the end of the Cold War and how it left the United States as the world's sole superpower but it also allowed a myriad of regional tensions to break out in armed conflicts. Where once the Cold War imposed a stable bi-polar regime of power relations on many regions in Latin America, the Balkans, Africa, and significant regions of Asia, the end of the Cold War uncapped this hegemonic stabilizing system and allowed a wide range of new ethnic and tribal energies to seek expression and institutionalization in new national formations. Tragically the end of the Cold War witnessed a host of emerging regional conflicts and horrific civil wars. Sadly the high hopes of a peaceful New World Order were dashed on the realities of emerging fracturing of nations into ethnicity and sometimes religiously driven conflicts that exhibited horrific carnage and generate immense raw human suffering.

I examine also the powerful turning point of the 9/11 attacks on the United States by Al-Qaida, an Islamicist terrorist organization supported by Afghanis and Saudis. This attack highlighted how even the world's remaining superpower is vulnerable to the tensions and hatreds born from distant failed state conditions. The Al-Qaida training camps were located in Afghanistan, a tragically poor country who has seen civil war sustained across the decades following the Soviet Invasion. The 9/11 attacks made clear how the international system has been integrated profoundly. A failed state is everybody's business because in our historical condition failed states half way across the globe can harbor terrorist organizations with global reach. As 9/11 made clear, American national security requires an engagement to minimize failed state conditions for failed states can often serve as the breeding grounds for international terrorist threats. In chapter

three, I examine Protestant perspectives on Christian ethics and use these to reflect on the contemporary problems of failed states. I make the case that there are core Christian theological and ethical resources that enable us to address state failures and promote nation-building. These key Christian ethical principles are love, justice, hope, and the promotion of the common good. In this chapter I draw significantly on the Methodist tradition and its emphasis on moral and socio-political actions. For example, the Wesleyan movement came to adopt the application of the quadrilateral—that is scripture, reason, tradition, and experience in dealing with fundamental moral issues. In the last section of this chapter I will focus on Reinhold Niebuhr, whose work significantly shapes this dissertation. His articulation of Christian realism addresses how we as Christians can deal with real world problems as a moral responsibility.

In chapter four, I will analyze the Roman Catholic tradition on the articulation and application of the common good as a bridge ethics. Herein, a bridge ethics is a universally acceptable code of religious and moral teachings that unite everyone under a communion of understanding and appreciating the search for truth, justice and social action. We shall rely on the works of David Hollenbach, Michael Novak and a number of Papals' encyclicals for insights into the development of Roman Catholic Social thinking on these issues. Finally, I will argue that there is an emerging consensus on the common good as advocated by both Protestants and Roman Catholics. As such, Christians are encouraged to accept the fact that our moral responsibility requires us being attentive and active in the pursuit of the common good of the individuals and society as a whole—especially as it relates to the problem of failed states in need of rebuilding.

In chapter five, I will develop a wholistic nation-building toolkit that I assert is realistic and attainable. This toolkit that I refer to as SIDE (Security, Institutional Building, Democracy, and Economics) is the bedrock for the restoration and functioning of any nation and is a critical element in the practice of nation-building. I shall argue that ultimate goal is the search for social cohesion, embedded with SIDE. In addition, other factors like transitional justice, the delicate balance between reconstruction and development, and the international aids syndrome, and the role of narrative shall be emphasized within this toolkit. We shall also reemphasize the works of Christian thinkers such as Augustine, Aquinas, Wesley, Niebuhr, Tillich, Novak, Hollenbach, et al, who have been strong advocates for the Christian's involvement in socio-political, economic, and cultural issues that affect our world. Though distinct in their own experiences, these Christian thinkers shared a common historical narrative based on the personal and universal themes of suffering, injustice, and depravation—in which they each seeks a world in dire need of love, hope, justice and the common good.

It is in this very world of injustice, hopelessness, indifference, and alienation, that my own personal narrative (that I shall share in this conclusion) becomes interspersed with these great thinkers. We all seemed to be moved internally or externally, by powerful experiences that forced us out comfort zones, and ubiquitously requiring a full attention and engagement in this world especially redressing the unavoidable problems of failed states—the greatest challenge to the common good in our time.

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ABSTRACT

Intractable civil and regional conflicts are creating the worst political, economic, and social disintegration around the globe, raising moral and ethical questions about the appropriate responses by the global community in general and the Christian community in particular. In view of these problems, we argue for the concept of genuine nation-building as an effective framework and panacea for addressing these crises. Why have there been many failed attempts at nation-building and the obstructing cleavages? Christians cannot claim to be marginalized from the center of power and affluences with responsibilities in the political, social, cultural, and economic institutions of society.

The basic method used in this dissertation is the application of historical narratives to understanding the phenomenon of failed states and assessing the strengths, weaknesses and ongoing relevance of Christianity and the International Community in the global public sphere of political, economic, and social policies and practices that have either created these failures or addressed them. In particular, we argue that Christianity provides distinctive perspectives on love, hope, justice and the common good as lenses for understanding self-interest through Christian realism as articulated by Reinhold Niebuhr. On this basis, it is in our interest and is a moral responsibility to champion the cause of nation-building, grounded in an ethical paradigm that also draws upon secular theories and practices. As a future research, we hope to observe the implications of this work on Christians who are cognizant and actively participating in nation-building as an ethical and theological task for the in breaking of God's Kingdom in the here and now.

CHAPTER ONE

FAILED STATES: A GLOBAL CRISIS AND A RELIGIOUS
AND MORAL CHALLENGE

The Problem of Failed States

The proliferation of failed states today certainly is one of the most destructive forces threatening the global common good. It creates vast human suffering accounting for over 270 million civilian and military deaths during the past century.¹ Without our active participation in reversing these global threats, we proceed down the path to more death and destruction and to, what some fear, is the eventual collapse of civilization and global stability.²

Summary of Failed States and their Implications

“Failed states” are what Noam Chomsky, in his book, *Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy*, describes as those “that do not protect their

¹ Rudy Rummel. *Death by Government*. New Brunswick: Transaction Books. 1994. He is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Hawaii, who has researched this phenomenon of the state and violence. He uses the term “democide” to describe “death by government.” This work transcends theoretical treatise and is more a seminal work with an empirical account of the magnitude of government mass murders, mainly in the political arena, committed in peacetime totaling 174 million victims of government violence, as compared with about 36 million as a result of government violence in time of war. Failed state is followed closely by the HIV/AIDs pandemic that have killed more than 34 million more people than all of the combined civil wars fought in the last 40 years. This pandemic is directly or indirectly tied to failed states in their inability to deal with pressing social and economic issues facing their populations.

² Lester Brown. *Plan B 4.0: Mobilizing to Save Civilization*. Washington, DC: Earth Policy Institute, 2009. Brown seriously cautions the world leaders to proactively begin “mobilizing to save civilization” acknowledging the importance of such global action. Also see Brown’s book, *World on the Edge: How to Prevent Environmental and Economic Collapse*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011.

citizens from violence and perhaps even destruction, that regard themselves as beyond the reach of domestic or international law, and that suffer from a ‘democratic deficit,’ having democratic forms but with limited substance.”³ Such state failure creates a false sense of stability but underneath is a massive reality of deep fear, hopelessness, and outbursts of lawlessness and violence once state power or authority is overwhelmed by competing armed groups engaged in armed struggle and power grabs. Since the dawn of civilization we have seen similar cases of such failure, leading to the decline of many once great empires and city-states.

The early history of the Fertile Crescent civilizations in the Middle East, ancient Egypt, empires in China, warring states in India, and the competing city-states of the Mayans in what is today Mexico and Guatemala all exhibited in their history powerful examples of massive state collapse into contesting sub-groups and factions. As seen through the lenses of history, those ancient regimes’ failures, some gradual and some rapid, led to destructive conflict, deep fear, disruption of commerce, and sustained warring tribes, regions, nations, and neighbors.⁴

Brief Historical Examples of Failed States

Indeed as Jared Diamond notes in his book, *Collapse: How Societies choose to Fail or Succeed*, the root of past destructions, such as the Mayan and other ancient civilization, lies often in the ecological problems initiated mainly by rising population growth that demands increased agricultural appropriation of the local ecosystems via

³ Noam Chomsky. *Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy*. New York: Metropolitan book, 2006, 3.

⁴ See Jared Diamond for his helpful historical treatment of ancient failed states in his book *Collapse: How Societies choose to Fail or Succeed*. New York: Viking Press, 2005, 23ff.

forest clearing and increased planting and in dryer settings an increase of the use of irrigation. Often such population pressures lead to unintended consequences like soil erosion, salt intrusion into soils because of irrigation, and ultimately overall agricultural collapse with increased societal tensions and political collapse.⁵

Of significance is Diamond's historical and comparative analysis of the island of Hispaniola—shared by the Dominican Republic and Haiti, two nations with similar historical narrative, resources and geography.

However, their current conditions are markedly different. Haiti holds the distinct title as the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, accounting for only one percent of forested land as compared to twenty eight percent in the Dominican Republic. Why the difference? These problems can be traced to the historical practices of Haitians in deforestation and mismanagement that were spurred by high population growth with limited resources—thereby creating immense pressure for the state's impending collapse. Once the forests were cleared for agriculture and wood supplies for fuel, the soils were opened up to the full brunt of rain water action leading to massive soil erosion and a degradation of agricultural fertility. This ecological tragedy was sustained in great part

⁵ Jared Diamond. *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed*. New York: Viking Books. 2005. In this fascinating work, the author seeks to understand the fates of past societies that collapsed due to ecological reasons, combining the most important political and policy debates of our world. Sadly, the developed world and its citizenry become oblivious to these imminent dangers due to conveniences around them. Thus Diamond compares past and present failure and successes in places like Greenland and Iceland, Rwanda, Australia, Montana, the ancient Mayans and modern China and the world.

through the historical conflict between colonial France and Western interferences in Haiti for a long period of time.⁶

On the other hand the people and leaders of the Dominican Republic, in spite of their own socio-political tension, chose to establish laws governing agricultural and environmental policies and practices in anticipation of a sustainable future. The result has led to a more prosperous, healthy and stable Dominican Republic in contrast to its neighbor Haiti.⁷ In other contexts, security threats caused by invading armies and tribes created internal chaos and collapse that directly impacted the failure of particular empires or nation states as illustrated by Ambassador John Herbst⁸ of the US State Department who writes that:

Over 2,000 years ago, the Chinese built the Great Wall to keep out intruders from the Eurasian steppes, and over 1,600 years ago, the Romans built a complex defensive system to demarcate and defend its borders in Germany and England. In the past, ungoverned spaces posed a problem only for immediate neighbors.⁹

However, the current threat of failed states has far more global consequences that transcend a single national community. History has marched on and the international system of peoples and states and their economies are more integrated than ever. As Paul Kennedy has argued, the last 50 years have seen a powerful global economic integration

⁶ Yasmine Shamsie and Andrew S. Thompson. *Haiti. Hope for a Fragile State*. Waterloo, Ontario: Center for International Governance Innovation, 2006, 29-31.

⁷ Phillip Scher. *Perspectives on the Caribbean: A Reader in Culture, History, and Representation*. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 247.

⁸ John Herbst. *The Problem of Failed States: A New Instrument*. Ambassador John E. Herbst is the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the U.S. Department of State. This article was written in *The Prism*, on August 13, 2010, filed under Security and Development, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/prism1-1/3_Prism_21-26_Herbst.pdf (accessed 08.25.11).

⁹ Ibid., 1.

created by new advances in shipping, transportation and communication that allow for a vast increase in international trade and investment.¹⁰ Kennedy argues that increasingly the nations of the world have seen a diminishment of their ability to control their own destiny by themselves. Increasingly they are forced to face the reality of the demands of the global economy even as they are exposed to the globally wide shared threats posed by rising ecological concerns such as global climate change, habitat loss, deforestation, depleting aquifers, melting glaciers which have heretofore served as water reservoirs sustaining river flow during dry summer months, and species extinction.

Nation-states today, Kennedy argues, seek to provide stability and security to their citizens, but they face this challenge of powerful forces beyond national governmental control. The global economic dynamics and the globally shared impacts of planetary wide climate change and other ecological dynamics mean that nation-states today are more integrated into a planetary community whether they wish it or not.¹¹ This changed historical context means that the problem of failed states has a widening flow of regional and indeed global impacts.

Today a failed state in one geographical location has a wide flow of negative impact on its entire region and indeed upon the global community. This problem and its complexities are regional, continental, and for that matter a global affair—often

¹⁰ See Paul Kennedy. *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Vintage Book, 1994. Also See Thomas Friedman, *The World is Flat, 3.0 A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2006.

¹¹ Thomas L. Friedman. *Hot, Flat, and Crowded, 2.0. Why We Need Green Revolution and How it Can Renew America*. New York: Picador Book, 2009. Friedman argues for a concerted national strategy called “Geo-Greenism” needed to save the planet from disaster. The core argument is to save the planet from deforestation, pollution and overheating which is also needed to make America a healthier, richer, more innovative, more productive, and more secure nation.

threatening global peace, security, trade, and governance.¹² Sadly, it took September 11, 2001, as the wake-up call for the world's most powerful nation—the United States of America, when men trained in the caves and mountains, in one of the remotest part of the world in Afghanistan, launched a terroristic attack on the greatest economic and military symbols of the Western World—the Twin Towers (World Trade Center) and the U.S. Department of Defense. More than three thousand innocent civilians were killed, a reminder to the West, the USA and all nations, that there was no longer a safe haven for anyone, or nation, in this globalized community of nations.

Therefore, a new era in international relations has been redefined, negating the illusive and flirtatious Post Cold War,¹³ symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall in

¹² See William French. "Natural Law and Ecological Responsibility: Drawing on the Thomistic Tradition." *University of St. Thomas Law Journal*. St. Paul: Volume 5 No.1. Winter 2008, 13-15. Professor French argues that humanity's action has far reaching consequences on the ecological state of the world and its effect on global security. He distinguishes the two distinct post-modernist views –the social constructionists and the postmodern deconstructionists.

¹³ In my argument of the post Cold War in which I concluded, "Therefore, a new era in international relations has been redefined, negating the illusive and flirtatious Post Cold War era", I assert that the West was either oblivious to reality or delusional to have preempted or concluded that the end of the Cold War meant declaring victory over communism, thereby relieving the United States and the West from its responsibility in truly helping those nations it supported or undermined for many decades as its so-called Cold War allies/adversaries—through the process of democracy. As documented, the decade of the 90s imploded into hot wars in Africa—namely in the former Yugoslavia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola and Sudan's protracted wars, Somalia, and the D.R. Congo. What did the West or international community do? Watched and reluctantly responded but quickly pulled out. It took a decade for the West and international community on 9/11 to realize that the so-called distant wars perceived as tribal or low level civil wars were in fact the continuation of wars of aggressions that had the same effect or more global effect on war peace, economics, politics and environment. Nevertheless, to blame the West and the international community alone as the only culprit for the creation of failed state would be an injustice based on bias and uncritical analysis of the facts. Therefore, I further insist that dictatorial regimes in these failed states were also directly responsible for the implosions of their nations—Liberia's Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor failure to adhere to the rule of law, The DRC's Mobutu Sese Seko Nkuku Ngbendu wa Za Banga's authoritarian and bloody regimes, Haiti's Francois and Jean-Claude Duvalier corrupt and ruthless regimes, and other dictators chose paths of nepotism, mismanagement, suppression, and destruction to ruin the lives and progress of their people and nations. Interestingly, a debate has ensued between the so-called "externalists" and "internalists" who either blame outside intervention or local actors as the root of the problems of failed states. For example, in August 2000 at a conference in St. Paul MN, where I was privileged to attend (African Nation-Building Conference), one of the keynote speakers, Dr. George

1989, when President George H. W. Bush declared a “New World Order”¹⁴ which parallels Professor Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history,” where the latter makes the case that the end of the Cold war signaled the spread of western democracy and the terminal point in humanity’s socio-political advancement or evolution in the affairs of global governance.¹⁵

However, Fukuyama later answered his critics by tracing the term “end of history” to Hegel and Marx. In this argument, Fukuyama posits that Hegel understood human history as a coherent, gradual evolutionary process—where human reason would accept the concept of freedom in the world. But Marx on the other hand, was more focused on economic theory, based on the means of production—historically originating

Ayittey of Ghana and American University, proffered that the internalists argue that for uncritically long time, African elites and leaders, for their own benefits and scapegoating, which demonstrated their weaknesses, had blamed the continent’s problems on external factors alone without looking at the internal factors that have also contributed to the continent’s problems. It was this event that launched my curiosity and to seriously consider a future project on nation-building as a research endeavor.

¹⁴ “*The New World Order*” as declared by George H.W. Bush was in reference to the end of the Cold war in 1989 and the first Gulf war, where, on September 11, 1990, President George Bush speaking to U.S. Congress, Joint Session, in a speech entitled, *Towards A New World Order*,” remarked: “The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times; our fifth objective—a new world order—can emerge: a new era—freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we’ve known. It’s a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice and strong respect the rights of the weak. This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He and other leaders from Europe, the Gulf, and around the world understand that how we manage this crisis today could shape the future for generations to come.” Among other topics, Bush also stated that the war presented an opportunity for a “New World Order” to emerge a balance in power and international cooperation led by the global powers as evidenced in the first Gulf war. The irony is that on September 11, 2001, eleven years later, Bush II would be engulfed in another global conflict demanding a new world order, where Iraq and the second Gulf War would serve as an opportunity or miss opportunity for global cooperation, <http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/war/bushsr.htm> (accessed 04.10.11).

¹⁵ Francis Fukuyama. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992. Also see *Open Democracy*. May 1, 2006.

from the evolution of societies from “pre-human to hunter-gatherer to agricultural to industrial ones.” Clearly, the “end of history” was a theory of modernization that raised the question of where that modernization process would ultimately lead.¹⁶

Therefore, in reality the post–Cold War era that witnessed 9/11 illustrates the global dangers of failed states especially in Afghanistan, of a world more chaotic, unstable, and with uncontrollable chronic violence. Accordingly, the *Foreign Policy*,¹⁷ in its analysis of *Failed States Index 2010*, states that the top ten failed states have rotated among fifteen countries since 2005 when the index was first published, with a vast majority being African nations. The 2010 report lists “90,000 publicly available sources in its analysis of 177 countries, based on a criterion that rates them on 12 indicators of state collapse—from the problems of social, economic and political upheavals. These are key failed states indicators:

Social: Mounting Demographic Pressures; Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating Complex Humanitarian Emergencies; Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia; Chronic and Sustained Human Flight. Economic: Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines; Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline. Political: Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State; Progressive Deterioration of Public Services; Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights; Security Apparatus Operates as a “State within a State”; Rise of Factionalized Elites; Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors.¹⁸

¹⁶ Ibid., 65.

¹⁷ *Foreign Policy* is published by the Slate Group, a division of *Washington Post* and *Newsweek*.

¹⁸ Failed States List 2010, *The Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy Magazine*, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010failedstatesindexinteractivemapandranks> (accessed 02.23.10).

Clearly, the index rates every nation's performance, giving us an indication of triggers that define stability or instability of that nation. In 2009 there were forty troubled spots. But in 2010, the number has increased to sixty, posing grave challenges and complexities to an already overburdened and troubled world, which Herbst asserts will last beyond a generation or more, due to "a consequence of paradoxical tendencies within the international system."¹⁹ These tendencies lead to inconsistency, disinterestedness, limitation, and sometimes narrow self interest of powerful nation-states, becoming selective in responding to various intractable and prolonged global and regional crises.

Clearly, there is empirical data that offer insight and help forecast concerns of our contemporary time. We have before us the sad reminder of 9/11 that highlights how a failed state condition in one part of the world can sow such animosities and hatreds that it can reach out globally to promote massive destruction and suffering anywhere. In this new world the nations and peoples of the world are all linked together. This premise asserts that there ought to be a strong self-interest by the developed world in the task of nation-building and global justice to prevent new cases of failed states that might become sources of international terrorism and of the disruption of the basic universal human rights. This global response is premised on the reality that fundamentally failed states are menaces that never go away until a concerted response is done to redress the problems, in contrast to past eras where powerful empires and stronger nations were built or expanded by preying on the territorial sovereignties of weaker nations and states.

¹⁹ John Herbst. "The Problem of Failed States: A New Instrument." *Prism Magazine* posted on August 13, 2010, 2.

Today the failed state frequently faces an overwhelming lack of interest in its current plight and in its future. These states tend to linger in their failed and failing conditions which create regional instabilities posing further challenges to neighboring states, regional stability, and international security. Empirically, we have seen in West Africa, Central Africa and the Middle East how state failure tends to occur in regions where other fragile states exist, creating refugee movements with serious trans-ethnic or inter-tribal conflicts, thereby burdening those neighboring states. It is possible that a cycle of regional state failure could result from the persistence of a failed state and their fluid nature.

Often time, the neighboring states as exemplified in Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo were drawn into border conflicts, directly and indirectly, from the use of their territories for illicit arms trafficking, by conflicting ethnic groups and militias. For example, the Hutu militias, the “*Interahamwe*” were notorious for carrying out ethnic cleansing in their quests for seeking safe havens across weak and porous boundaries—in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda where ethnic Hutus and Tutsis were involved in conflicts in five countries.²⁰

²⁰ Herman Musahara, Prisca Mbura Kamungi, et al. Conflict in the Great Lakes Region—How is it Linked with Land and Migration? *Natural Resource Perspectives*. London: Number 96, March 2005. The Overseas Development, London. In this article, the authors argue that Africa’s Great Lakes Region—(comprising of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya, and the DRC), sharing the vast fresh water lakes of Victoria, Tanganyika, Edwards, and Kivu, entering into the Congo basin) has been a hotbed of political strife, armed conflict and population displacements with severe humanitarian consequences. While these events have clearly revolved around political struggles for the control of the state, recent research has pointed to the significance of access to renewable natural resources as structural causes and sustaining factors in struggles for power in the region. They illustrate that contested rights to land and natural resources are significant, particularly in light of land scarcity in many areas and the frequency of population movements. Further they point at “growing literature on the so-called ‘resource curse’ – i.e. the potential for abundant natural resources to hamper sustainable development, increasing poverty, tribalism and state

Reliable information to date suggests that it is very difficult to contain the problems of the failed states within the physical boundaries of that state. Another concern demanding international attention and response is how failed states matter to the larger international community. As noted earlier they are vulnerable to internal and external disruption as well as exploitation by other state and non-state actors with less-than-noble motives. And the suffering of one nation and people in today's integrated world can sadly impact on other peoples across the globe.

Therefore, the inability of any state to control illicit or criminal activities such as drug smuggling or weapons smuggling, money laundering, and terrorism may eventually transform that country into a kind of safe haven from which criminal groups can effectively consolidate and expand operations. To simply ignore the persistence of the failed state or to fail to develop a clear strategy poses risks that we should be wary of accepting without a global and concerted response.

The current situation in Somalia is sadly a classic example of the problem when a failed or failing state is exploited by criminal groups. It is tormented with pirates operating on the vast Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden disrupting shipping and international commerce. This pervasive and powerful influence of Somali pirates is a

failure" (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001; Le Billon, 2001). Additionally, primarily agricultural lands have continued to serve as source of fomenting or sustaining conflict through the use of profits or political capital from natural resource extraction or redistribution for purchase of arms, or mobilization of human and diplomatic resources for war. In Rwanda, unequal access to land was one of the structural causes of poverty which was exploited by the organizers of the genocide. Also see Samantha Powers. *A Problem from Hell: America in the Age of Genocide*. New York: Harper Perennial, 2003.

concern not only for the future of world maritime but potentially for the broader oil or energy supplies of the world.²¹

Population growth and the expansion of production and consumption patterns can greatly stress ecosystems that support national communities and push them into failed state conditions. Lester Brown, former head of the World Watch Institute, documents well how ecological overuse, ecosystem damage, and population surge too often push food insecurity and famine that in turn are catalysts for the failure of state institutions. Even in a world that lacks the wherewithal, Brown remains cautiously optimistic that if we act collectively to reverse these calamities there is hope to reverse such trends.

In his work, *Plan B. 4.0: Mobilizing to Save Civilization*, Brown lists several key factors that directly or indirectly push toward the collapse of civilizations or nations. Among them are: ecological degradation, food shortages, insecurity, climate change, overpopulation, corruption and other negative factors.²² How can a nation claim its sovereignty or independence when it cannot provide the basic needs of its people such as food, water and shelter?

In Brown's analysis, food security is paramount to world peace and stability. When there are food shortages or diminished supplies there is a trend for a dangerous geopolitics of food scarcity in which fragile nations and other countries, acting in their

²¹ Roger Middleton. *Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Peace and feeding Local Wars*. London: Chatham House, 2008. Also see Abdi Afyare Elmi. *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam and Peacebuilding*. London: Pluto Press, 2010.

²² Lester Brown. *Plan B 4.0: Mobilizing to Save Civilization*. Washington, DC: W. W. Norton; Earth Policy. 2009. In the tradition of Reinhold Niebuhr, Brown is demanding the world's attention in "mobilizing to save civilization" from the impending destruction of the earth and its resources. The starting point is an overpopulated world that is unable to feed itself (pp. 2-3) forcing farmers to rethink their alternatives which sometimes become negative, for example the use of corn to help as fuel for cars in the USA.

narrowly defined self-interest, perpetuate such negativity.²³ Brown also notes that wheat-exporting countries such as Russia and Argentina controlled or banned the exportation of their commodities in an attempt to counter domestic food price increases while Brazil, the Democratic Republic of Congo and other tropical nations are diminishing their rainforests that are significant in sequestering carbon-monoxide.²⁴

Additionally, Brown draws attention to some of the disjointed economic practices that function as a “global ponzi economy.”²⁵ This scheme is based on overexploitation of the natural resources of national ecosystems in the name of monetary profit vis-à-vis social and sustainable investments. Brown quotes Paul Hawken, author of *Blessed Unrest*, whose university commencement speech reads:

At present we are stealing the future, selling it in the present, and calling it gross domestic product. We can just as easily have an economy that is based on healing the future instead of stealing it. We can either create assets for the future or take the assets of the future. One is called restoration and the other exploitation.²⁶

For example, the recent wave of democracy sweeping the Arab and Muslim world has its immediate causation to economic downturn—based on the soaring price of flour, wheat and cooking oil. It started in Tunisia when a young man was humiliated and denied

²³ Ibid., 9.

²⁴ Lester Brown. *World on the Edge: How to Prevent Environmental and Economic Collapse*. Washington, DC: Earth Policy Institute, Chapter 5, 2011.

²⁵ Ibid. *Plan B*, 14, The Ponzi like scheme described by Brown involves the world economy consuming far above the earth’s sustainable yield. Brown illustrates this by presenting the 2002 study published by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, a team of scientists led by Mathis Wackernagel, concluding “that humanity’s collective demands first surpassed the earth’s regenerative capacity around 1980. This means we are meeting current demands in part by consuming the earth’s natural assets, setting the stage for an eventual Ponzi-type collapse when these assets are depleted” (pp. 14-15).

²⁶ Paul Hawken. “Commencement Address to the Class of 2009,” speech at University of Portland, Portland, OR, 3 May 2009.

opportunity to sell his vegetables to earn the necessary cash in feeding his family. Sadly, he, in his extreme frustration, doused himself in gasoline and burned himself to death.²⁷ His remarkable personal sacrifice sparked a wave of anti-government revolutionary movements—the “Arab Spring” that have pushed for remarkable changes and reforms across much of Northern Africa and across the Middle East. These movements have toppled dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya and are continuing to try to push democratic reform in Syria.

In Brown’s construct, a failed state, “In the past, was due to the “concentration of too much power in one state, as in Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union.”²⁸ But today the fractured or failing states that emerged out of the old imperial states and empires are providing the greatest threats to global order and stability that are replete with tragedies based on the collapse of basic structures that affect the rules of law and order and the political function of the state. These states are characterized as having corrupt leaders, dysfunctional institutions, and high levels of chaos and violence. They pose both internal to its people and external threats to its neighboring countries.

²⁷ The wave for democracy in North Africa and the Arab world began on December 17, 2010 when twenty-six year old Mohammed Bouazizi, the sole bread winner for his extended family of eight was disgraced by state authority for operating an unlicensed vegetable cart in Tunisia. The young man attempted to pay the hefty fine of 10-dinar fine (more than his daily earning and equivalent to \$8 USD). In response a local policewoman slapped him, spat in his face, and insulted his late father. The humiliation led Bouazizi, after failure of the local court authority to give him a redress, the young man doused himself with a flammable liquid and set himself on fire. His action led to public outrage which soon spread like a Hammatan wind. This incident was caught on cell phones and became instant worldwide news on Facebook, YouTube, CNN, BBC, etc. However, the causes of these crises were mismanagement, high unemployment, high prices for food, corruption, lack of political freedom, and poor standard of living.

²⁸ Lester Brown. *Plan B 4.0: Mobilizing to Save Civilization*, the author attributes states failure to the loss of territorial control, lack of security to the citizenry. He writes, “When governments lose their monopoly on power, the rule of law begins to disintegrate. When they can no longer provide basic services such as education, health care, and food security, they lose their legitimacy. A government in this position may no longer be able to collect enough revenue to finance effective governance. Societies can become so fragmented that they lack the cohesion to make decisions” (pp. 18-19).

Now in the last few decades it has become clear that the collapse of societies in failed states in one part of the world can have a huge negative impact on other nations and societies who can be heavily impacted by violence and even terrorism that can flow out of failed state regions. We now know that what affects one country or region has a global ramification as depicted by the most recent Arab revolutions, the collapse of the global stock market, the global recession, the impact of high unemployment rates, the closing of multinational corporations, and degradation of the biosphere. The world we live in is truly a global village—requiring all of our full attention and collective responsibilities. When one member of this global family, nation or region is affected, we—as a planetary community—need to act collectively and responsibly dealing with these crises of conscience.

Genuine Nation-Building: The Solution to Failed States

The solution to remedy the chronic problems of failed or failing states by these world bodies, powers, including all of us, ought to be a genuine and sustainable nation-building mission—which I conceive, is a complex, arduous, and often frustrating undertaking. Nevertheless, the need to engage in nation-building is the most urgent endeavor that we must undertake if we are to radically avert future calamities that follow in the wake of 9/11, the Rwanda genocide, the Balkans crises, the Darfur ethnic cleansing, the enormity of the Congo Basin's conflict—so-called World War III, the Islamic and other religious extremist and terrorist movements in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, spreading their tentacles worldwide, the horrors of blood diamonds and exploitation of the biodiversities in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where war-

lords drugged kids, raped women indiscriminately, and pillaged their nations—in quest for greed and violence unimaginable.

For this work, a nation is conceived as “a body of people occupying a given area whose common interests are strong enough to make possible the maintenance of a single sovereign civil authority, i.e. a state which may and often does predate the nation as a historical reality.”²⁹ The term “nation” therefore is in reference to nation states or countries that form the global community of nations being represented at the United Nations, the global world body that coordinates humanitarian and other socio-political activities around the world.

So what is nation-building? It is “the process of reinforcing the common bonds among the people of a nation state to the end that there may be general stability and prosperity so that the nation may participate usefully in the community of nations.”³⁰

The Overseas Development Institute (ODI), a British think tank normatively sees:

Nation-building in its simplest formulation, [as] state-building, especially as understood by the international community since the 1990s, [as] set of actions undertaken by national and/or international actors to establish, reform and strengthen state institutions where these have seriously been eroded or are missing...[with] key goals...include[ing the] provision of security, establishment of the rule of law, effective delivery of basic goods and services through functional formal state institutions, and generation of political legitimacy for the new set of state institutions being built.³¹

²⁹ Bela Harmati. *The Role of the Church in Nation Building*. Report of an International Consultation held at the Njube Youth Center, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, and Geneva: Lutheran World Federation. September 2-7, 1983, 8.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ ODI. *Understanding State-Building from a Political Economy Perspective*. London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI), September 2007, 13.

In these formulae, nation-building must be seen as evolutionary process with many complexities and entanglements, needing perseverance, dedication and sustained vision by those partaking. The ultimate goal is to establish stability and (re)build institutions that can in the long-term produce a peaceful and functioning society.

James Dobbin and other theorists and experts from the RAND Corporation, approach the concept of nation-building through the use of force or military intervention. In this analysis, “the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy”³² is the starting point for nation-building. This concept places the onus on the military as the intervening force that sets the agenda for democratizing the broken states and reforming the states’ institutions.

While we recognize that nation-building has a specific usage as a term, we can also use it in a very general term if we clarify how we are using it. First it is a concept used in political science and military affairs for a specific project when the United States troops are engaged in “nation-building.” But the more general usage is that it is most anything that we think is important to taking tribal and clan, and war-lords’ lawless regions into some sort of national stability and security. Thus nation-building is what every person or the critical mass in Liberia hopes for or every person in Iraq today.

On the other hand, nation-building can be pursued from a painstakingly difficult level requiring a much more robust and arduous tasks. This is usually in situations where

³² James Dobbins. *Nation-Building: the Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower*. Washington, DC: RAND Review, summer 2003. This report is a comparative analysis of lessons learned from seven historical cases: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, in which the United States military power has been used in the post-war era to resolve instability and enable to process of democracy since World War II. This view shall be discussed fully in this work as we argue that nation building goes beyond military intervention.

the society has little experience of institution building beyond tribal councils. The reason is that the people of such community have very little experience of bureaucracy and modern economic theories and the needs of a complex society beyond subsistence standard of living.

This is illustrated in the work of Carolyn Stephenson, *Nation Building*, where she essentially argues that “nation-building programs are those in which dysfunctional or unstable or failed states or economies are given assistance in the development of governmental infrastructure, civil society, dispute resolution mechanisms, as well as economic assistance, in order to increase stability.”³³ Nation-building is the responsibility of someone or something intentionally leading the process to transform the brokenness of the failed state(s). However, Stephenson alerts us of the negative effect of nation-building. In her critique she presents historical analysis of how the processes have been destructive to other nations and peoples. She writes:

In the building of the US nation and others, aboriginal nations were erased or marginalized. The Six-Nations Confederacy of the Iroquois had existed before the US nation (and was thought by some to be a model for it). Today many “First Nations “are in the process of nation re-building, re-building the social, cultural, economic and political foundations for what is left of self-governance. First nations seek to re-build cultural identities

³³ Carolyn Stephenson. *Nation-building, Beyond Intractability*. Ed. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Resolution Consortium. Boulder: University of Colorado. December 2005, 1-4. In her analysis, she makes the argument that Nation-Building is more evolutionary than revolutionary, and that takes a long time and is a social process that cannot be jump-started from outside. The “evolution of the Italian city-states into a nation, the German city-states into the Zollverein customs union and later a nation, the multiple languages and cultural groups in France into the nation of France, the development of China from the warring kingdoms, took a very long time, and were the result, not only of political leadership, but of changes in technology and economic processes (the agricultural and then industrial revolutions), as well as communication, culture and civil society, and many other factors.” This argument is important to this work as we delve more deeply into the current state of nation-building with the views from all sides of the debates. Also see “Power and Justice in International Conflict Resolution,” in *Forum International*, Volume 13: Armed Forces After the Cold War. Munich: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, 1992, 93–117.

as nations in order to challenge their disintegration by others in the creation of their own states.³⁴

However, rebuilding these nations, in particular aboriginal cultures and what is referred to as *First Nations*, Stephenson argues, that these people must be equipped with the institutional foundation necessary to increase their capacity to effectively assert self-governing powers on behalf of their own economic, social and cultural objectives that also requires the people to determine: As Stephenson puts it:

1) Genuine self rule (for making decisions about resource allocations, project funding and development strategy), 2) creating effective governing institutions (non-politicized dispute resolution mechanisms and getting rid of corruption), 3) cultural match (giving first nations institutions legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens), and 4) the need for a strategic orientation (long-term planning).³⁵

While it is true that historically the United States and its allies pursued this model of intervention with variation of successes in Japan and Germany, Iraq and Afghanistan proved to be quite challenging and very expensive. This means that the current trends in world's conflicts with all the complexities require a new model of intervention that goes beyond military intervention.³⁶ This new model for nation-building, as we shall later

³⁴ Ibid., 2.

³⁵ Ibid., 3.

³⁶ Many scholars and think tanks like James Dobbins of RAND and ODI, The Overseas Development Institute have argued that the successes in Germany and Japan had much to do with the WWII nations having the basic understanding of governmental structures. This was possible because these nations had an educated populace, a drive for technology, effectiveness, and also the realization that the cultural forces were defeated in the case of Japanese belief that the emperor was god or Nazism orientation of a superior race. A defeated Japanese population came to the conclusion that the godlike emperor was defeated and so must look favorably to the conquerors for guidance in the midst of its social and cultural dislocations. Germany also understood its future lies not in a longing for Hitler's understanding of the purity of the races but in a new vision of peace and cooperation with the rest of the world. Additionally, their proximity to Europe and Soviet Union created conditions of collective self interests of France, Britain and other nations. However, I am certain that there was a growing rift between the western powers and the

discuss in detail, ought to be wholistic and well-balanced. It is a model that forces us to reexamine what we consider smart versus stupid nation-building. It is important to ask why intervene in Iraq and Afghanistan rather than Darfur?

This requires us to examine the limitations and role of the post-colonial and post Cold-War era, in the polarization and prioritization of failed states and nation-building. In particular, we analyzed the historical role of the Christian church in nation-building. For example, the intervention of America in Afghanistan was presented to the world as a humanitarian intervention. However, it was clearly known that the United States saw the Taliban government in Afghanistan as a direct threat and therefore needed to be ousted for accommodating Al-Qaida.

In Iraq, the invasion was centered on regime change because the United States feared that Saddam with weapons of mass destruction posed grave threat to America and its allies. With little preparation and lack of a long time strategy, the United States soon realized that it was stuck in nation-building. Yet, with a decade since the United States invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States has not formally accepted the reality that it has been involved in nation building despite nearly 2.3 trillion dollars spent on those two wars combined.³⁷ Premised on such an ambiguous narrative of nation-building strategy, other scholars have critiqued nation-building endeavor and its intended goals for

Communist East that further enhanced geopolitical dominance in the form of nation building in Japan and Germany (West Germany). Unlike Iraq and Afghanistan where the formal ceremonies of wars did not occur: official wars, official surrender ceremonies, and official occupations, the US led operations has failed to even acknowledge its role as an occupier. So nation building can only succeed when we take into account contexts, situations, and reality that nation building is an expensive enterprise needing strategic and long term commitment.

³⁷ Joseph Stiglitz. *The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2008.

establishing stability and democratic nations as a misadventure. A notable critic is Amitai Etzioni who makes the case that the task of nation building is as an illusion rarely producing the necessary results. He writes,

The central thesis of this essay is that nation-building-however defined-by foreign powers can rarely be accomplished and tends to be very costly, not merely in economic resources and those of political capital, but also in human lives. Hence, for both empirical, social science considerations and on normative grounds, foreign powers would be best advised to scale back greatly their ambitions and promises. The more these powers focus whatever resources they are willing and able to commit on modest intervention, the more good they will do for the nation they seek to help and for themselves. There are many reasons why superpowers and other powers are tempted to promise nation-building. They believe in the value of forging nations and helping their development. They are keen to share with others that which they hold dear-domestic peace, the blessing of democratic politics and the rich fruits of developed economies.³⁸

In this polemic, Etzioni assumes that the ambitious nation builders are overly optimistic and believe in the ideals of human progress without accepting the reality of failure. In their illusive minds, Etzioni seems to argue that these nation builders hold that such developments can be accomplished relatively easily, especially if one is dedicated to bringing them about.³⁹ But this assertion of Etzioni is an exaggeration. The reason United States and others avoid nation-building is due to the tedious task and expensive nature of

³⁸ Amitai Etzioni. "A Self-Restraining Approach to Nation-Building by Foreign Powers." *International Affairs* 80, no.1 (2004): 1-17. This article is s based on his earlier work, *Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations* (April 2004). The author lists several reasons nation-building ought to be drastically restrained; one of such is that it greatly narrows the scope of factors it tackles. It must not seek to "fix a whole society; rather, we should identify a few key elements in it, and fix them."In other words we must avoid any ambitious undertaking in nation building project. The second restrained approach entails "working initially with whomever is in power (as the old regime implodes or is decapitated), rather than starting by dethroning them." This is premised on the notion that "the hyper-ambitious approach...which assumes that one can extract the warlords, the tribal chiefs, the "ethnic leaders and the religious authorities and replace them with national leaders." Etzioni is in my view, is on the extreme because one does not have to rid the entire old regimes to creating a new society. There are always technocrats who are of importance to jump starting a new nation in progress.

³⁹ Ibid., 1.

nation building. Additionally, there is a lack of strategic planning. Their involvement in these nations is mainly due to (over)reaction. For example, Iraq was a case of regime change and Afghanistan was a war against the Taliban and Al-Qaida, rather than a concerted and strategic effort to carry on the task of nation building.

This strategic and long term approach is contextual and a difficult task but has far greater impact in creating a world much safer and peaceful. It seeks to redress essential components, namely—security, institutional building, democratic process, and sustained economic programs that are the necessary in the progression and stability of our world and sovereign nations.

The Christian Church's Response to Failed State Concerns

As a student of Christian ethics, my approach shall be limited within the scope of Christian ethical and theological tradition. However, I shall pay close attention to historical, social, political, economic, and developmental fields that authentically complement or inform my understanding of what nation-building ought to be pursued—thereby challenging the limitations of the Christian approach to nation-building.

Therefore, I shall identify within our own Christian heritage four focal points or themes that influence the Christian thinking on political theory: namely, love, hope, justice and the common good, in correlation with scripture, tradition, reason and experience. My choice of Reinhold Niebuhr in this discussion is that he brings a contemporary clarity on Christian realism that I consider as quintessential in any Christian engagement of real world problems and a search for genuine solutions.

My Christian ethical method is closely grounded in a communitarian value system⁴⁰ that I assert is at the heart of Christian worldview. It embodies stewardship and responsibility for neighbors and the greater community. But I also recognize the individual's need for freedom, innovation, and self expression (autonomy) as inalienable rights. This work is an attempt to present a Christian ethical response that applies to a wide range of global situations that affect the wellbeing of all peoples—the nations of the world and especially the fragile societies. Therefore most of the Christian scholars I've chosen have a lot in common—recognizing that ethical reflection on global matters is not a simple issue and that many times the conflicting claims over the forms of narrative that represents the greater good of the community can become conflicting ethical perspectives. Nevertheless, these thinkers drawn from both Roman Catholic and Protestant traditions—Hollenbach, the Papals' Encyclicals, John Wesley, Paul Tillich, and Reinhold Niebuhr, provide numerous insights into how ethics can clarify and help to resolve difficult issues especially as pertain to nation-building from a Christian perspective that reflects the *zeitgeist* of our time.

So why has the challenge of failed states and need for nation-building often been a neglected area of Christian ethical discussion? Many frames are helpful for thinking about the better practices that help in conflict-resolution and nation-building, but an ethical paradigm that obligates Christian ethical and theological thinking on nation-building shall remain an essential point of analysis. Firstly, any Christian ethical and

⁴⁰ Read Gad Barzilai. *Communities and Law: Politics and Cultures of Legal Identities*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 2003. Communitarianism is a political and social philosophy that emphasizes the importance of community in the functioning of political life, in the analysis and evaluation of political institutions, and in understanding human identity and well-being.

theological tasks that do not engage these pertinent and complex global issues and concerns for nation-building are either disengaged or inadequate like the ultra realist school that objectifies narrow self-interest as the primary lenses for conducting foreign policies or international relations. Secondly, a Christian ethical and theological contribution to nation-building has an explicit paradigm that also correlates with other multidisciplinary studies on nation-building.

Therefore, the understanding of the global common good is an important component of any serious analysis of the responsibilities of nation-building today. William Cavanaugh's work, *Killing for the Telephone Company: Why Nation-State is not the Keeper of the Common Good*, places the onus on the church and not the nation-state, to be carrier of the common good. This church must "constitute itself as an alternative social space...need[ing] at every opportunity to promote alternative economies and authorities..."⁴¹ Cavanaugh's assertion thus presents some of the core debates and controversies in this work.

This global common is about the basic moral values that transcend national, ethnic, religious, or other cultural boundaries. This is the issue Sissela Bok takes up in her book, *Common Values*.⁴² She begins by listing a number of problems that transcend these boundaries: problems of the environment; war and hostility; epidemics; overpopulation; poverty; hunger; natural as well as technological disasters. The fact that we recognize

⁴¹ William T. Cavanaugh. *Killing for the Telephone Company: Why Nation-State is not the Keeper of the Common Good*. Modern Theology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004, 256.

⁴² Sissela Bok. *Common Values*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995, 42-81.

these as common problems suggests that we share some basic values (e.g., health, safety, and the desire for at least minimal happiness).

In spite of these shared problems, we are caught in a stalemate of resolving a lot of these issues due to conflicting and competing views and interests that impede or delay genuine resolutions and global consensus for resolving the many protracted and deadly conflicts of our world. She lists ten ways we may seek a set of moral values. But for this work, I will briefly survey the last two that speak genuinely to the issue of the common good—that is, our moral values are held in common by virtually all human beings, such that they’ve had to be worked out by all human societies. Regarding these two, Bok makes four basic claims:

Firstly, there is a basic set of values that every viable society has to accept in order to survive collectively. This includes positive duties of mutual support, loyalty, and reciprocity; negative duties to refrain from harming others; and norms for basic procedures and standards for resolving issues of justice. Secondly, these values are necessary (although not sufficient) for human coexistence at every level—in one’s personal and working life, in one’s family, community, and nation, and even in international relations. Thirdly, these values can respect diversity while at the same time providing a general framework within which abuses can be criticized. Finally, these values can provide a common basis for cross-cultural discussions about how to deal with problems that have global dimensions. This requires our understanding of the common good.⁴³

⁴³ Ibid., 1-8. Bok argues that there are ten different ways in which we might express what we think we need and how they are expressed by various sets of moral values as: “1. Divinely ordained 2. Part of the natural order, 3. Eternally valid 4. Valid without exception, 5. Directly knowable by anyone who is rational, 6. Perceivable by a moral sense, 7. Independent of us, in the sense that they do not depend on us for their existence. 8. Objective rather than subjective, 9. Held in common by virtually all human beings, 10. Such that they’ve had to be worked out by all human societies.” Although religious and philosophical traditions have concentrated on 1-8, Bok suggests we should start with 9 and 10. Due to the inability of religious and philosophical traditions to reach consensus on 1-8, it seems unlikely, she says, that we will reach consensus on 1-8.

Clearly, Bok makes a compelling historical and ethical case in differentiating the current global tragedies from that of the past by insisting that the pace and magnitudes of current crises are rapid, global, trans-border, and the worst threat to all of life. Therefore, we must avoid at all cost holding on to absolute ideological positions and work towards a constructive dialogue based on our shared humanity that transcends national, ethnic, religious, culture, and status. Even in a minimalist way, we must collectively seek means to address injustice, poverty, war, disease, and environmental concerns.⁴⁴

For Cavanaugh, the state should be a *communitas communitatum*, which is “the true meaning of our word Commons; not the mass of common people, but the community of the communities.”⁴⁵ This community seeks the participation of all members to be joined together in the promotion of a common good that leads to the fulfillment of the general public good. “It’s [the common good] most basic meaning that the community and its institutions should serve the good of all its citizens and not just the restricted good of a particular ruler or class.”⁴⁶ The nation-state then presents itself as a way of reconciling the many into one, *e pluribus unum*, serving the common good. This notion of the common good is best illustrated in the preamble of the United States which states:

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings

⁴⁵ Cavanaugh, 17. Cavanaugh among others, views the work of Figgis who was a historian, political philosopher and monk. Figgis works focused on the relation to the history of ideas, and the concepts of pluralism within state formation.

⁴⁶ Bradley Lewis. “The Common Good in Classical Political Philosophy,” *Current Issues in Catholic Higher Education* 25, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 25-41.

of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.⁴⁷

This notion in the preamble is the recognition that the common good is directed to serving all rather than a specific interest group. Yet, it also understands the divergent views and other differences that exist in a nation, in which we must reconcile our individual rights with our responsibility for the whole community in acknowledging our common values.⁴⁸

In his work, *The Just War Ethic Protecting the Global Common Good*, J. Bryan Hehir traces the origin of the concept of the common good within the scope of secular and religious traditions.⁴⁹ He asserts that “the common good has referred primarily to the goal of each individual society to create a broad social fabric of spiritual, material, and temporal goods from which all would benefit.”⁵⁰ He further adds that this concept of the common good took on a global nature beyond national borders during the second half of the 20th century and credits Pope John XXIII for invoking this concept of the global common good in 1961. Hehir asserts:

⁴⁷ Michael Novak. *Free Persons and the Common Good*. Lanham: Madison Books, 1989, 44.

⁴⁸ It must be noted here that “common values” is not the same as values that an interest groups or individual communities may impose in restricting or excluding others. Rather, what we might call “common values” are those that create and maintain the conditions necessary for on-going dialogue and debate about what constitutes the common good in theory and practice. Such conditions include both basic rights to survival but extend also to conditions that enable people to benefit and participate in public discourse.

⁴⁹ J. Bryan Hehir. *The Just War Ethic Protecting the Global Common Good*. Pursuing the Global Common Good Principle and Practice in U.S. Foreign Policy. Center for American Progress, 2007, 16-17. Also see “Just War Theory in a post-cold War World” in *Journal of Religious Studies*, Fall 1992, 237-257. See L S Cahill, Theological Contexts of Just War Theory and Pacifism: A Response to J Bryan Hehir, in *Journal of Religious Studies*, Fall 1992, 260-262.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 17-18.

[The pope] recognized...the growing interdependence of the world in material terms required a moral vision that would connect the national common good to the international common good. Issues such as security, political economy, human rights, and global governance were related to national and international common interests. And all of these issues come to the forefront when exploring the role of the Just War Ethic in the pursuit of the global common good.⁵¹

If as Hehir insists that the global common good is rooted in the vision of a global human responsibility for all, then a global issues on security, economics, governance and social capitals are core assets to the common good. This means that there is a responsibility on part of the international community and the United States and its allies to pursue the common good even at the level of the use of armed intervention to curb violent regimes and human rights abuses around the world especially in places that are hotbeds for civil unrests and terrorism. What is the measurement of such moral justification of war of intervention?

Hehir claims that “the Just War Ethic makes morally legitimate and morally harmful methods of using force; its premises have been grounded in the concept of a single human community.”⁵² This view holds that even if there is a moral justification for war, there is a code of ethics based on preexisting moral bonds that must be respected by the intervening forces even during conflict. But war must be waged as last resort after exhausting all other available means of resolving the conflict. The history of just war has always been part of every culture. As a theory in Western civilization over the last

⁵¹ Ibid., 17.

⁵² Ibid., 18-19.

thousand years, the classic principles have evolved. We now have a consensus of religious and secular views of the use of such authority to engage in war.

Basically, the obvious question at this point is, what are the principles of just war theory and how do they work to limit the negative effects of war? The modern theory of just war comprises three distinct but related areas that work together to determine which types of war are justifiable (*Jus ad Bellum*), which acts of war are permissible (*Jus in Bello*), and finally how to re-establish peaceful coexistence once war is over (*Jus post Bellum*). The moral rules of war are expressed as positive rights that states possess.⁵³ So, for example, what we are witnessing more and more in our times, while the state has the right to defend itself and its citizens against attack from an aggressor—either as non state actors another state, the globalized world is now taking responsibility against regimes that perpetuate aggression on its own people—Libya, Liberia, Egypt, and now Syria are concrete examples of the emerging new world order.

This theory of Just War is further articulated by Michael Walzer in his attempt to distinguish between justifiable and unjustifiable uses of organized armed forces.⁵⁴ In a television interview titled *On Just War in the Gulf War*,⁵⁵ he describes the classic just war

⁵³ Walzer. *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, New York: Basics Book. 1977, 259-60.

⁵⁴ Walzer. *Arguing About War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004, 48-53.

⁵⁵ Walzer makes the claims that the “troubles that we [USA] have had in Iraq after 2003 come from the loss of confidence of trust that we produced by our behavior in 1991.” For him trust plays an important role in building confidence. When such mutual trust is injured it always becomes suspicious when the same person or country attempts to rebuild that trust. I find the issue of “mistrust” quite remarkable. Madam Clinton in her role as Secretary of States and on her visit to Pakistan on October 27-29, 2009 at the heightened tension of the Taliban offensive in both Afghanistan and Pakistan remarked that there is a “trust deficit,” <http://bigthink.com/michaelwalzer/michael-walzer-on-just-war-in-the-gulf-war> (accessed 07.09.10).

theory that calls on the intervention forces to act in defeating or repealing an aggression.

Thus in the Gulf War of 1991, he contends:

The USA and its coalition acted justifiably. However, the coalition failed its mission when it supported a rebellion or insurgency in Iraq and later failed to adequately support the uprising. The end result was Saddam's brutal defeat of the rebellion by slaughtering a portion of the Iraqi population that was tied to the opposition.⁵⁶

Walzer also rejects pacifism, a non-violent alternative to any forms of aggression.

This theory of non-violence argues that its moral principle is pragmatic and effective in confronting violent actions. There are wide spectrums on pacifism—from those who totally opposed any forms of violent actions to those who support some form of physical violence for emergency defense of self or others. Some may accept symbolic forms of violence targeting specific power structures such as the military or big corporations. However, part of the pacifist belief system is taking responsibility for one's actions by submitting to arrest and using a trial to publicize opposition to war and other forms of violence. Martin Luther King, the late American civil rights leader and Mahatma Gandhi, the late Indian leader and lawyer were avid devotees of absolute pacifism.

However, Walzer counters the pacifists by arguing on two fundamental grounds:

The moral causes for war *jus ad bellum* and the moral means of war *jus in bello*. This ethical concept one can asserts “is not a tightly designed theory but a tradition of moral analysis that contains multiple theories of how it should be argued.”⁵⁷ But they serve to

⁵⁶ Ibid., 3. *On Just War in the Gulf War*. May 30, 2010. Also see Walzer, Michael. *Arguing About War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. Also see *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. New York: Basic Books, 1977.

⁵⁷ J. Bryan Hehir. *The Just War Ethic Protecting the Global Common Good. Pursuing the Global Common Good: Principle and Practice in U.S. Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC: Center for American

give us a working format in dealing with the ever changing nature of human conflicts and our role and responsibility of the interventionist(s).⁵⁸

The doctrine of the common good teaches that the individual person is a member of a larger body. Just as the goal or end of each individual member of a community is the common good of that larger community, so also the goal or end of each organ and muscle in our body is the common good of the overall person. We are all ordered by God to the same good. Moreover, we attain this good in life with others and not by ourselves. This should not be surprising for as Aristotle observed, even before Aquinas, humans are by nature social animals. Therefore, our happiness or the perfection of our natures will include this social dimension. For example, parents and children, as a microcosm of society, naturally have a sense that their individual good is the good of the family.

Should Christians then privatize their faith as a spiritual matter and disengage from national or global affairs? Should we advocate strict national sovereignty and avoid any global social and political responsibility? The global common good is also articulated by the Center for American Progress. In its 2007 publication, *Pursuing the Global Common Good*, the Center for American Progress argues that “U.S. foreign policy must go beyond preconceived notions of national self-interest and security by including our

Progress, 2007, 20-21. Hehir posits that this “ethic is not a tightly designed theory but a tradition of moral analysis that contains multiple theories of how it should be argued. Acknowledging the multiple spectrums of this concept, Hehir believes that it is possible to recognize the essential elements that urge us to engage the “political-strategic realities” that confront us.

⁵⁸ Nicolas Fotion. *War and Ethics: A New Just War Theory*, ed. James Garvey and Jeremy Stangroom, Think Now. New York: Continuum, 2007, 23.

ethical obligations to the global community.”⁵⁹ America must see its responsibility beyond its own self-interest because its self-interest is interwoven with its moral responsibility to do the good around the world.

Moreover, while other disciplines have succinctly argued for the concept of nation-building as the most effective framework for addressing these global crises, Christian ethics or theology has largely been uncoordinated in engaging the whole area of international peacemaking and nation-building. Instead, what it has offered are universal scattered themes on love, hope, peace, justice, etc., on the one hand, but accepting the status quo, where evil, suffering, injustice and poverty are part of God’s plan—while we await the miraculous intervention of the *Eschaton*—God. The form of eschatological concept describes here in, holds that bliss is out there in the future and that God will bring an end to these global socio-political ills, but presumably in the after-life rather than in this real and visible world. However, we must recognize other diverse models of eschatology that are much more realistic and practical. One of such is well espoused by St. Augustine and Reinhold Niebuhr. This view of the “already but not yet” form of eschatology holds that the Reign of God is already in breaking into history but that it is not yet complete.⁶⁰ However, we must acknowledge that Christian theologians and

⁵⁹ Salley Steenland, Michael Fuchs, et al. *Pursuing the Global Common Good Principle and Practice in U.S. Foreign Policy*, 20. Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2007, 20-29ff, <http://www.americanprogress.org/projects/commongood> (accessed 05.08.11).

⁶⁰ St. Augustine. *City of God*, 20.7, 1; see also G. Folliet, “La typologie du *sabbat* chez Saint Augustin. Son interpretation millénariste entre 386 et 400,” *REAug* 2 (1956): 371-90. As a dominant and prevailing view in his time, St. Augustine was not only premillennialist in his early eschatology, but also a dispensationalist. But three prevailing factors converged in northern Africa which influenced Augustine to take a new approach to the Millennium. The first was his revulsion over the bacchanal celebrations of the Donatists, detested by The Roman Catholics, who were the newcomers in North Africa, the “Biblical heartland of the Mediterranean world, during the fourth century. The Donatist Church separated from

ethicists have greatly engaged the key themes and incidents of war and peace and for that matter, there is a large corpus of work on the subject of war and peace. Therefore, there are those Christians who would argue as pacifists against the proponents of the just war tradition that favor the use of force in certain cases of humanitarian intervention. We've seen images of protests since the Vietnam War, of Christians and ordinary citizens in America and other parts of the world, marching for or against different wars, such as the Persian Gulf wars, eliciting strong sentimental feelings on all sides.

Nevertheless, many ordinary Christians and their pastoral leaders—the bishops, theologians, ethicists, and pastors are often times jittery or reluctant to deal with the issues of failed states or support for military humanitarian intervention. At worst they seem to find it difficult to make the case for a wholistic nation-building agenda in which a long and strategic plan of action—in which blood, financial resources, and technological expertise are at the crux of the matter. Probably, the messiness, complexities, and newness of the issues of failed state and nation-building seem so overwhelming.

Rome over the issue of rebaptism of the *traditores*, by refusing to succumb to the pressure from Diocletian to burn their holy books. Also see Reinhold Niebuhr. *The Nature and Destiny of Man*. Like Augustine, Niebuhr averred that the full completion of human's life rests upon a divine action beyond history. In his word, this "interim is characterized by positive corruptions, as well as by partial realizations and approximations of the meaning' of life (p. 23). For Niebuhr, eschatological symbol are important in understanding the role of Christ in history in offering hope through God's grace and countering meaninglessness. However, we must find a delicate balance. Niebuhr said that these eschatological symbols are to be taken seriously but not literally. He said this is so because these symbols have a double character. They are meaningful for history, but they transcend history as spirit transcends nature. They cannot be reduced to a point in history. However, like a double edge sword, Niebuhr contended that history is meaningful but depends upon God for its fulfillment. Conclusively, Augustine and Reinhold Niebuhr both felt that the final fulfillment of the *eschaton* was a long ways off so that we needed to deal with the life and challenges we have in the here and now and hope for reformists like Ghandi, Martin Luther King, Mandela, Daisy Bates, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the ordinary nationals of the Arab Reawakening, Sister Shirley Koelmer and her fellow martyred nuns in Liberia, who sought to gradually improve our communal wellbeing here below.

Therefore, most Christians and their leaders retreat into their own comfort zones and act out their Christian love and virtues by participating in soup kitchen projects, taking a mission trip in Africa, Latin America, or other parts of the world—building schools, clinics, bore holes or wells, providing food, and other basic essentials to the poor and needy. These are all good efforts but they fail to engage with the massive structural violence caused by failed-state conditions.

While we acknowledge such altruistic endeavors, there is a need to have a more robust and coordinated denominational efforts to educate about the need for nation-building as a Christian goal of the in-breaking and building God’ kingdom on earth. In this schema, we recognize the different Christian ethical customary discussions or conversations—ranging from pacifism, just war theory, social justice and developmental concerns. For example, pacifism with a wide range of views, advocates the peaceful resolution of conflicts and non violence by the demolition of military institution by means of physical violence to obtain political, economic or social goals, the obliteration of force except in cases where it is absolutely necessary to advance the cause of peace, and opposition to violence under any circumstance, even defense of self and others.⁶¹

⁶¹ Peter Brock. *Varieties of Pacifism: A Survey from Antiquity to the Outset of the Twentieth Century*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1999. In Brock’s historical analysis, he traces the pacifist movement to Jesus who never discuss the issue of war. He situates this belief from the Sermon on the Mount in which Jesus urges nonviolence against evil and love of enemies. Additionally, evidence points to the early Christians being noncombatants with the early church leaders unequivocally denouncing wars and killing as intrinsically evil. It was only the year 313 that Christian anti-militarism ended—with Constantine at the helm of the world and a converted Christian. This meant Christianity now took a privileged position—ending Christian persecution, which some pacifists concluded marked the fall of Christianity. Also see John Howard Yoder *Nevertheless: The Varieties and Shortcomings of Religious Pacifism*. Scottsdale, PA: Herald Press, 1992. In this work, Yoder attempts to descriptively distinguish between the many varieties and nuances of pacifism. The term “pacifism” has been overused and deflated by its popular and vague usage that some guide to discriminate between the many kinds is needed. Yoder identifies seventeen different strands of pacifist thinking and carefully distinguish the various positions with a close

As good as the pacifist's intentions are, there seems to be a lack of realism especially in a world where evil and violence are part of the human condition. This is the point that Samantha Power vividly illustrates in her great book covering Rwanda, The Balkans and America's response to the UN and NATO's responses to these crises. She thus asserts that "The United States has never in its history intervened to stop genocide and had in fact rarely even made a point of condemning it as it occurred."⁶² Imagine a world where the Bin Laden's, the Ghadaffi's, Bashar Al-Assad, the Mugabe's, the Charles Taylor's and so-called leaders of powerful Western and Eastern nations have directly and indirectly wrecked havoc on ordinary citizens, while the pacifists advocated a non-confrontational approach to dealing with these crises. Such a stance in my view, simply illustrates how good men and women can be deeply idealistic, inattentive and silent in the midst of violence against the innocent.

Just war theory is a realistic assessment that conflict is the revolving reason opposing factions and countries usually fight wars. Sadly, the inability to resolve these conflicts is mainly due to the bellicosity and selfish political posturing of entrenched and intransigent leaders. According to Reinhold Niebuhr, in his seminal work *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, conflict is inevitable, and in this conflict power must be challenged by

and tolerant analysis. He doesn't pass judgments about the varieties. However, he seems to suggest that all are preferable to a militarist position. The result is an excellent map of the manifold understandings that pass under the rubric of religious pacifism.

⁶² Samantha Power. *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: HarperCollins, 2003, xv. In this book, Power draws on numerous examples of twentieth century genocide by examining how the United States reacted to these situations. Power discusses the genocides that occurred in Turkey, Germany, Cambodia, Iraq, Bosnia, Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Kosovo. She further discusses the development of international laws against genocide and the dedication of activists, such as Lemkin, Proxmire and others, who pushed for the United States to ratify the Genocide Convention which would have compelled them to intervene when genocides occurred.

power.⁶³ War then is the last resort because of the unpredictable, unexpected, unintended, and unavoidable horrors that it regularly brings.

While a secular view of war is pertinent, religious debates are often pivotal to conflict, and therefore the religious view of war cannot be denied. With conflicting views of the necessity of war, the concept of just war cannot be ignored. Just war is an argument that war, under certain moral conditions, is not only acceptable, but also morally necessary. These moral conditions can be of different values, but may include minimal death and suffering, recognition of human dignity and rights, and a true cause to the start of the war, such as one country declaring war to stop genocide.

The just war tradition of moral reasoning has been deeply shaped by many centuries of Christian reflection and discussion. A just war acts toward the goal of the common good. With this is a call to solidarity, because just war may come at a cost for a certain country, with no visible benefits other than to serve others. While war does cause

⁶³ Reinhold Niebuhr. *Moral Man and Immoral Society*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932, 257-259. Niebuhr argues that a realistic analysis of the problems of human society reveals a constant and seemingly irreconcilable conflict between the needs of society and the imperatives of a sensitive conscience. This conflict, which could be most briefly defined as the conflict between ethics and politics, is made inevitable by the double focus of the moral life. One focus is in the inner life of the individual, and the other in the necessities of our social life. From the perspective of society the highest moral ideal is justice. From the perspective of the individual the highest ideal is unselfishness. Therefore, society must strive for justice, even if it is forced to use means, such as self-assertion, resistance, coercion, and perhaps resentment, which cannot gain the moral sanction of the most sensitive and moral spirit. The individual must strive to realize his life by losing and finding himself in something greater than himself. Political morality, in other words, is in the most uncompromising antithesis to religious morality. Niebuhr also dissected the problem with pacifism, where he conjectures, that pacifism attempts to live in history without sinning. He also saw violence as part of the class struggle usually undertaken by the underprivileged classes. He fully recognized the evil of war, but judged it less evil than acquiescence to Nazi tyranny. He became an avid polemist against wartime appeasement, and staunch supporters of the refugees' right and those fleeing Hitler's Europe. Also read Reinhold Niebuhr. *The Contribution of Religion to Social Work*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1932, 49. In this book he argued that religion created a conscience which is quick to understand social need, that religious philanthropy gives charitably but without raising ultimate questions about the causes of social maladjustment, that religion unifies individuals, stabilizes societies, creates social imagination and sanctifies social life; but it also perpetuates ancient evils, increases social inertia, creates illusions and preserves superstitions.

death, a Christian ethical response to war is not to simply avoid war. War is sometimes an ugly truth that, according to the Just War view, is morally required.

The Christian ethical response to war is that war should be avoided whenever possible, but that if war must be fought, it should be just. Avoiding war whenever possible is obviously ethical, as if conflict can be resolved peacefully it is best for the common good. However, defining the implication of just and unjustness on the Christian ethical view of war is not as straightforward. Justness does not only include an effective and beneficial end to the cause of the war. The basis of war or *jus ad bellum* must be reconciled with the idea of the justness of the fighting of the war itself. In such cases, like Libya or Syria today, the greater good is served by reining in mass murderers and dictators who dehumanized their people and thereby posing grave humanitarian crises that spawn across economics, political, social, and religious and moral boundaries. For Christians to sit aside and justify a non-intervention stance on a failed state is to accept a world of powerlessness and anarchy rather than embracing a Niebuhrean realism—where evil is real and must be confronted in order to approximate justice on earth.⁶⁴

On this basis of realism, where failed states have affected the global common good, creating some of the most unimaginable evils and deplorable conditions, the Christian ought to be the champion of justice, love, and hope. Christian realism requires the use of reason, experience, tradition, and Scripture to help us navigate the complexities

⁶⁴ Read Reinhold Niebuhr. *Love and Justice*. Selections from the shorter writings of Reinhold Niebuhr. Louisville: John Knox Press, 1957, 161-166. Also see Samantha Power. *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books, 2002, 479.

and ambiguous human conditions. To be inattentive to the problems of failed states and international issues is to be as guilty as the perpetrators of these evils acts.

Our task then is not to wait for the *eschaton*, but to acknowledge and work in the here and now—in the breaking of the Kingdom of God, where we are active agents of change, affecting the general wellbeing of all people. On this notion, we must understand history to gaze at the ethical or lack thereof, of how civilization and society, have failed the vulnerable population through negligence, leading to wars, famines, genocides, and other forms of neglects. In the next chapter, we will analyze the role of international neglects and its global implications.

CHAPTER TWO

THE TRAGEDY OF INTERNATIONAL NEGLIGENCE

A Historical Analysis of International Negligence and Failed Interventions

History has been littered with the expansion of city-states and empires via war and the subjugation of surrounding peoples. The ancient empire of Persia, the conquests of Alexander, the wars that pushed the borders of the Roman Empire—all these forced many peoples to pay homage and taxes to the central imperial power. War, conquest and domination have ancient roots. But modern global history has been powerfully shaped by the emergence of European dominance and European colonial outreach that some say began in earnest in the period of the European seafaring exploration of the world's oceans and the European discovery of the riches of the New World of the Americas.¹

This historical fact is further illustrated by numerous scholars. One of such is Naill Ferguson whose magnificent narrative of the British Empire encapsulates the dominance of this European power.² Paul Kennedy also expands on this notion by asserting that the British Empire as we know it was the largest expansion of global dominance and power to date.³

¹ Jared Diamond. *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999, 414-415.

² Naill Ferguson. *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power*. New York: Basic Books, 2003, 12-26 ff.

³ Paul Kennedy. *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*. New York: Vintage Books, 1987, 535. Herein, Kennedy makes the case that European did overreach in imperial colonial expansion especially

What we have today in terms of technology, communications, and governance, including the many global conflicts, is the by-product of British global hegemony.⁴ On this basis, I assert that since the beginning of the twelfth century, Europeans gradually became more aware of the outside world. The Crusades and the great Mongol Empire were etched on the minds of Europeans. The elites of European societies, were fascinated by imports, especially spices and other commodities coming from India and Southeast Asia to the Middle East by Arab vessels, and then carried to Europe by traders from Italian city-states. Sadly, these powers of the Far East, like the Mongols and many great African and South American Empires, in spite of their enormous wealth and natural resources, failed to improve on naval technology which undermined their ability for sustainable global trade, expansion, and dominance.⁵ On the contrary, the Europeans launched a more concerted and robust technological campaign for global expansion from the late thirteenth century, which would forever, reshape the world as we know it today.⁶ Let us begin with 1492 as an important era in this narrative because of the emotions, distortion and myth that often get entangled with the facts of history.

Spain into South America. Also see Kennedy's *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Vintage Books, 1994, where he argues that part of the impetus of European colonial outreach was due to the need to feed a huge population explosion in Western Europe brought on by new agricultural power and industrial advances.

⁴ Naill Ferguson. *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World order and the Lessons for Global Power*. New York: Basic Books, 2002.

⁵ Bernd Hamm and Charles Russell Smandych. *Cultural Imperialism: Essays on the Political Economy of Cultural Domination*. Reference, Information and Interdisciplinary Subjects Series. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005.

⁶ Ian Morris. *Why the West Rules--for Now: The Patterns of History, and What They Reveal About the Future*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2010.

Global Imperialism and Colonialism (1492-1960s)

1492 and the Columbus Odyssey conjure lots of responses and serve as a flashpoint for controversy, drawing anger or admiration from different sides of the debate. While many consider this period as the beginning of cultural imperialism and colonialism, I argue that while colonialism is a key modern thing, it is basically as old as the Persian and Roman Empires. It was just done differently.⁷ Basically, it is about subjugation or oppression or dominance—as seen through the Persian, Mayan, Mali, British, Soviet or American Empires.

However, to understand the modern historical tragedy of international negligence and of failed international interventions, one must be cognizant of the history and brutal ideology of imperialism and colonialism.⁸ Colonialism may be defined as the extension of a nation's sovereignty over territory beyond its borders by the establishment of either settler colonies or administrative dependencies in which indigenous populations are directly ruled or displaced.⁹ Colonizing nations generally dominate the resources, labor, and markets of the colonial territory, and also, often, seek to impose socio-cultural,

⁷ Shiraz Dossa. "Slicing Up Development: Colonialism, Political Theory, and Ethics." *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 5 (2007): 887-899. Also see Mary Kaldor. *New and Old Wars*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006.

⁸ Kalevi J. Holsti. "Political Causes of Humanitarian Emergencies," in E. Wayne Nafziger et al., *War, Hunger, and Displacement* (note 9), p. 239. See also Donald M. Snow, *Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996; Herfried Munkler, *The New Wars*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004; Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006. See also C. Monga. *Anthropology of Anger: Civil Society and Democracy in Africa*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996.

⁹ Margaret Kohn and Daniel O'Neill. *A Tale of Two Indias: Burke and Mill on Racism and Slavery in the West Indies*. *Political Theory* 34 (2006): 192-228. Also "See also Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* for a helpful analysis of the rise of the modern nation state as it is intertwined with the European colonial outreach into North and South America."

religious and linguistic structures on the conquered population.¹⁰ The term colonialism may also be used to refer to a set of beliefs used to legitimize or promote this system. Colonialism was often based on the ethnocentric belief that the morals and values of the colonizer were superior to those of the colonized. Some observers link such beliefs to racism and pseudo-scientific theories dating to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the Western world, this led to a form of proto-social Darwinism¹¹ that placed Caucasian at the top of the different races of humanity and thus naturally in charge of dominating non-European indigenous populations.¹²

¹⁰ Matthew Lange, James Mahoney and Matthias vom Hau. *Colonialism and Development: A Comparative Analysis of Spanish and British Colonies*. Chicago: University of Chicago. AJS 111: 5 (March 2006): 1412–62. Debate about the perceived positive and negative aspects of colonialism has occurred for centuries, amongst both colonizer and colonized, and continues to the present day. Despite all the negative experiences of colonialism, communication and transportation infrastructures built during colonial times have brought more and more people into contact with each other. More and more people understand themselves as citizens of the world and realize that such challenges as the ecological crises, eradicating poverty, combating disease can only be met by global cooperation among the nations. The expansion of universal human rights and the view that shared values permeate the cultures and faiths of the world, despite their diversity and variety and some differences too, would be inconceivable without the colonial heritage and legacy.

¹¹ Herbert Spencer. *The Social Organism* originally published in *The Westminster Review*. Reprinted in *Spencer Essays: Scientific, Political and Speculative*. London, 1892. Social Darwinism is a belief, popular in the late Victorian era in England, America, and elsewhere, which states that the strongest or fittest should survive and flourish in society, while the weak and unfit should be allowed to die. The theory was chiefly expounded by Herbert Spencer, whose ethical philosophies always held an elitist view and received a boost from the application of Darwinian ideas such as adaptation and natural selection as used to justify numerous exploits which we classify as of dubious moral value today. Colonialism was seen as natural and inevitable, and given justification through Social Darwinian ethics - people saw natives as being weaker and more unfit to survive, and therefore felt justified in seizing land and resources.

¹² Bartolomé de Las Casas. *Apologetic History of the Indies*. 1550. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. An ensued argument developed that if the colonial power departed, ancient animosities and tribal rivalry would create a blood-bath; thus only colonial rule could keep the peace. Others would argue that the divide and rule policy pursued by many colonial powers either exacerbated existing rivalries or encouraged and even manufactured division that did not exist before. In post-colonial contexts, discussion of conflict, when this occurs, is often reduced to the concept that this it is always driven by inter-tribal hostility. One of the pioneer critics of European colonialism was Bartolomé de Las Casas, who advocated that the indigenous population of the Americas were people of values and dignity and condemned their conqueror for greed and cruelty. On the other hand, Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda expressed the opposite view; the Spanish were in every respect superior to the natives, who lacked any

On the other hand, John Henrik Clarke asserts that the voyages of Christopher Columbus marked the starting point of modern world capitalism and the beginning of Europe's colonial domination of the world.¹³ Columbus set in motion a historical domino effect that influenced the course of history and powerfully shapes it down to our present day. During this period, Europe witnessed the renewal of nationalism as well as the political transformation from feudalism into nation states through the centralization of power by the monarchs.

Nonetheless, Columbus's voyages were not the key catalyst but rather the result of the rise of the power of first Spain and Portugal and then the race joined in by England to colonize the new world (Americas) and to exploit the gold and silver resources. Previously in the pre-modern states of Europe, most people saw themselves as tribal societies and indigenous peoples and sometimes city-states and empires. However, most of those societies experienced conditions of failure in governmental apparatuses, ecological declines, chaos and starvation, as well articulated by Jared Diamond, Lester Brown and other scholars.

Clearly, this was a period that Europe took a big leap in dealing with its overpopulation and economic concerns. In Europe there was a gradual process of a coalescing of principalities and city-states in feudal structures and over 2-3 centuries

trace of humanity and needed to be governed in the same way that children need to be parented. In fact, drawing on Aristotle he said that such people should be enslaved because slavery suited their natural state. See Marvin Lunenfeld. *1492 Discovery, Invasion, Encounter: Sources and Interpretations*. Sources in Modern History Series. Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1991, 218.

¹³ John Henry Clarke was an African American scholar, writer, historian, professor, and a founding member of the creation of Africana studies and professional institutions in academia starting in the late 1960s. His works include numerous articles and books on the legacy of people of African descents.

these coalesced into larger geographic entities, the slow emergence of European nation-states. Spain for example only saw a unification of its peninsula in 1492 when the last of the Muslim city-states, Granada, was taken and the Muslims and Jews were given the choice to convert or leave. Italy was a bunch of city-states until the late 19th century when Garibaldi finally unified it into what we today know as Italy. German unification also was late. Great Britain took wars to consolidate Wales, Scotland [See movie Braveheart and Ireland]. Even now the consolidation has stresses in that Scotland has its own parliament and some want to secede.

Indeed this may well be one of the key power advantages that the colonizing European powers brought that allowed them to colonize the American Indigenous peoples. For example, Cortez with about 300 Spaniards defeated the Aztec Empire by in good part enlisting the hostility of many tribes who hated the Aztecs. So the Aztec and Inca Empires were pretty strong, but the Europeans were able to exploit some of the anger that locals had against these empires. Further, European diseases spread rapidly killing off large numbers of Indigenous Americans—thus weakening their ability to resist the Europeans. With new territories in the Americas, the Europeans sought means to harness the natural resources, enslaving the natives and later Africans as suggested by

Bishop Las Casas and approved by Charles V in 1517.¹⁴ Yet, the Church in its authority condemned slavery but struggled with the cultural complexities of the practice.¹⁵

Africans and Other Subjugated Peoples

The African slave trade played an important role in the stabilization of Europe's economy, its transition to capitalism, the development of the nation state, and the establishment of their imperial empires.¹⁶ The opening of the Atlantic led to the development of Europe's commercial empire and industrial revolution. The continuing demand for African slaves' labor arose from the development of plantation agriculture, the long-term rise in prices and consumption of sugar, and the demand for miners. Not only did Africans represent skilled laborers, but they were also experts in tropical agriculture. Consequently, they were well suited for plantation agriculture. The high immunity of Africans to malaria and yellow fever compared with Europeans and the indigenous peoples made them more suitable for tropical labor. While white and red labor

¹⁴ Hugh Thomas. *The Slave Trade: the story of the Atlantic slave trade, 1440–1870*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. We must add for historical accuracy vis-à-vis long held biases that Columbus' voyages were misadventures and opportunities. He was in search of the Indian Sub-Continent and not the Americas—that is while he mistakenly called the native populations Indians. In addition, he ought not to be credited for discovering the Americas when people already inhabited it.

¹⁵ John T. Noonan, Jr. *A Church That Can and Cannot Change. The Development of Catholic Moral Teaching*. Fort Wayne: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005. The history of slavery is quite complex and controversial. Other people further claim that the Church changed its teaching on slavery as it has on other issues too. Judge Noonan and I will be collaborating in the future to do a TV documentary on a book he wrote called *The Antelope*, the story of African slaves brought to the USA and contested before the United States Supreme Court between Portugal, Spain, and some Americans. Also a book, entitled, *The Popes and Slavery* written by Fr. Joel S. Panzer (Alba House, 1996), shows that the Popes did condemn racial slavery as early as 1435. Throughout history, the Church found itself among cultures practicing slavery and had to deal with it. An early example is St. Paul's Epistle to Philemon. St. Paul appears to tolerate slavery, but he also warned slave masters that they too have a Master in Heaven who would judge them (Col. 4:1). Due to its socio-political weaknesses in many parts of the world, the Church could not stop every evil practice. However, political weakness does not mean approval.

¹⁶ John Henrik Clarke. *Christopher Columbus and the Afrikan Holocaust: Slavery and the Rise of European Capitalism*. E-World Inc, 2000, 2-4. Also see Jürgen Osterhammel, *Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*. Princeton: M. Wiener, 1997.

was used initially, Africans were the final solution to the acute labor problem in the New World.¹⁷

The economic systems, which dominated the African slave trade, reflected the transitions in Europe's economic systems. Initially, mercantilist views characterized the conduct of the slave trade. The primary purpose of mercantilism, an economic system, which developed during the transition of Europe from feudalism to nation-states, was to unify and increase the power and monetary wealth of a nation through strict government regulation of the national economy.¹⁸ Therefore, the organization of the trade in the 16th century tended to be entrusted to a company, which was given the sole right by a particular nation to trade slaves and to erect and maintain forts. However, these monopolistic companies had two major opponents, the planter in the colonies, who complained of insufficient quantity and poor quality of high priced slaves, and the merchants at home.¹⁹

¹⁷ Helen Ellerbe. *The Dark Side of Christian History*. New York: Morning Star Books, 1995. Also see Jefferson Davis' speech: "[Slavery] was established by decree of Almighty God...it is sanctioned in the Bible, in both Testaments, from Genesis to Revelation...it has existed in all ages, has been found among the people of the highest civilization, and in nations of the highest proficiency in the arts." Jefferson Davis, President, Confederate States of America (Jefferson Davis, "Inaugural Address as Provisional President of the Confederacy," Montgomery, AL, 1861-FEB-18, Confederate States of America, Congressional Journal, 1:64-66.) Also see Thomas Hugh. *The Slave Trade: the story of the Atlantic slave trade, 1440-1870*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997.

¹⁸ See Peter Groenewegen. *A Concise History of Economic Thought: From Mercantilism to Monetarism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. The author describes mercantilism as a theory and system of political economy that dominated Europe and later Japan after the decline of feudalism, based on national policies of accumulating bullion, establishing colonies and a merchant marine, and developing industry and mining to attain a favorable balance of trade.

¹⁹ Tatah Mentan. *Africa: The State in Africa: An Analysis of Impacts of Historical Trajectories of Global Capitalist Expansion and Domination in the Continent*. Yaoundé: Langa Publishing and Researching Common Initiative Group and Michigan State University Press, 2010, 127-129.

One can argue that the failure of monopolies and the competitive spirit of European nations to deliver enough slaves led to free trade in the 18th century. While it is easy to analyze the various economic systems utilized in the African slave trade, it is far more difficult to determine a precise estimate of how profitable the trade was. The slave trade was one of the most important business enterprises of the 17th century. The nation states of Europe stabilized themselves and developed their economy mainly at the expense of African people. There are several reasons why the European nations competed with each other to gain colonies in Africa. They all wanted to gain power and prestige. The more territory that they were able to control in Africa the more powerful and influential they thought they could become.²⁰

Africa was tremendously rich in natural resources, which could be brought to Europe and turned into manufactured goods. Europeans also needed markets for their manufactured goods. These goods could be sold in Africa and the rest of the world for large profits.²¹ This new sense of wealth, prestige, and power gave rise to the concept of modern nation-building, that is, the rise of the modern nation-state. However, we must

²⁰ Benedikt Stuchtey. *Colonialism and Imperialism, 1450-1950*, European History Online, Mainz: Institute of European History, 2011. (accessed August 12, 2011). Also see Tatah Mentan. *Africa: The State in Africa: An Analysis of Impacts of Historical Trajectories of Global Capitalist Expansion and Domination in the Continent*. Yaoundé: Langaa Publishing and Researching Common Initiative Group and Michigan State University Press, 2010.

²¹ The Berlin Conference (1884-1885): Due to intense rivalries among Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, and Portugal for additional African territory, and the ill-defined boundaries of their various holdings, a conference was arranged in Berlin. Here the powers of Europe, together with the United States, defined their spheres of influence and laid down rules for future occupation on the coasts of Africa and for navigation of the Zaire (DRC) and Niger rivers. No African states were invited to the Berlin conference, and none signed these agreements. Whenever possible, Africans resisted decisions made in Europe, but revolts in Algeria, in the western Sudan, in Dahomey, by the Matabele (Ndebele) and Shona (present day Zimbabwe), in Ashantiland (modern Ghana), in Sierra Leone, and in the Fulani Hausa states were eventually defeated.

point out that the theoretical framework for the modern nation-state was still in its evolutionary stage and therefore lacks a coherent philosophical grounding. This view is further espoused by Benedict Anderson, who asserts that theoretical approaches had largely ignored nationalism, merely accepting it as the way things are. He writes,

Nation, nationality, nationalism – all have proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone analyze. In contrast to the immense influence that nationalism has exerted on the modern world, plausible theory about it is conspicuously meager.²²

If the concept of nation-state is an emerging phenomenon, a breakaway from the primordial village, feudal systems, empires or monarchies of the past, we must then see the nation-state as vital in the affairs of global order. It's where the global market place(s) and international relations are conducted between the nations. It is where people within sovereign borders must forge new identities beyond tribal, racial, or religious lines. It is as Benedict Anderson asserts an imagined community. "In fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined...distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined."²³ In essence, this imagined community, the welding of tribes, into a larger political unit can historically be traced to revolution of the printing press when:

The coalition between Protestantism and Print-capitalism exploiting cheap popular editions, quality created large scale reading public...who typically knew little or no Latin-and simultaneously mobilized them for politico-religious purposes.²⁴

²² Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso Book, 2006, 3.

²³ Ibid., 6.

²⁴ Ibid., 40.

So nation-building is the process in which diverse tribes are integrated into a coherent larger political and geographic unit to which they identify and begin to show allegiance and concern—as for example, Americans are made up of many tribal and ethnic traditions and communities. Therefore, the nation-state of the USA takes these diverse peoples and socially constructs them via customs, holidays, baseball and sports, into a people. The concept of “social construction of reality” is best described by Peter Berger who conceives this socio-political reality as intrinsic in our search to govern our activities as we externalize ourselves in order to create a sense of meaning.

In essence, such social reality is evolutionary in scope shapes our ability to form distinct cultures, traditions, social mores, and other forms of expressions. Berger writes,

Social order is a human product, or, more precisely, an ongoing human production. It is produced by man in the course of his ongoing externalization. Social order exists only as a product of human activity. Both in its genesis (social order is the result of past human activity) and its existence at any instant of time (social order exists only and insofar as human activity continues to produce it) it is a human product.²⁵

This constructed reality of nation-states often has a religious overtone—that is, a “civil religion,” in which we recognize certain historical figures, holidays, symbols, and forms of ritualization of the nation and its people in observance of customs and traditions imbedded in the society. This idea of the sacredness often bestowed onto nation-states is also articulated by Ninian Smart, who describes nationalism as a set of ideas, rituals, and practices that endow and unite a nation or region.²⁶ For example, Smart illustrates how

²⁵ Peter Berger. *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. Garden City: Doubleday, 1966, 52.

²⁶ Ninian Smart. *Dimensions of the Sacred. An Anatomy of World's Beliefs*. San Francisco: University of California Press, 1996, 230, 248.

colonial experience helped galvanized the colonized people into a sense of shared identity that transcended ethnicity and languages. He asserts,

Partly because the colonial experience brought them [colonized] into a more intense self-awareness, certain large regions-previously disparate-are now considered as cultural networks...Black Africa was an extensive region before the advent of European powers and of Arab and Western slavers...The colonial boundaries, though short lived, lasted long enough to stay in place...create[d] new predominantly artificial nationalisms...punctuated here and there by civil wars between ethnic groups...Nevertheless, the bond of Pan-Africanism remained important.²⁷

In spite of the prospects of the imagined community and its social construction of reality, we experienced the exploitation of the nationalism through leaders like Hitler, Mao, Stalin, the Apartheid regimes in South Africa, and others. In their extremism, they implored racism, tribalism, and other forms of ontic evils like genocide. However, Anderson does not think the problem originated from nationalism but rather from racism:

The fact of the matter is that nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations, transmitted from the origins of time through an endless sequence of loathsome copulations: outside history.²⁸

Sadly, in the last century, the rise of nation-states and their impending complexities created new crises, imploding into two major wars and their domino effects. This created a global climate of changed condition, leading to the once enslaved and colonized people to gain independence and forged a new complex, conflicting, and evolving paths in their quest towards poor nation-building and eventually, failed-states.

²⁷ Ibid., 248.

²⁸ Benedict Anderson, 149. Also read Robert Bellah. *Robert Bellah Reader*. Raleigh: Duke University Press, 2006. He discusses numerous issues on the notion of civil religion that serves to tie emotionally the people of a nation together.

The World Wars, Independence and the Cold War

World War I²⁹ and World War II³⁰ had a huge impact on the way people viewed the world. Mainly, the end of World War II led to the draft of the Atlantic Charter,³¹ a pro Churchill and Roosevelt vision of a new post World War II peace and security order. This was followed by the birth of the 20th Century independent movement—creating new nations unprecedented in world history. Sadly, the high hopes and the euphoria for self rule and optimism were dramatically shattered in major part due to the start of the Cold war.³² By the 1960s, after years of fighting for independence, most Western colonial territories had gained self-rule in Africa, South America, and South-East Asia.

Independence and national sovereignty, however, did not always bring with it freedom from imperialist influences. Colonial legacies were visible in the desire of the new governments to keep the boundaries that were created during colonial times, in the

²⁹ Martin Gilbert. *The First World War: A Complete History*, Clearwater: Owl Books, 2004, 306. Known as the First World War (The Great War), started by European nations in the summer of 1914 and lasted until November 1918. It produced two opposing sides, triggered by the assassination of the archduke of Austria.

³⁰ Roger Chickering. *World at Total War: A Global Conflict and Politics of Destruction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. WW II was a military conflict lasting from 1939 to 1945, which involving almost all nations of the world. It pitted two camps against each other, the Allies and the Axis. It began with the German invasion of Poland and Slovakia. It ended when Germany and Japan were defeated and surrendered in 1945.

³¹ Douglas Brinkley and David Richard Facey-Crowther. *The Atlantic Charter*. New York: St. Martin Press. 1994. This was a pivotal policy statement first issued in August 1941 that provided the victorious Allied nations a set of working goals for the post-war world. It was drafted by Churchill and Roosevelt. The Charter stated the ideal goals of the war: no territorial aggrandizement; no territorial changes made against the wishes of the people; restoration of self-government to those deprived of it; free access to raw materials; reduction of trade restrictions; global cooperation to secure better economic and social conditions for all; freedom from fear and want; freedom of the seas; and abandonment of the use of force, as well as disarmament of aggressor nations.

³² Margaret L. Coit. *Mr. Baruch*. Washington, DC: Beard Books, 2000. Bernard Baruch coined the term Cold War on April 16, 1947.

promotion of ethnic rivalry, in the continuation of inhumane and unjust actions against minority populations, and in the practice of distributing the country's resources in an uneven manner. Also, after being under foreign rule for decades, newly independent governments often lacked governmental institutions, good governance skills, and the governing experience needed to effectively rule their newly sovereign nations.³³

In most cases, the transition from colonial province to independent state was a violent and arduous journey. Many post-colonial states in Africa, South-East Asia, The Middle East, Latin America and Eastern Europe, experienced similar problems.³⁴ For example, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its former Eastern European allies in the early 1990s, they faced conflicts involving borders, ethnic rivalry, human-rights violations, and the uneven distribution of resources which raged through these lands in Asia and Africa.³⁵ In addition, many post-Soviet governments were plagued by a lack of governmental institutions, and good governance skills.

³³ Robert D. King and Robin Kilson. *The Statecraft of British Imperialism: Essays in Honor of William Roger Louis*. London: Frank Cass Publisher, 1999.

³⁴ See Robert H. Jackson. *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

³⁵ The influence of colonization on the newly independent nations was staggering but overshadowed by the Cold War bipolarity. Eurocentric infrastructure was put in place, and then abandoned in the 60's when Europeans occupying forces began pulling out of the colonized lands in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, leaving the people with very little preparation for self governance. In some countries, like Rwanda, the occupying white forces had purposefully divided the country's population into groups and treated one group much better, to make them easier to rule. When the settlers' departed the oppressed group continued to struggle with the favored groups for power. The long history of oppression and violence escalated the conflicts into civil wars and violent coup d'états. The countries were mostly poor enough that they could not afford stable government, so the groups continued to overthrow each other in an effort to take power of the country. Another factors centered on artificial borders. The problem of building strong, independent nations in Africa, however, was complicated by the way in which European imperialists had divided up the continent, plundered its resources, and left the countries unprepared to deal with independence. The colonialists had imposed borders having little to do with the areas where ethnic

Most of these new nations, however, had not existed at all as nations before colonization, or they had not existed within the post-colonial borders. Most colonial and Soviet satellite borders were created either through conquest, negotiation between empires, or simply by administrative action. Nevertheless, many of the leaders and governments of postcolonial and post-Soviet states have fought to keep the territorial boundaries created by past imperialist governments.³⁶ As a result, a number of boundary conflicts have arisen within post-colonial and post-Soviet territories. Parties to these conflicts justify and legitimate their side's position, using different historical boundaries as evidence for their claims even at the point of war for economic and political reasons, as exemplified in the Iraq-Iran war.³⁷

The conflict between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, for example, has its roots in ethnic rivalry encouraged during British colonial rule. During this time, Turkish and Greek populations were often played against one another as a means of maintaining control on the island. For example, as Greek Cypriots pushed for self-rule, the British encouraged Turkish Cypriots to actively oppose them. By the time the British pulled out of Cyprus in 1960, they had helped cleave deep divisions between the Greek and Turkish populations.³⁸

groups actually lived. While borders separated culturally similar people, they also enclosed traditional enemies.

³⁶ See Stephen D. Krasner. "Rethinking the Sovereign State Model," *Review of International Studies* 27, no. 5 (December 2001): 17–42.

³⁷ Lawrence Potter. *Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War*. New York: MacMillan, 2004, 153.

³⁸ Heinz A. Richter. *A Concise History of Modern Cyprus: 1878-2009*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 217-250.

The new independent nation, equally ruled by Greeks and Turks, soon was embroiled in ethnic conflict. Greek Cypriots wanted the entire island to become part of Greece, while Turkish Cypriots wanted the northern part of the island to become an independent Turkish state. Consequently, hostilities between the two groups escalated to the point of violence.³⁹ Decades later, ethnic rivalries that were encouraged during British rule, continue to impact the people of Cyprus as violence between Greeks and Turks continues to periodical erupt on the island state. The practice of favoring one ethnic, religious, racial, or other cultural group over others in most colonial systems, or of giving them a higher status, helped to promote inter-group rivalries, and often contributed to the unequal distribution of resources. Favored or privileged groups had access to, or control of, important resources that allowed them to enrich their members, at the expense of nonmembers. Today, many post-colonial and post-Soviet states continue the practice of favoring one group over others, whether it is a minority European settler population as in South Africa, a minority European alliance group (e.g., Lebanon, Syria, Rwanda, Burundi) or an internal ethnic group.⁴⁰

Today, many post-colonial and post-Soviet governments have adopted the legacies of unjust colonial practices and policies as a means to preserve their dominant status. Rights with regards to traditional lands, resources, and cultural language are denied to many populations, as groups that were marginalized under colonial occupation

³⁹ Christopher Hitchens. *Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger*. New York: Verso, 1997.

⁴⁰ Bill Ashcroft. *Post-Colonial Transformation*. London: Routledge, 2001. Also see Henry F. Carey, "The Postcolonial State and the Protection of Human Rights." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 22, no.1 & 2, <http://www.cssaame.com/issues/22/Carey.pdf> (accessed 5.10.10).

continue to be marginalized under postcolonial governments, most notably indigenous populations such as the indigenous peoples of West Papua, Indonesia, and the natives of the Amazon. Human-rights violations, including horrific events of mass murder and genocide, can be found in postcolonial and post-Soviet states such as Cambodia, Rwanda, Kosovo, El Salvador, and The Democratic Republic of Congo.⁴¹

For the most part, colonial and Soviet satellite societies were repressive and undemocratic in nature. Domestic governmental systems and structures were controlled and operated either from abroad or by a select domestic, privileged group. Consequently, when liberation came, these states lacked the internal structures, institutions, and best practices of thinking needed to create good governance systems. The result is that many postcolonial and post-Soviet states, although independent, are still ruled by repressive and restrictive regimes.⁴²

Ironically, during World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union fought together as allies against the Axis powers. However, the relationship between the two nations was a tense one. Americans had long been wary of Soviet communism and concerned about Soviets leader, Joseph Stalin's tyrannical, blood-thirsty rule of his own

⁴¹ Ariel Cohen. *Russian Imperialism: Development and Crisis*. Westport: Praeger, 1996, 99-100. Also see Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin. *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures*. London: Routledge, 1989, 2. The postcolonial states are defined, as a minimum, as the fifty-two African and sixteen Asian states that became independent after World War II. Others include the states decolonized in the Caribbean, Trans-Caucasia, and the Central Asia republics. To some extent, this is an arbitrary definition. First, there were a few colonies that were liberated after World War I and before. Liberia, Ethiopia and to some extent Egypt were not considered as colonized. See, for example, Robert Fatton, Jr. *Predatory Rule*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992; Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996; Thomas M. Franck, *Human Rights in Third World Perspective*. London: Oceana Publications, 1982; Tony Evans, ed., *Human Rights: A Reappraisal*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998.

⁴² Ibid., 102-104.

country. For their part, the Soviets resented the Americans' decades and long refusal to treat the USSR as a legitimate part of the international community as well as their delayed entry into opening a Western Front at D-Day against Hitler's forces in World War II, which resulted in the ongoing carnage on the Eastern Front of World War II and the deaths of tens of millions of Russians.⁴³ After World War II ended, these grievances ripened into an overwhelming sense of mutual distrust and enmity. Postwar Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe fueled many Americans' fears of a Russian Communist plan to control the world. Meanwhile, the USSR came to resent what they perceived as American officials' bellicose rhetoric, arms buildup and interventionist approach to international relations. In such a hostile atmosphere, no single party was entirely to blame for the Cold War; in fact, some historians believe it was inevitable.⁴⁴

However, one must credit President Richard Nixon for taking a new approach to international relations in the bipolar world. Instead of viewing the world as a hostile place, he advocated diplomacy in particular to hostile neighbors as the goal for a new

⁴³ Michael Kort. *The Columbia Guide to the Cold War*. Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2001, 3-4. The author argues that the continuing state of political conflict, military tension, proxy wars, and economic competition existing after WWII (1939–1945) between the Communist World – led by Soviet Union and its bloc and the Western world led by United States and its allies. Although the primary participants' military force never officially clashed directly, they expressed the conflict through military coalitions, strategic conventional force deployments, extensive aid to states deemed vulnerable, proxy wars, espionage, propaganda, conventional and nuclear arm race, appeals to neutral nations, rivalry at sports events, and technological competitions such as stars war.

⁴⁴ As the world began recovering from World War II, the first General Assembly of the United Nations met in London in January 1946, and created the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. The Soviets rejected the Baruch Plan, since it would have left the United States with a decisive nuclear superiority until the details of the Plan could be worked out and would have stopped the Soviet nuclear program. They responded by calling for universal nuclear disarmament. In the end, the UN adopted neither proposal. See Wilson D. Miscamble. George Kennan: A Life in the Foreign Service. *Foreign Service Journal* 81, no. 2 (May 2004): 22–34. This fascinating work chronicles the life and legacy of George Kennan, one of America' top diplomat who redefined real politic or political realism, credited for designing America's Cold War strategy.

world order. To that end, he encouraged the United Nations to recognize the Communist Chinese government and, after a trip there in 1972, began to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing. At the same time, he adopted a policy of “détente”–“relaxation”–toward the Soviet Union. In 1972, he and Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), which prohibited the manufacture of nuclear missiles by both sides and took a step toward reducing the decades-old threat of nuclear war.⁴⁵

However, under the Reagan administration, the bipolar tension was reignited. Like many leaders of his generation, Reagan believed that the spread of communism anywhere threatened freedom everywhere. As a result, he worked to provide financial and military aid to anticommunist governments and insurgencies around the world. This policy particularly was applied in the developing world in places like Angola, Liberia, Grenada and El Salvador. Even as Reagan fought communism in Central America, however, the Soviet Union was disintegrating. In response to severe economic problems and growing political ferment in the USSR, Premier Mikhail Gorbachev took office in 1985 and introduced two policies that redefined Russia’s relationship to the rest of the world: *glasnost*, or political openness, and *perestroika*, or economic reform. Soviet influence in Eastern Europe waned.⁴⁶ In 1989, every other Communist state in the region

⁴⁵ Raymond L. Garthoff. *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (revised ed.) Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985.

⁴⁶ The historical narrative of the end of the Cold War began with the end of the communist ideology, the disintegration of the Soviet juggernaut, through the radical introduction of *glasnost* and *perestroika* by the Gorbachev’s administration in the defunct USSR, and the fall of communist backed regimes in Eastern Europe, signaling the evolution of a new global international geo-strategic, economic, social, and political order.

replaced its government with a noncommunist one. In November of that year, the Berlin Wall—the most visible symbol of the decades-long Cold War—was finally destroyed, just over two years after Reagan had challenged the Soviet premier in a speech at Brandenburg Gate in Berlin: “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.”⁴⁷ But prior to the Reagan’s Berlin Wall speech, the Soviets were already in deep economic decline. The end of the Cold War can directly be traced to the end of the communist ideology and disintegration of the Soviet juggernaut, through the radical introduction of *glasnost* and *perestroika* by the Gorbachev’s administration in the defunct USSR.⁴⁸ This was precipitated by the rapid fall of communist backed regimes in Eastern Europe, signaling the evolution of a new global international geo-strategic, economic, social, and political order.

This end of the Cold War was immediately followed by a global and regional uneasiness and uncertainties as formerly backed Communist and Western regimes in places like Africa that depended heavily on these two ideological superpowers for military, economic and social aids were left in the dust—forced to directly confront any internal and external threats from rebellious citizens who felt excluded from the center of powers for a long time. The thawing was over and the new hot wars were rapidly and disastrously spreading their flames in almost every part of the globe.

⁴⁷ Romesh Ratnesar. *Tear Down This Wall: A City, a President, and the Speech that Ended the Cold War*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009.

⁴⁸ Read Edward A. Hewett, Victor H. Winston. *Milestones in Glasnost and Perestroika: Politics and People*. Brookings Institution Press, 1991. *Glasnost* was the policy of openness, and transparency in the activities of all government institutions in the former USSR together with a free press or freedom of information. *Perestroika* was a political movement within the Soviet Union leadership structure championed by Mikhail Gorbachev. It literally meant the “restructuring” of the Soviet political and economic system. *Perestroika* is often argued to be one of the primary causation for the fall of socialism in the Soviet Union and other Eastern European nations.

Illustrative of Liberia, my world and that of thousands of Liberian citizens were forever changed on December 25, 1989 when American trained exiled Liberians in collaborations with other ethnic groups, who were ironically trained in Libya. On that date they launched an incursion that is now known as the 13 years long Liberian civil war—a war that destroyed the lives of more than 350,000 civilians and pillaging the natural resources. This historical narrative from a personal and national perspective is briefly chronicled in the second section of the introduction of this dissertation.

The End of Cold War, the Unipolar World and Post 9/11

The collapse of the Cold War bi-polar world in 1988 ushered in the post-Cold War era as a changed condition with enormous global conflicts and complexities. Arguably it can be considered as the “new world order” or disorder.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, in this unipolar post-Cold war era, the U.S. and its allies erroneously predicted that the thawing of the East-West contestation and the relaxation of tensions between the superpowers marked a new Westphalian era of relative global peace.⁵⁰ The remaining concern was that the only superpower and its allies needed to police those nation-states who had weapon of mass destruction—WMD primarily in Iraq, North Korea, and appeasing Pakistan and India to avoiding a nuclear war. A power vacuum evolved and manifested itself with catastrophic results. From this vacuum have emerged the problems

⁴⁹ The term “New World Order” was first used by President George H.W. Bush while Joseph Nye used the term “New World Disorder” to refer on the changed conditions of world policy during the current post-Cold War (Nye 1992).

⁵⁰ Stephen Krasner. “Compromising Westphalia,” *International Security* 20, no. 3 (Winter 1996):.115–51. The Treaty of Westphalia ended the 30 years war (1618-1648) in Europe and recognized a new political order in central Europe, based upon the concept of the sovereign state as the sole actor in international relations.

of terrorism and state sponsored genocide. Even with the military and political presence of the Western nation-states in the Middle East and Central Asia, Islamic extremist organizations have relocated and opened a new front in the war on terror.⁵¹

Paradoxically, a “new world disorder” or new world reality erupted in such places as the Balkans, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and The Democratic Republic of Congo, as clear evidence of a world of new vicious hot wars, in which the international community responded reluctantly and selectively. Human rights abuses were visibly on the increase in nations such as Afghanistan, Haiti, Egypt, Myanmar, the Middle East, the Sudan, and many other places.⁵² These conflicts, mainly intrastate, also had regional, ethnic and religious implications, characterized by the unleashing of terror and violence on the civilian population. Additionally, these conflicts were intractable, porous, and championed by the emergence of sub-state actors in the forms of cartels, insurgents, irregular forces, local warlords, ethnic nationalists, etc, challenging the governing state authority and engaging in war as a business of greed and profiteering.

Furthermore, due to the complexities of these crises, borders and loyalties were redefined, and compounded by an absence of clearly defined objectives of the warring parties. Therefore any genuine efforts for mediations often seem to be a daunting or almost an impossible task by mediators or third parties. Moreover, a lingering perception has been formed that the international community is too weak or disinterested in seeking

⁵¹ Mark N. Katz. *Collapsed Empires. In Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996, 25-37.

⁵² James S. Coleman. “Conclusion: The Political Systems in Developing Countries,” in *The Politics of Developing Areas*, ed. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, 552-556. Also see Kanan Makiya, *Cruelty and Silence: War, Cruelty, Uprising in the Arab World*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1994.

a panacea. Sadly, we saw the end results of this in the negligence in Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Balkans, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and now Darfur.

These crises have been characterized by:

Decades of wars, political quagmire, societal dislocations, and military tensions that not only psychologically destabilized, but equally put terror on the faces of the war victims. The sum total of these disorders are economic decay, militarism and militarization of society, erosion of state cohesion and power, etc. that accelerated the pauperization of the society.⁵³

Consequently, the failed state typically lacks the wherewithal to adequately provide the public goods, such as security, health care, economics, and education.

Additionally, these states have weak central institutions, no independent courts, the absence of democracy; military coercion becomes the only tool in the hand of the executive authority.

The new world order of the unipolar post-Cold War era has greatly reconfigured the international system with the emergence of multiple actors competing with states over the monopoly of the instruments of coercion, thereby negating the Westphalian conception of the sovereignty of the state in international relations. This tension created an erosion of the harmony and hegemony of the state, which serves as the legitimacy of its government. As a result of the post 1989 world order, many nations were exposed to the structural weaknesses once kept intact by the Cold-War bi-polar world. Therefore, the legacy of the common good as the cohesive and unifying force for stability of the civilian

⁵³ Isiaka Alani Badmus and 'Dele Ogunmola. "Towards Rebuilding a Failed State: The United Nations Intervention in the Post-Civil War Sierra Leone," written in the *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Science* 1, no. 3, 720-735. Armidale: University of New England, NSW, Australia. 2009.

populations within a sovereign state was forcefully challenged and to some extent negated.

Today, the term failed state became popularized by the disintegrations taking place in the early nineties in the Balkans, Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, to name a few. The so-called experts and theorists of international relations and political science were fascinated in analyzing this phenomenon but mainly from academic perspectives. Professor William Reno also referred to this phenomenon as “shadowed states.”⁵⁴ For him, the collapsed state was the result of the shadow states, a form of personal rule, where decisions and actions are taken by an individual ruler and do not conform to a set of written laws and procedures, although these might be present.

These Shadow State rulers manipulate the international communities and various agencies for access to both formal and clandestine markets, by relying on the global recognition of sovereignty, and are thereby able to undermine formal government institutions. Thus “Shadowed States” or “informal commercially orientated networks are created that operate alongside remaining government bureaucracies.”⁵⁵ These crises and their sad and painful results have been the experiences of the people in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Libya, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and many failed nation-states that are either recovering from protracted civil wars or ongoing rebellion seen in Libya and Syria.

⁵⁴ William Reno. “Clandestine Economies, Violence and States in Africa.” *Journal of International Affairs* 53, no. 2 (2000): 434-35.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 434-35. Also see Jennifer Milliken. *State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction*. MA: Blackwell Publisher, 2003.

Furthermore, others scholars were mainly interested in understanding the causation of these problems but could do little or nothing in convincing the World's only superpower and the international community that these were serious if not the most urgent matter that required a concerted, collective, and sustained global effort to contain the implosion and explosion of these collapsing/collapsed or failing/failed states—considered as sovereign states.

Primarily, state recognition is based on Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States where in “the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”⁵⁶ However, the quagmire that the new world order or disorder must address is what to do with nation-states that continually violate human rights and are sponsors of international terrorism or nation-states that are so weak that the central governmental administrations have little control over the smuggling and sales of illegal drugs, weapons, human trafficking, and environmental pollutions? Should they be recognized as full members of the community of nations or accorded quasi-state status or should they be considered as test cases for robust and sustained nation-(re)building?⁵⁷ A full investigation by Scholars and Truth

⁵⁶ Ruth Gordon. “Saving Failed States.” *American University Journal of International Law and Policy* 12, no. 6 (1997): 903-73. The document was signed at Montevideo on December 26, 1933 and entered into force, December 26, 1934, with Article 8 reaffirmed by Protocol, December 23, 1936. However, Bolivia alone amongst the states represented at the Seventh International Conference of American States did not sign the Convention. The United States of America, Peru, and Brazil ratified the Convention with reservations directly attached to the document.

⁵⁷ Robert H. Jackson. *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Also see Stephen D. Krasner, “Rethinking the Sovereign State Model,” *Review of International Studies* 27, no. 5 (December 2001): 17–42.

Commissions may offer us some pertinent answers to these issues that may help us document and address these failures.⁵⁸

As such, I argue that a new perspective on the definition of the state must emerge to exclude states that violate the rights of its people and that of its neighbors.

Consequently, the terrorist attack against the United States on September 11, 2001 that shocked and awakened the conscience of America and the rest of the world sent a powerful signal that even strong states cannot be protected from the devastating effect of weak or failed states in a technological and globalized world as we saw in the then Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Hence, the irony is America did not envision the prophetic vision of former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali who advocated for a new understanding of international relations in a speech entitled *An Agenda for Peace*. He remarked that:

The foundation-stone of this work is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ William Reno. *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1995; *Warlord Communities and African States*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner; 1998. Also see Michael T. Klare. *Resource Wars. The New Landscape of Global Conflict*. New York: Metropolitan Books. 2001. Also see Priscilla B. Hayner, "Fifteen Truth Commissions—1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study." In *Human Rights Quarterly* 16, no. 4 (1994): 558. Also see Desmond Mpilo Tutu. *No Future without Forgiveness*. New York: Doubleday, 2000, 21.

⁵⁹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali. *An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*. Speech delivered at the UN Security Council in New York on 31 January 1992. As well documented, the United States was instrumental in the removal of Boutros-Boutros Ghali by withholding its financial support to the UN. The US saw him as confrontational. Boutros-Ghali was the only UN secretary-general not to be elected to a second term in office. Also read Richard Clarke. *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror*. New York: Free Press, 2004, 201.

It was such failure on the part of the international system to act or slowly respond to global threats that saw the implosion of the Balkans, Liberia and Sierra Leone in West Africa, and Rwanda and Burundi in Central Africa in the early nineties. Today, the problem of failed states overwhelmingly, has become an urgent security matter requiring a global response or strategic policy agenda. But the lingering question remain how effective could a nation-building tool kit be designed in dealing with conflict situations of weak or failed states. Before arriving at a genuine solution, I will examine a number of specific cases of nations who have trended toward failing/failed or collapsing/collapsed state status, while their entrenched and privileged rulers advocated for sovereignty against international interventions. I will describe these cases in their historical narratives—imperialism, colonialism, post-colonialism, the Cold-War, and post 9/11 era.

Overview of a Few Illustrations on the Failed States Index

Somalia

Somalia, situated in the Horn of Africa, is ranked first in the 2010 *Failed States Index*. It was founded by various African tribes mainly from the Ethiopian Highlands.⁶⁰ However, from 1875 to 1941, Somalia was always occupied by regional and colonial powers such as Egypt, France, England, and Italy.⁶¹ The only form of leadership the

⁶⁰ Helen Chapin Metz, ed. *Somalia: A Country Study*. Washington, DC: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1992. The author deconstructs the notion that Somalia was founded by Arabs coming across the Red Sea's western coast, or perhaps in southern Arabia. Rather she points at the origin from the highlands of southern Ethiopia, specifically in the lake regions.

⁶¹ Lee V. Cassanelli. *The shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600–1900*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982, 119. The author succinctly details the history of Somalia, by focusing on the Islamization of the Somali as a central formative process in their history. More than 95 percent of contemporary Somalis are professed Muslims, and many claim that their ancestors were converted more than a millennium ago. Also read Kevin Shillington, *Encyclopedia of African History*. New York: CRC Press, 2005, 1406. It chronicles the wars with British Empire in which

locals exercised was based on clans or traditional patriarchal hegemony. The image of Somalia etched in the minds of many in the U.S. and around the world is one of a powerful symbol of United Nations' peacekeeping failure. This was the result of the inability of the international community to respond quickly to Somalia's mass famine and civil wars in the early 1990s. During the Cold War both the U.S. and Soviet Union sought for influence and control over Somalia because of its strategic location along oil routes from the Persian Gulf.

In the 1970s the USSR armed and aided Somalia. President Siad Barre, in turn, professed socialism to win Soviet military support and nationalized most of the economy.⁶² He also took on the adventure to annex Ethiopia's ethnically Somali Ogaden region. After the Soviet Union switched support to Ethiopia's new Marxist military government, Somalia lost the Ogaden war.⁶³ By the early 1980s the U.S. had replaced the Soviet Union as Somalia's military patron. U.S. military aid to Somalia during the 1980s totaled more than \$200 million, with hundreds of millions more in economic aid. The United States sought to maintain its influence in this volatile area, and to counter the

the Somalians on four occasions forced the British to retreat until 1920 when British used airpower to subdue the state. The Italian also took portion of Somaliland until 1941 when the British took control again.

⁶² Read Helen C. Metz. *Siad Barre and Scientific Socialism, Somalia: A Country Study*. Washington, DC: GPO Press, 1992. Like other African strong men of the personality cult, Siad Barre proclaimed "scientific socialism" as the guiding ideology of Somalia. This Marxist ideology, he argued, stressed hard work and public service and was believed to be compatible with Islam. A number of industries and large firms, especially foreign banks and oil companies, were nationalized.

⁶³ Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. *Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operations*. New York: ABC-CLIO, 1999, 222-223.

Soviet presence in Ethiopia. Barre gave the U.S. a naval communications facility at Berbera on the Gulf of Aden, which had previously been under Soviet control.⁶⁴

The simmering conflicts between and among Somali clans and rival militias broke out in a full-blown civil war in 1988. Three years later the Russians abandoned Ethiopia as the Soviet Union collapsed. But the United States stuck with the Somali regime despite significant repression and corruption. Then, after years of creating Somalia's dependence on imported food, the United States pulled out, which led to the ouster of President Siad Barre in 1991.⁶⁵ The enormous quantities of military hardware from Somalia's Cold War-era sponsors virtually guaranteed the country's long-term destabilization. As the United States left Somalia as it would do in many other African countries, ordinary people were confused and saw their hopes dissipated as they reflected on the meaning and prospects of independence.

A power vacuum led to further anarchy and civil war that gave leading clan militia's leaders greater and greater economic power because of their military might in a stateless and chaotic environment.⁶⁶ Only after the international media finally carried shocking pictures of the widespread starvation hitting many Somali families and children did Washington and its allies begin to plan a relief and peacekeeping mission.⁶⁷ In April

⁶⁴ Ibid., 223-225.

⁶⁵ Steve Kretzman. "Oil, Security, War, the Geopolitics of U.S. Energy Planning." *Multinational Monitor Magazine*, Jan/Feb 2003.

⁶⁶ Peter D. Little. *Somalia: Economy without State*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003, 4.

⁶⁷ Steven Livingston. *Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Military Intervention*. Research paper. Cambridge: The Joan Shorenstein Center (JFKSG). President and Fellows of Harvard College, 1997.

1992 the UN intervened with a mandate to make Somalia safe for the distribution of food and other aid. But it proved a disaster as various factions fought and humiliated the UN and US Special Forces—making Somalia ungovernable. In August 2000 Clan leaders and senior figures met in Djibouti and elected Abdulkassim Salat Hassan president of Somalia. They arrived with the newly formed government in Mogadishu and received a heroic welcome for the first time since 1991.

But in April 2001, other Somali warlords, backed by Ethiopia, announced their intention to form a national government within six months, in direct opposition to the country's transitional administration. In August 2004, for the 14th time since 1991, an attempt was made to restore the central government, after a new transitional parliament was inaugurated at a ceremony in Kenya, headed by Abdullahi Yusuf as President. But there were bitter divisions over where in Somalia the new parliament should sit. From 2006 to 2008, the UN endorsed the presence of African Peacekeeping Forces, but ones which excluded the participation of Somali's neighbors. Yet, the country, in spite of an interim government and the presence of African Peacekeepers, remains fragile. These flawed international responses have been criticized by the *Enough Project*, a strategy paper dedicated to ending genocide and crimes against humanity.⁶⁸ Somalia is now facing the worst famine and drought since the Ethiopian famine that brought out the star studded

⁶⁸ ENOUGH is a project of the Center for American Progress working to end genocide and crimes against humanity. Its initial projects were on the crises in Sudan, Chad, eastern Congo, Somalia and northern Uganda. ENOUGH's strategy papers and briefings provide sharp field analysis and targeted policy recommendations based on a "3P" crisis response strategy: promoting durable peace, providing civilian protection, and punishing perpetrators of atrocities. ENOUGH works with concerned citizens, advocates, and policy makers to prevent, mitigate, and resolve these crises, www.Enoughproject.org (accessed 8.13.11).

performance aimed at generating funds for humanitarian relief led by Lionel Richie, Harry Belafonte, and the late pop star, Michael Jackson in 1985.⁶⁹

Sudan

Sudan, which ranks third on the *Failed State Index* in 2010 list, is the largest and one of the most geographically diverse countries in Africa. The region known in modern times as the Sudan comes from Arabic *bilad as-sudan*, “land of the blacks.” Its imperial and colonial history is intricately linked with or influenced by Egypt, its immediate neighbor to the north.⁷⁰ Its historical narrative has also been influenced by Christianity, Islam, British colonialism, and Cold War politics. It has been divided between its Arab heritage, identified with northern Sudan, and its African heritages to the south. The two groups are divided along linguistic, religious, racial, and economic lines, and the cleavage has generated intractable violence and destructions that officially ended after two devastating civil wars.⁷¹ Following the January 2011 referendum it was announced that almost 99 percent of voters in the Christian South had voted for independence from the

⁶⁹ Jonathan Taylor. “A Hit with a Heart: ‘We Are the World’ Buoyed by Brisk Sales and Curiosity.” *Chicago Tribune*, March 17, 1985.

⁷⁰ Modern relations between the two countries began in 1820, when an Egyptian army under Ottoman command invaded Sudan. In the years following this invasion, Egypt expanded its area of control in Sudan down the Red Sea coast and toward East Africa's Great Lakes region. The sixty-four-year period of Egyptian rule, which ended in 1885, left a deep mark on Sudan's political and economic systems. The emergence of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium in 1899 reinforced the links between Cairo and Khartoum. After Sudan gained independence in 1956, Egypt continued to exert influence over developments in Sudan.

⁷¹ Douglas H. Johnson. The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars. *African Journal of Political Science* 8, no. 1 (2003): 147.

Muslim North, making Southern Sudan the newest nation—in need of a nation-building toolkit, come July 9, 2011.⁷²

Historically, Nubia, a vast portion of Sudan was influenced by Christianity dating back to the fourth century, when Egypt formally adopted the religion (along with the rest of the Byzantine Empire) and when the ruler of Ethiopia was converted to Christianity by Frumentius.⁷³ But by 1881 an ascetic religious leader, Mohammed Ahmed, living with his disciples on an island in the White Nile, inspired by the revelation that he was the long-awaited Mahdi, publicly announced his new status advocating the creation of a strict Islamic state.⁷⁴ The colonial administration in Khartoum immediately called for his arrest; however, he quickly escaped to the mountains with his followers and later defeated the Egyptian and British forces. He later died of typhus and his grave was desecrated.⁷⁵

⁷² USA Today. “Over 99 Percent in Southern Sudan Vote for Secession,” http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2011-01-30-2052877353_x.htm (accessed .01.30.11).

⁷³ Paul Bowers. “Nubian Christianity: The Neglected Heritage.” *Africa Journal of Evangelical Theology* IV, no. 1 (1985): 3-23. The earliest references to Nubia’s successor kingdoms are contained in accounts by Greek and Coptic authors of the conversion of Nubian kings to Christianity in the sixth century. According to tradition, a missionary sent by Byzantine empress Theodora arrived in Nobatia and started preaching the gospel about 540. It is possible that the conversion process began earlier, however, under the aegis of Coptic missionaries from Egypt, who in the previous century had brought Christianity to the Abyssinians. The Nubian kings accepted the Monophysite Christianity practiced in Egypt and acknowledged the spiritual authority of the Coptic patriarch of Alexandria over the Nubian church. The Christian Nubian kingdoms, which survived for many centuries, achieved their peak of prosperity and military power in the ninth and tenth centuries. However, Muslim Arab invaders, who in 640 had conquered Egypt, posed a threat to the Christian Nubian kingdoms. Most historians believe that Arab pressure forced Nobatia and Muqurra to merge into the kingdom of Dunqulah sometime before 700 A.D.

⁷⁴ P.M. Holt. *The Mahdist State in Sudan, 1881-1898*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970, 45-47.

⁷⁵ See Noah Salomon’s article. *Undoing the Mahdiyya: British Colonialism as Religious Reform in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898-1914*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.

Similarly, the period of British control (1899-1955) has had a lasting impact on Sudan. In addition to pacifying and uniting the country, the British sought to modernize Sudan by using technology and industry to facilitate economic development and by establishing democratic institutions to end authoritarian rule. Even in 1991, many of Sudan's political and economic institutions owed their existence to the British. Lastly, Sudan's post independence history has been shaped largely by the southern civil war.⁷⁶ This conflict has greatly delayed the country's social and economic development, encouraged political instability, and led to an endless cycle of weak and ineffective military and civilian governments. The conflict appears likely to continue to affect Sudan's people and institutions for a long time to come.⁷⁷

Across the centuries, Islam eventually changed the nature of Sudanese society and facilitated the division of the country into north and south. Nevertheless, Islam also fostered political unity, economic growth, and educational development among its adherents; however, these benefits were restricted largely to urban and commercial centers. The spread of Islam began shortly after the Prophet Muhammad's death in 632.

⁷⁶ Helen C. Metz. *Sudan: A Country Study*. Washington DC: GPO Press, 1991. Sudan has long been considered an impoverished backwater overshadowed by its Egyptian and Ethiopian neighbors. Even during the Cold War, Moscow and Washington showed little interest to meddle in the Sudanese civil war; they were far more interested in the terrible conflicts fought in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Somalia. Nevertheless Sudan has subsequently played a central role in the evolution and development of militant Islam, providing Osama bin Laden with sanctuary after he fell out with the Saudi royal family. Washington has listed Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism since the early 1990s; though it has said it will remove Sudan if the referendum went well. After British forces took control of Sudan from the Mahdists in the late 1890s until independence in 1956 Britain ruled the country as two entities. The two halves came to blows just before independence sparking a civil war that dragged on until the early 1970s. The imposition of Islamic Sharia law in the early 1980s and General Jaafar Nimeiri ignoring the Christian south's autonomy sparked war again with the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

⁷⁷ Richard Crockett. *Sudan: Darfur and the Failure of an African State*. Hartford: Yale University Press, 2010.

By that time, he and his followers had converted most of Arabia's tribes and towns to Islam, which Muslims maintained united the individual believer, the state, and society under God's will.⁷⁸

Islamic rulers, therefore, exercised temporal and religious authority, enforcing Islamic law (*sharia*), which was derived primarily from the Quran. However, the Arabs realized the commercial advantages of peaceful relations with Nubia and used the treaty to ensure that travel and trade proceeded unhindered across the frontier. The treaty also contained security arrangements whereby both parties agreed that each party (Christian Nubians and Muslim Arabs) would come to the defense of the other in the event of an attack by a third party.⁷⁹

The British colonial adventure in Sudan sought to modernize the country by applying European technology to its underdeveloped economy and by replacing its authoritarian institutions with ones that adhered to liberal English traditions. However, southern Sudan's remote and undeveloped provinces received little official attention until after World War I, except for efforts to suppress tribal warfare and the slave trade. The British justified this policy by claiming that the south was not ready for exposure to the modern world.⁸⁰ To allow the south to develop along indigenous lines, the British, therefore, closed the region to outsiders.

⁷⁸ Read Derek A. Welsby. *The Medieval Kingdoms of Nubia — Pagans, Christians and Muslims along the Middle Nile*. London: British Museum Press, 2002.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 35-37.

⁸⁰ Winston Churchill. *The River War-An Historical Account of the Reconquest of Soudan*. New York: Carroll & Graff, 1889; reprinted 2000. This work is an historical account of the British involvement in the Sudan and the conflict between the British forces led by Lord Kitchener and Dervish forces led by

As a result, the south remained isolated and backward. A few Arab merchants controlled the region's limited commercial activities while Arab bureaucrats administered whatever laws existed. Christian missionaries, who operated schools and medical clinics, provided limited social services in southern Sudan.⁸¹ Sudanese nationalism, as it developed after World War I, was an Arab and Muslim phenomenon with its support base in the Northern provinces. Nationalists opposed indirect rule and advocated a centralized national government in Khartoum responsible for both regions. Nationalists also perceived Britain's southern policy as artificially dividing Sudan and preventing its unification under an Arabized and Islamic ruling class.⁸²

During World War II, some British colonial officers questioned the economic and political viability of the southern provinces as separate from northern Sudan. Britain also had become more sensitive to Arab criticism of the southern policy. In 1946 the Sudan Administrative Conference determined that Sudan should be administered as one country. Moreover, the conference delegates agreed to readmit northern administrators to southern posts, abolish the trade restrictions imposed under the "closed door" ordinances, and allow southerners to seek employment in the north. Khartoum also nullified the prohibition against Muslim proselytizing in the south and introduced Arabic in the south as the official administration language.

Abdallahi Muhammad, heir to the self-proclaimed Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad, who envisioned setting up an Islamic Caliphate.

⁸¹ Jok Madut Jok. *Sudan – Race, Religion and Violence*. Oxford: OneWorld Publications, 2007, 23ff.

⁸² Heather J. Sharkey. *Living with Colonialism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003, 34-39.

On December 19, 1955, the Sudanese parliament unanimously adopted a declaration of independence and on January 1, 1956 Sudan became an independent republic. The leadership called for the withdrawal of foreign troops and requested the condominium powers to sponsor a plebiscite in advance of the scheduled date. To advance their interests, many southern leaders concentrated their efforts in Khartoum, where they hoped to win constitutional concessions. Although determined to resist what they perceived to be Arab imperialism, they were opposed to violence. Most southern representatives supported provincial autonomy and warned that failure to win legal concessions would drive the south to rebellion.

Sudan achieved independence without the rival political parties having agreed on the form and content of a permanent constitution. Instead, the Constituent Assembly adopted a document known as the Transitional Constitution, which replaced the governor general as head of state with a five-member Supreme Commission that was elected by a parliament composed of an indirectly elected Senate and a popularly elected House of Representatives.

The parliamentary regime introduced plans to expand the country's education, economic, and transportation sectors. To achieve these goals, Khartoum needed foreign economic and technical assistance, to which the United States made an early commitment. Conversations between the two governments had begun in mid-1957, and the parliament ratified a United States aid agreement in July 1958.⁸³ Washington hoped

⁸³ Graham E. Fuller. *The Future of Political Islam*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, 107-113.

this agreement would reduce Sudan's excessive reliance on a one-crop (cotton) economy and would facilitate the development of the country's transportation and communications infrastructure.⁸⁴ This tenuous relationship of the USA and Sudan has always been in flux. Sudan broke diplomatic relations with the U.S.A in June 1967, following the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War. But relation was restored in 1971 when the Sudanese Communist Party attempted to overthrow President Nimeiri and suspected Soviet involvement. U.S. assisted Sudan in 1972 peace settlement with the south.⁸⁵ On March 1, 1973, Palestinian terrorists of the "Black September" organization murdered U.S. Ambassador Cleo A. Noel and Deputy Chief of Mission Curtis G. Moore in Khartoum.⁸⁶ Sudanese officials arrested the terrorists and tried them on murder charges. In June 1974, however, they were released to the custody of the Egyptian Government.

The origins of the civil war in the south date back to the 1950s. On August 18, 1955, the Equatoria Corps, a military unit composed of southerners, mutinied at Torit.⁸⁷ Rather than surrender to Sudanese government authorities, many mutineers disappeared into hiding with their weapons, marking the beginning of the first war in southern Sudan.⁸⁸ By the late 1960s, the war had resulted in the deaths of about 500,000 people.

⁸⁴ See John Lewis Gaddis. *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Also see *The Cold War: A New History*. New York: Penguin Books, 2005.

⁸⁵ Graham Fuller. *The Future of Political Islam*, 28, 37, 51, 100-102.

⁸⁶ J. K. Cooley. "Green March, Black September": *The Story of the Palestinian Arabs*. New York: Frank Cass and Company Ltd., 1973.

⁸⁷ Stephen Morrison, J; Alex de Waal. "Can Sudan Escape Its Intractability?," *Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict*. Washington DC: USIP, 2005.

⁸⁸ Abel Alier. *Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonored*. New York: Exeter Press, 1990.

Several hundred thousand more southerners hid in the forests or escaped to refugee camps in neighboring countries.⁸⁹

By 1969 the rebels had developed foreign contacts to obtain weapons and supplies. Israel, for example, trained Anya Nya recruits and shipped weapons via Ethiopia and Uganda to the rebels. Anya Nya also purchased arms from Congolese rebels and international arms dealers with monies collected in the south and from among southern Sudanese exile communities in the Middle East, Western Europe, and North America. The rebels also captured arms, equipment, and supplies from government troops.⁹⁰

After the settlement in the south, President Nimeiri attempted to mend fences with northern Muslim religious groups. The government undertook administrative decentralization, popular with the Ansar that favored rural over urban areas where leftist activism was most evident. Khartoum also reaffirmed Islam's special position in the country, recognized sharia law as the source of all legislation, and released some members of religious orders who had been incarcerated. However, reconciliation with conservative groups, which had organized outside Sudan under Sadiq al Mahdi's leadership and were later known as the National Front, eluded Nimeiri.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Robert O. Collins. *A History of Modern Sudan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 26-27.

⁹⁰ Mohamed Suliman. *Civil War in Sudan: The Impact of Ecological Degradation*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania. African Study Center, 2010.

⁹¹ Mansour Khalid. *Nimeiri and the Revolution of Dis-May*. London: Routledge Press, 1985, 234, 239.

Notwithstanding, the region of Darfur, in western Sudan, erupted into conflict in 2003. Despite international outrage and demands around the globe to end the brutality, the deadly conflict continues.⁹² Darfur remains one of the world's worst human rights and humanitarian catastrophes where pro-government Arab militias (*Janjaweed*) are accused of a campaign of ethnic cleansing against non-Arab locals.⁹³ The conflict has strained relations between Sudan and Chad, to the west. Both countries have accused each other of cross-border incursions. The leader of Sudan, Mr. Omar-al Bashir⁹⁴ faces two international arrest warrants, issued by the International Criminal Court in The Hague, on charges of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. He has dismissed the allegations and has continued to travel to countries who have opposed the indictment. Sudan also played host to Osama Bin Laden in 1992, when he was exiled by Saudi Arabia, in a deal brokered by Ali Mohamed.⁹⁵ It was in Sudan that bin Laden continued

⁹² Read *Amnesty International Report on Darfur*. New York. 2011. According to Amnesty International, "Civilians have become victims of egregious human rights violations, primarily at the hands of the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed, an allied militia. Together, they have been responsible for killings, torture, rape, detentions, forced displacement, the burning of homes and villages, and the theft and deliberate destruction of crops and cattle." The protracted war has left 300,000 men, women, and children dead and 2.6 million have been displaced, <http://www.amnestysusa.org/darfur/darfur-history/page.do?id=1351103> (accessed 04.15.11).

⁹³ Branden I. Koerner. *Who are the Janjaweed? A Guide to the Sudanese Militiamen*. New York: Slate, July 19, 2005.

⁹⁴ Mark Tran. "Prosecutors Move Closer to Darfur Trial." *The Guardian* (December 15, 2006).

⁹⁵ See Steve Emerson. *Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan Era*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1988. Also see *Abdullah Assam: The Man before Osama Bin Laden*, www.iacsp.com/itobli3.html (accessed 10.28.10). Following the attacks on the US embassies in East Africa, America launched cruise missile attacks on the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum in 1998, because of its alleged production of chemical weapons and links to al-Qaida. Afterwards Khartoum showed a new willingness to cooperate with counterterrorism measures. The Sudanese authorities raided suspect terrorist training camps in Kurdufan State in 2003, arresting extremists and seizing illegal weapons. Three years later the US State Department said Sudan had become a strong partner in the war on terror. Despite this Sudan remained firmly on the US list of state sponsors because it continues to support Palestinian Hamas. In addition in 2006 after Washington proposed to send a

his verbal assault on King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and in response, on March 5, 1994, Fahd sent an emissary to Sudan demanding bin Laden's passport. His family was persuaded to cut off his monthly stipend, the equivalent of \$7 million a year.⁹⁶

In 2001 the Bush administration named a presidential envoy for peace in the Sudan to explore what role the U.S. could play in ending Sudan's civil war and enhancing the delivery of humanitarian aid. Andrew Natsios and subsequently Ambassador Richard Williamson served as presidential envoys to Sudan during the Bush administration. More recently, on March 18, 2009 President Obama announced the appointment of Major General (Ret.) J. Scott Gration as the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan who is tasked to understand the influence of political Islam.⁹⁷ This is the integration of religion and politics within Islamic States.⁹⁸ Finally, On October 19, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton announced the Obama's new Sudan strategy of three core principles:

- (1) Achieving a definitive end to conflict, gross human rights abuses, and genocide in Darfur; (2) Implementation of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that results in a peaceful post-2011 Sudan, or an orderly path toward two separate and viable states at peace with each other; and (3) Ensuring that Sudan does not provide a safe haven for international terrorists.⁹⁹

peacekeeping force to war-torn Darfur, bin Laden released a tape urging his followers to go to Sudan to attack UN troops.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 4.

⁹⁷ Graham E. Fuller. *The Future of Political Islam*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, 5-9. Also See The White House report on Sudan, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/President-Obama-Announces-Major-General-Scott-Gration-as-US-Special-Envoy-for-Suda/ (accessed 04.12.11).

⁹⁸ Ibid., 13-46.

⁹⁹ Payton L. Knopf. *How to Secure Peace in South Sudan*. Washington, DC: United State Council on Foreign Relation. International Affairs Fellow in Residence, July 13, 2011. Also see U.S. Policy on

This raises the prospect of the new nation of Southern Sudan that might be the poorest place in the world that largely lacks basic sanitation, clean water, clinic, hospital and more. The United States, through the United Nations, NGOs and religious organizations must continue to engage the Sudanese in facilitating a wholistic approach for peace and stability. It is of such nation and people, that assert, is it perfect test case for a strategic nation-building agenda involving all stakeholders—the church, international community, the local populations, and other NGOs.

The Democratic Republic of Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo which ranks fifth on the *Failed States Index 2010* report is one of Africa's largest countries with vast mineral and economic resources. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) has been a flash point of what is now known as Africa's world war claiming more than 5.4 million lives. The vast majority have died from preventable non-violent causes such as malaria, diarrhea, hunger, malnutrition, pneumonia, creating one of the world's worst humanitarian crises.¹⁰⁰ Almost 45 thousand perish every month. The five-year conflict which began in 1998, pitted government forces, supported by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, against rebels backed by Uganda and Rwanda. To date it remains the world deadliest conflict since

Sudan: "A Critical Moment, A Comprehensive Approach." Washington, DC: United State Council on Foreign Relation. October 19, 2009. USAID History. *United States Agency for International Development*, http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html (accessed 03.10.11). Also see http://sudan.usembassy.gov/ussudan_relations.html.

¹⁰⁰ Robert Edgerton. *The Troubled Heart of Africa: A History of the Congo*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2002, 24-37.

WWII.¹⁰¹ Despite a peace deal and the formation of a transitional government in 2003, people in the east of the country remain in terror of marauding militia and the army known for raping, pillaging, and exploiting the natural and human resources of the vast nation.¹⁰²

Its colonial legacy began from 1840 to 1872, the Scottish missionary, David Livingstone, engaged in a series of explorations that brought the Congo to the attention of the Western world.¹⁰³ During these travels, Livingstone was out of touch with Europe for two years. Henry Morton Stanley, a journalist, was commissioned by the *New York Herald* to conduct a search for him. The two met at Ujiji, on the eastern shore of Lake Tanganyika, in 1871. Three years later, Stanley was commissioned by the *New York Herald* and London's *Daily Telegraph* to continue the explorations begun by Livingstone. With three British companions, Stanley began the descent of the Congo from its upper reaches, completing his journey in 1877. Returning to Europe, he tried to interest the British government in further exploration and development of the Congo but met with no success. His expeditions did, however, attract another European monarch.

Stanley's adventures brought the Congo to the attention of Belgium's King Leopold II, a man of boundless energy and ambition. The European occupation of Africa

¹⁰¹ Adam Hochschild. *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa*. New York: Mariner Books. 1999. Also see Abraham McLaughlin and Duncan Woodside's "Rumblings of War in the Heart of Africa," in the *Christian Science Monitor*, June 23, 2004 and Chris Bower's, "World War III" in *My Direct Democracy*, July 24, 2006.

¹⁰² Robert Edgerton. *The Troubled Heart of Africa: A History of the Congo*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2002, 35-39.

¹⁰³ M. Mackenzie, "David Livingstone: The Construction of the Myth," in *Sermons and Battle Hymns: Protestant Popular Culture in Modern Scotland*, ed. Graham Walker and Tom Gallagher. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990.

was well under way, but the Congo River basin remained for the most part unknown to Europeans. With no great powers contesting its control, the area appeared to present an ideal opportunity for Belgian expansion. Recruiting Stanley to help him from 1878, Léopold II founded the International Association of the Congo, financed by an international consortium of bankers. Under the auspices of this association, Stanley arrived at the mouth of the Congo in 1879 and began the journey upriver. After the 1884-85 Conference of Berlin gave undisputed sovereignty of the region of modern Zaire to Léopold II, king of Belgium, the first order of business was to structure the area's economy to suit Belgian needs. The goal was to make an economically viable and self-sustaining entity out of the Congo Free State, as Zaire was then known. Although exploitation of the country's mineral and agricultural wealth was substantial during the colonial period, economic development bore little direct relationship to the needs of the indigenous population.¹⁰⁴ The history of similar prejudices were also meted on the Congo in 1904 when Christian Missionary brought and showcased Ota Benga, an African pigmy at New York's Bronx zoo, placing him in a monkey cage.¹⁰⁵

The production of cash crops for export was stressed at the expense of the production of food crops. Moreover, monetary benefits accrued almost entirely to non-Congolese, the foreign shareholders of the industrial and agricultural companies that constituted the modern sector, and the colonial state, which had holdings in many of the

¹⁰⁴ Roger Louis and Jean Stengers. *E.D. Morel's History of the Congo Reform Movement*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968.

¹⁰⁵ Jason Stearns. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa*. New York: Public Affairs books, 2011.

companies. The colonial government's major aim was to encourage foreign investment in the Belgian Congo to develop agricultural commodities for export, to exploit the country's mineral resources for the same purpose, and to establish a transportation infrastructure to facilitate the export of goods.¹⁰⁶ The colonizer had very little interest with such basic social needs as health care or education, which were provided by religious missions and to some extent by the large concessionaire companies. Policies designed to promote state economic objectives emphasized measures to ensure adequate supplies of labor at low wages and human rights abuses.¹⁰⁷

Among such measures were the use of forced recruitment and restrictions on the establishment of foreign commercial trading activities, which would have encouraged the farm population to produce surpluses for sale rather than take low-paying work on plantations and in mines. Colonial authorities obtained through coercion the indigenous labor necessary to perform public works and private investment projects. A decree of 1917, for example, required African peasants to devote sixty days a year to agricultural work, and mandated penal sanctions for disobedience.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation. *American Economic Review* 91, no. 5 (2001): 1369-1401.

¹⁰⁷ See Adam Hochschild. *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa*. New York: Mariner Books, 1999. This is one of the most horrifying and nearly forgotten crimes of the century: greedy Belgian King Leopold II's rape of the Congo, the vast colony he seized as his private fiefdom in 1885. Until 1909, he used his mercenary army to force slaves into mines and rubber plantations, burn villages, mete out sadistic punishments, including dismemberment, and mass murder.

¹⁰⁸ Peter Forbath. *The River Congo: The Discovery, Exploration and Exploitation of the World's Most Dramatic Rivers*. New York: Harper & Row, 1977. During the murderous campaign of King Leopold to exploit the vast natural resources of the Congo, the native population was decimated by King Leopold's personal rule—an estimated 10 million people were victimized in one of the worst untold genocides.

Sadly, the history of Democratic Republic of Congo has been one of civil war and corruption. After independence in 1960, the country immediately faced an army mutiny and an attempt at secession by its mineral-rich province of Katanga.¹⁰⁹ A year later, its prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, was seized and killed by troops loyal to army General Joseph Mobutu. In 1965 Mobutu seized power, later renaming the country Zaire and himself Mobutu Sese Seko. He turned Zaire into a springboard for operations against Soviet-backed Angola and thereby ensured US backing. But he also made Zaire synonymous with corruption.¹¹⁰ After the Cold War, Zaire ceased to be of interest to the US. Thus, when in 1997 neighboring Rwanda invaded it to flush out extremist Hutu militias, it gave a boost to the anti-Mobutu rebels, who quickly captured the capital, Kinshasa, installed Laurent Kabila as president and renamed the country The Democratic Republic of Congo.¹¹¹

Nonetheless, D.R. Congo's troubles continued. A rift between Mr. Kabila and his former allies sparked a new rebellion, backed by Rwanda and Uganda. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe took Kabila's side, turning the country into a vast battleground. Coup attempts and sporadic violence heralded renewed fighting in the eastern part of the

¹⁰⁹ Ade J. F. Ajayi. Colonialism: An Episode in African History. In *Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960*, vol. 1, *The History and Politics of Colonialism, 1870-1914*, ed. L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969, 137-46.

¹¹⁰ Larry Devlin. *Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone*. New York: Public Affairs, 2007. Also see Patrick Manning. *Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

¹¹¹ Ricardo Rene Laremont. *Borders, Nationalism, and African State*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. This book details the many conflicts in Africa with emphasis on border wars and the Congo's crisis.

country in 2008. Rwandan Hutu militias clashed with government forces in April, displacing thousands of civilians.¹¹²

Another militia under rebel General Laurent Nkunda had signed a peace deal with the government in January, but clashes broke out again in August 2008. Gen Nkunda's forces advanced on government bases and the provincial capital Goma in the autumn, causing civilians and troops to flee while UN peacekeepers tried to hold the line alongside the remaining government forces.¹¹³ In attempt to bring the situation under control, the government in January 2009 invited in troops from Rwanda to help mount a joint operation against the Rwandan rebel Hutu militias active in eastern D.R. Congo. Rwanda arrested the Hutu militias' main rival, General Nkunda,¹¹⁴ a Congolese Tutsi hitherto seen as its main ally in the area. However, during 2009 eastern areas remained beset by violence. These shocking figures would usually be more than enough to get media attention the world over, especially if it were to threaten influential nations in some way. Yet, perhaps as a cruel irony, influential nations in the world benefit from the vast resources coming from the D.R. Congo for which people are dying.¹¹⁵ This deadly crisis in essence, had been driven by conflict minerals that multinational corporations

¹¹² Read Nicholas D. Kristof. "Orphaned, Raped and Ignored." *New York Times*, 31 January 2010.

¹¹³ Filip Reyntjens. *The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

¹¹⁴ Séverine Autesserre. *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding* (Cambridge Studies in International Relations). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

¹¹⁵ Gerard Prunier. *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, 73-77.

including electronic companies like Apple and Microsoft desperately need for their sustainability and profit margins.¹¹⁶

Afghanistan

Afghanistan which ranks sixth in 2010 *Failed States Index*, has a long history of instability. It's a landlocked and very mountainous nation. Its strategic position wedged between the Middle East, Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent along the ancient "Silk Route" means that Afghanistan has long been fought over despite its rugged and forbidding terrain. It was at the center of the so-called "Great Game"¹¹⁷ in the 19th century when Imperial Russia and the British Empire in India vied for influence. And it became a key Cold War battleground after thousands of Soviet troops intervened in 1979 to prop up a pro-communist regime, leading to a major confrontation that drew in the US and Afghanistan's neighbors.¹¹⁸ But the outside world eventually lost interest after the

¹¹⁶ "The Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and Rebel Access to Natural Resources," *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (January 2010): 15-28. Also see "Resources, Violence and the Telluric Geographies of Small Wars," *Progress in Human Geography* 35 (December 2011): 733-756. First published on February 28, 2011. The D. R. Congo is one of the few places on earth with some of the rarest of valuable natural resources—considered as curses rather than blessings. The primary conflict minerals are: Tin (produced from cassiterite) –is used for cell phone and all electronic products as a solder on circuit boards. The biggest use of tin worldwide is in electronic products. Congolese armed groups earn approximately \$85 to \$100 million per year from trade in tin. Tantalum (produced from "coltan") –is used to store electricity in capacitors in iPods, digital cameras, and cell phones. 70 to 80 percent of the world's tantalum is used in electronic products. Congolese armed groups earn an estimated \$10 million per year from trading in tantalum. Tungsten (produced from wolframite), is used to make cell phones to vibrate. Tungsten is a growing source of income for armed groups in Congo, with armed groups currently earning approximately \$5 million annually. Also Gold – used in jewelry and as a component in electronics, is valuable and easy to smuggle between porous borders. Congolese armed groups are earning between \$50 million to \$100 million per year from illegal gold smuggling.

¹¹⁷ Peter Hopkirk. *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia*. New York: Kedonsha Globe Book, 1994. This is a historical work by British standard told in a series of short plays, based on Asia and Afghanistan, with long history of foreign intervention to the present day.

¹¹⁸ Nojumi Neamatollah. *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region*. New York: Palgrave, 2002.

withdrawal of Soviet forces, while the country's protracted civil war dragged on. But their extreme version imposed widespread oppression across Afghanistan and attracted widespread international criticism.

The Taliban,¹¹⁹ drawn from the largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns, were opposed by an alliance of factions drawn mainly from Afghanistan's other communities and based in the north. In control of about 90% of Afghanistan until late 2001, the Taliban were recognized as the legitimate government by only three countries. They were at loggerheads with the international community over the presence on their soil of Osama bin Laden, accused by the US of masterminding the bombing of their embassies in Africa in 1998 and the attacks on the US on 11 September 2001.¹²⁰ After the Taliban's refusal to hand over bin Laden, the US initiated aerial attacks in October, paving the way for opposition groups to drive them from power.¹²¹

Infighting between local commanders over power and territory became a feature of the post-Taliban period. The authorities in Kabul have been able to exert little control beyond the capital and militant violence has continued. Predictions of the Taliban's demise after the adoption of a new Afghan constitution in 2004 proved to be premature,

¹¹⁹ Steve Coll. *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*. It is estimated by CNN that the ten years campaign to hunt Osama Bin Laden excluding the financial losses of the WTC, cost America \$ 1.3 trillion dollars. That amount in a decade could have done more to create a just and stable world than the lives and destruction and hostilities it has created.

¹²⁰ Ahmed Rashid. *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, 22. Also read Robert Dreyfuss. *Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleashed Fundamentalist Islam*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005, 326.

as the hard-line group came back with a vengeance and violence has risen steadily to levels not seen since the fall of the Taliban in 2001.¹²²

The Afghan conflict replaced Iraq as the main policy headache for the US and their allies, and in March 2009 President Barack Obama unveiled a new American strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan to combat what he called an increasingly perilous situation.¹²³ In December, this was followed by an order boosting US troop's numbers by 30,000, as well as a pledge to begin withdrawing forces by 2011. Afghanistan's heroin industry was reported to make up more than half of the economy by 2007, having boomed since the fall of the Taliban. The country supplies over 90% of the world's opium, the raw ingredient of heroin.¹²⁴ International bodies and governments concluded that the drug trade was helping to fuel the Taliban insurgency, which is estimated to generate up to US\$100m a year from the trade. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime called on Afghanistan to target the major traffickers and corrupt government officials,

¹²² Amin Saikal. *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. 2006, 352-259. Also see Roy Gutman. *How We Missed the Story: Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban and the Hijacking of Afghanistan*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2008.

¹²³ President Obama made this declaration on March 29, 2009 at a news Conference on new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. He read "This marks the conclusion of a careful policy review that I ordered as soon as I took office. My Administration has heard from our military commanders and diplomats. We have consulted with the Afghan and Pakistani governments; with our partners and NATO allies; and with other donors and international organizations. And we have also worked closely with members of Congress here at home. Now, I'd like to speak clearly and candidly to the American people." Also accessed from the paper of *Council on Foreign Relations*. March 29, 2009.

¹²⁴ Ashraf Ghani. "Where Democracy's Greatest Enemy Is a Flower," *The New York Times*, December 11, 2004, 19 [database on-line], available from ProQuest, accessed October 17, 2006. Also see John K. Cooley, "Just Say No to Opium-Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan," *Christian Science Monitor*, September 21, 2006, 9 [database on-line], available from ProQuest, accessed October 17, 2010.

who it says operate with impunity in the country.¹²⁵ At the conclusion of the NATO conference held in Lisbon, Portugal on November 20, 2010, the US and its NATO allies planed to hand over security to the Afghans by 2014.¹²⁶ Yet, the violence remains unabated with the killing of over twenty-five US Special Forces and President Karzai's half brother in 2011. With a clear mandate by the Obama's administration and NATO to end their mission in Afghanistan in 2013, the world awaits the outcome of a Post-NATO peace enforcement nation of Afghanistan, emerging either as a success story or a relapsed failed state.

Iraq

Iraq which ranks seventh in the *Failed States Index* has a long ancient and modern history. The land known as Mesopotamia,¹²⁷ wedged between the Tigris and Euphrates, which gave birth to some of the most early and advanced of ancient civilizations is present day Iraq. As the Sumerians, they created one of the most ancient civilizations in the world—credited with creating the first identifiable written language, sometime

¹²⁵ William Marley. *The Afghanistan Wars*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2009, 278-288. Also see Paul Collier. *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can be Done about it*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 31. Collier, for example, claims that 'Ninety five percent of global production of hard drugs is from conflict countries'.

¹²⁶ The British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC diplomatic correspondent, Jonathan Marcus made some observation and analysis of the NATO summit decisions in Lisbon, Portugal, on Afghanistan which he claimed sent different messages to different audiences. "For public opinion in the NATO countries the message is that a large exit banner has been unfurled." A transitional period has been established from July of next year until the end of 2014 by which time, it is hoped, NATO combat operations will end.

¹²⁷ Enrico Ascalone. *Mesopotamia: Assyrians, Sumerians, Babylonians (Dictionaries of Civilizations)*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007.

around 4000BC.¹²⁸ The ancient city of Babylon, capital of the region of Babylonia, lies in modern-day Iraq, its ruins found about 80 km south of Baghdad. The most sophisticated legal code of the ancient world came from Iraq. Introduced by King Hammurabi, whose dynasty ruled Babylonia from about 1793- 590BC, it is the first known legal code that takes into account whether a crime was committed intentionally or not. This makes it the precursor of the *mens rea* principle¹²⁹ upon which our modern criminal legal system is based.

During the reign of the Babylonian King Nebuchadnezzar II (604-562 BC), Babylon became the biggest city in the world. The great biblical patriarch Abraham came from the city of Ur in ancient Iraq. Nebuchadnezzar II is also said to have built the legendary *Hanging Gardens of Babylon*,¹³⁰ one of the seven wonders of the ancient world. In ancient times, Baghdad was built on western bank of the Tigris and was also known as Madinat al-Salam or “City of Peace”. The legendary warrior Saladin, who recaptured Jerusalem from the Crusaders in the 12th century, was born in Tikrit, near Saddam Hussein’s native village.¹³¹ Saddam made comparisons between himself and

¹²⁸ W. Eilers. “Iran and Mesopotamia,” in E. Yarshatar. *The Cambridge History of Iran*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

¹²⁹ Read Paul H. Robinson. *Mens rea Principle. Criminal Law: Cases and Controversies*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2005, 39. It’s a standard of judging the criminal mind in order to determine levels of mental states, just as homicide is considered more severe if done intentionally rather than accidentally. These terms are in descending order: “purposely”, “knowingly,” “recklessly,” and “negligently” and “strict liability”.

¹³⁰ Karen Polinger Foster. “Garden of Eden: Flora and Fauna in the Ancient Near East.” *Transforming of Middle Eastern Environments: Legacies and Lessons*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998, 320-329.

¹³¹ Read H.A.R. Gibb. *The Life of Saladin: From the Works of Imad ad-Din and Baha ad-Din*. London: Clarendon Press, 1973.

Saladin. In 1258, Genghis Khan's grandson, Hulagu, led an invasion which utterly destroyed the Islamic capital of Baghdad. The Mongol army made a pyramid of the skulls of Baghdad's scholars, religious leaders and poets. The late Saddam Hussein once called President George W. Bush as "the Hulagu of this age," and warned the US that "the people of Baghdad have resolved to compel the Mongols of this age to commit suicide on its walls."¹³²

Historically, Iraq, an Arabic word, has been associated with an ancient meaning of *Uruk*, for a Sumerian city in the 6th century. From 1534 -1918, the region was part of the Ottoman Empire. The British formed the modern state of Iraq when they consolidated the three disparate provinces of Basra (in the south), Baghdad and Mosul (in the north) in the aftermath of WWI, when the ruling Ottoman empire collapsed.¹³³ The modern nation state of Iraq became independent in 1932. In the late 1800s, the British controlled the Middle East in order to have a land route to India.

In 1904 the British Navy shifted from coal to oil and later in 1916 the British/French in Sykes-Picot agreement arbitrarily drew national borders in the Middle East; southern Mesopotamia including Baghdad was to be administered by Great Britain. Arabs were angry about this secret agreement when it was published by the Russian government in 1917.¹³⁴ Fearing a rebellion, the British used systematic aerial

¹³² Jessica Moore. The Iraq War Player Profile: Saddam Hussein's Rise to Power. PBS News Hour, 01.20.04.

¹³³ Magnus Thorkell Bernhardsson. *Reclaiming a Plundered Past, Archaeology and Nation Building in Modern Iraq*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005.

¹³⁴ See League of Nations Report to the Council of Nations by General F. Laidoner, Situation in the Locality of the Provisional Line of the Frontier between Turkey and Iraq fixed at Brussels on October

bombardment for first time in history, invading Mesopotamia and occupying Baghdad, making Iraq a British Mandate. By 1921 the British Colonial Office demarcated a line across Southern Iraq creating Kuwait to prevent Iraq access to Persian Gulf. When in the late 1940s after WWII British power began to wane the Americans stepped in.¹³⁵

It was George Kennan one of the architects of US Cold-war Foreign policy who stated in 1948 that:

The US has about 50% of the world's wealth but only 6.3% of its population. In this situation we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national security. To do so we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and daydreaming, and our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives. We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford the luxury of altruism and world benefaction. We should cease to talk about such vague and unreal objectives as human rights, the raising of living standards and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.¹³⁶

Therefore, the struggle for Middle East oil became a geo-political battle of the Cold-War era. Moreover, in 1951 Mossadigh took power in Iran and declared that they will control their own oil. But in 1953 after two years of U.S. sponsored sanctions the

29, 1924. Parliamentary Papers 1924–25, vol. xxxi Cmd. No. 2557. In the initial secret agreements, the British sought to place the French in Mosul in order for them to act as a buffer between a British Mesopotamia and a Russian controlled Armenia. This was amended in secret negotiations between Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau in February of 1919. See Harry N. Howard, *The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History 1913–1923*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1931.

¹³⁵ See Charles Tripps. *A History of Iraq*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

¹³⁶ George F. Kennan. *Realities of American Foreign Policy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954. See *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. George Frost Kennan (February 16, 1904–March 17, 2005) was an American advisor, diplomat, political scientist, and historian, regarded as the father of “containment” and as a key figure in the emergence of the Cold War.

CIA supported a plot to overthrow Mossadigh and placed the Shah in power.¹³⁷ The American General, Norman Schwarzkopf, was mandated to help the Shah develop its security apparatus. However, in 1958 a popular revolution led by Abd al-Kassem Quassim failed to overthrow the British-installed king of Iraq. But he was finally overthrown in 1959 and one of the assassins was Saddam Hussein who wounded Quassim.¹³⁸

Later Saddam became a tyrannical ruler. However, his totalitarian, centralized rule was quite effective in keeping the tensions inherent amongst the three primary groups in Iraq (Sunni Arabs, Shi'a Arabs, and Kurds) intact. Saddam's heavy-handed rule was the stabilizing force that held the ethnically and religiously divided nation of Iraq together, and when he fell from power the infrastructure of the state collapsed along with him. The long simmering tensions between the three groups finally surfaced. When the U.S. finally entered Baghdad, it found itself in a political and military quagmire which forced itself to be aggressive in helping avoiding civil war between the various groups.¹³⁹

¹³⁷ Hanna Batatu. *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

¹³⁸ Con Coughlin. *Saddam, King of Terror*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2002. Coughlin follows Hussein's rise from his simple birth in the late 1930's in a mud hut in al-Ouja, a wretched town on the Tigris. In spite of the disadvantages of his birth, Saddam was able to overcome those seemingly insurmountable social obstacles to reach the pinnacle of Iraq's political pyramid." Coughlin details Hussein's political career under the tutelage of his uncle Khairallah Tulfah, a Nazi sympathizer who once wrote a pamphlet called "Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: Persians, Jews and Flies."

¹³⁹ Reeva Spector Simon. *Iraq between the Two World Wars: The Militarist Origins of Tyranny*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, 7-43.

The Neo-Cons¹⁴⁰ of the Bush administration then, predicted that the newly liberated Iraq would become a beacon of democracy and hope for the rest of the Middle East, a region of autocratic regimes. The Bush administration was ideologically blinded by facts and reality. What most of the skeptics and critics of the world saw was “regime change” in Iraq and a massive failure to pre plan for the seemingly endless difficulties of nation-building in the absence of Saddam and his Baath Party.¹⁴¹

Haiti

Haiti which ranks eleventh on the *Failed States Index*, became the world’s first black-led republic and the first independent Caribbean state when it threw off French colonial control and slavery in a series of wars in the early 19th century. However, decades of poverty, environmental degradation, violence, high HIV/AIDS epidemic, instability and dictatorship have left it as the poorest nation in the Americas (Western hemisphere).¹⁴² A mostly mountainous country with a tropical climate, Haiti’s location, history and culture, epitomized by voodoo, once made it a potential tourist hot spot, but

¹⁴⁰ Read Bob Woodward’s book *Plan of Attack*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004; and Murray Friedman’s book, *The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. These works gave a succinct history of neo-conservatism in American politics, leading up to the war in Iraq.

¹⁴¹ Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay. *American Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute. 2003. The authors make the argument that the revolutionary Bush was no one’s puppet but a decisive leader. However, his decisions specifically on Iraq came with great risks and international alienation. His exertion of raw American power alone was not enough to preserve and extend America’s security and prosperity in the modern world. The United States often needs the help of others to meet the challenges it faces overseas.

¹⁴² Paul Farmer. *Aids and accusation: Haiti and the Geography of Blame*. San Francisco: California University Press, 2006. pp.180-183.

instability and violence, especially since the 1980s, severely dented that prospect.¹⁴³ Haiti achieved notoriety during the brutal dictatorships of the voodoo physician Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier and his son, Jean-Claude, or “Baby Doc”. Tens of thousands of people were killed under their 29-year rule.¹⁴⁴

Hopes that the election in 1990 of Jean-Bertrand Aristide,¹⁴⁵ a former priest, would herald a brighter future were dashed when he was overthrown by the military a short time later. Although economic sanctions and US-led military intervention forced a return to constitutional government in 1994, Haiti's fortunes did not pick up, with allegations of electoral irregularities, ongoing extra-judicial killings, torture and brutality. Additionally, a bloody rebellion and pressure from the US and France forced Mr. Aristide out of the country in 2004.¹⁴⁶ Since then, an elected leadership has taken over from an interim government and a UN stabilization force has been deployed. But Haiti is still plagued by violent confrontations between rival gangs and political groups and the UN has described the human rights situation as catastrophic.

Meanwhile, Haiti's most serious underlying social problem, the huge wealth gap between the impoverished Creole-speaking black majority and the French-speaking minority, one percent of whom own nearly half the country's wealth, remains

¹⁴³ See Colin Dayan. *Haiti, History, and the Gods*. San Francisco: University of California Press, 1998.

¹⁴⁴ Robert Debs Heinl and Nancy Gordon Heinl. *Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People 1492–1995*. University Press of America, 2005. Also read Amy Wilentz. *The Rainy Season: Haiti since Duvalier*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990.

¹⁴⁵ Charles Arthur. *Haiti in Focus: A Guide to the People, Politics, and Culture*. New York: Interlink Publishing Group, 2002.

¹⁴⁶ P. Hallward. *Damming the Flood: Haiti, Aristide, and the politics of Containment*. London: Verso Books, 2007, xiii, 78-79.

unaddressed. Many Haitians seek work and a better life in the US or other Caribbean nations, including the neighboring Dominican Republic, which is home to hundreds of thousands of Haitian migrants.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, the infrastructure has all but collapsed and drug trafficking has corrupted the judicial system and the police. Haiti has always been ill-equipped to deal with the aftermath of the tropical storms that frequently sweep across the island, with severe deforestation having left it vulnerable to flooding. It also lies in a region prone to earthquakes.

Natural disaster struck with full force in 2010, when the capital Port-au-Prince was hit by magnitude 7.0 earthquake became the country's worst disaster in 200 years. Tens of thousands of people were killed and much of the capital and its wider area devastated, prompting a major international aid effort. In mid October to early November of 2010, an outbreak of cholera and Hurricane Thomas hit the country, leaving scores of people dead and displaced. The Haitian people certainly have been hit by multiple calamities—social, environmental, political, racial economic disasters. Equivocally, the nation of Haiti deserves a robust nation-building agenda with the help of the international community and Haitians people themselves.

Rwanda

Rwanda which ranks forty-first in the *Failed States Index* 2010, has experienced Africa's worst genocide in modern times, and the country's recovery was marred by its

¹⁴⁷ Charles Arthur. *Haiti in Focus: A Guide to the People, Politics, and Culture*. New York: Interlink Publishing Group, 2002. Also see Adam Hochschild. "Birth of a Nation: Has the Bloody 200-year History of Haiti Doomed it to More Violence?", *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 30, 2004 (Retrieved November 24, 2011).

intervention in the conflict in neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo.¹⁴⁸ The country has been beset by ethnic tension associated with the traditionally unequal relationship between the dominant Tutsi minority and the majority Hutus. Although after 1959 the ethnic relationship was reversed, when civil war prompted around 200,000 Tutsis to flee to Burundi, lingering resentment led to periodic massacres of Tutsis. The most notorious of these began in April 1994.¹⁴⁹ The shooting down of the plane carrying President Juvenal Habyarimana, and his Burundian counterpart, near Kigali triggered what appeared to be a coordinated attempt by Hutus to eliminate the Tutsi population.¹⁵⁰ In response, the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) launched a military campaign to control the country. It achieved this by July, by which time at least 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus had been brutally massacred.¹⁵¹ Some two million Hutus fled to Zaire, now the D.R. Congo. They included some of those responsible for the massacres, and some joined Zairean (renamed the DRC) forces to attack local Tutsis. Rwanda responded by invading refugee camps dominated by Hutu militiamen.¹⁵²

Rwanda withdrew its forces from DR Congo in late 2002 after signing a peace deal with Kinshasa. But tensions simmered, with Rwanda accusing the Congolese army

¹⁴⁸ Linda Melvern. *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide*. New York: Verso Books, 2004, 49-60.

¹⁴⁹ Christian P. Scherrer. *Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War*. Westport: Praeger, 2002.

¹⁵⁰ See Philip Gourevitch. *We Wish To Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families*. New York: Picador, 2000.

¹⁵¹ Romeo Dallaire. *Shake Hands With The Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*. London: Arrow Press, 2005.

¹⁵² Edward L. Nyankanzi. *Genocide: Rwanda and Burundi*. Schenkman Books, 1998, 198.

of aiding Hutu rebels in eastern D.R. Congo. Rwanda has used traditional *Gacaca* community courts to try those suspected of taking part in the 1994 genocide.¹⁵³ But key individuals, particularly those accused of orchestrating the slaughter appeared before an International Criminal Tribunal in northern Tanzania. The country is striving to rebuild its economy, with tourism, coffee and tea production being among its main sources of foreign exchange. Yet, nearly two thirds of the populations live below the poverty line.¹⁵⁴

The Balkans (former Yugoslavia)

Only Bosnia-Herzegovina ranked sixtieth, is currently listed on the *Failed States Index* for 2010 from the former Yugoslavia. The defunct Yugoslavia Federation was first formed as a kingdom in 1918 and then recreated as a Socialist state in 1945 after the Axis powers were defeated in World War II. The constitution established six constituent republics in the federation: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. Serbia also had two autonomous provinces: Kosovo and Vojvodina.¹⁵⁵ By 1992 the Yugoslav Federation was falling apart. Nationalism had once again replaced communism as the dominant force in the Balkans.¹⁵⁶ Slovenia and then Croatia were the first to break away, but only at the cost of renewed conflict with Serbia.

¹⁵³ Mahmood Mamdani. *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.

¹⁵⁴ Alison Des Forges. *Leave No One to tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. *Human Rights Watch*. Also available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda> (accessed 10.12.10).

¹⁵⁵ See Robin Okey. *Taming Balkan Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

¹⁵⁶ John B. Allcock. *Explaining Yugoslavia*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.

The war in Croatia led to hundreds of thousands of refugees and reawakened memories of the brutality of the 1940s.¹⁵⁷

By 1992 a further conflict had broken out in Bosnia which had also declared independence. The Serbs who lived there were determined to remain within Yugoslavia and to help build a greater Serbia. They received strong backing from extremist groups in Belgrade. Muslims were driven from their homes in carefully planned operations that become known as “ethnic cleansing”. By 1993 the Bosnian Muslim government was besieged in the capital Sarajevo, surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces that controlled around 70% of Bosnia. In Central Bosnia, the mainly Muslim army was fighting a separate war against Bosnian Croats who wished to be part of a greater Croatia.¹⁵⁸

The presence of UN peacekeepers to contain the situation proved ineffective. American pressure to end the war eventually led to the Dayton agreement of November 1995 which created two self-governing entities within Bosnia-the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Muslim (Bosnjak)-Croat Federation.¹⁵⁹ The settlement’s aims were to bring about the reintegration of Bosnia and to protect the human rights but the agreement has been criticized for not reversing the results of ethnic cleansing. The Muslim-Croat and Serb entities have their own governments, parliaments and armies.¹⁶⁰ A NATO-led peacekeeping force was charged with implementing the military aspects of the peace

¹⁵⁷ Maria Todorova. *Imagining the Balkans*. Oxford University Press, 2009, 22-28.

¹⁵⁸ Barbara Jelavich. *History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century*, Volume 2. New York: American Council of Learned Societies, 1983.

¹⁵⁹ L. S. Stavrianos. *The Balkans since 1453*. New York: NYU Press, 2000.

¹⁶⁰ See Traian Stoianovich. *Balkan Worlds: The First and Last Europe*. Sources and Studies in World History. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994.

agreement, primarily overseeing the separation of forces. But the force was also granted extensive additional powers, including the authority to arrest indicted war criminals when encountered in the normal course of its duties.¹⁶¹

Croatia, meanwhile, took back most of the territory earlier captured by Serbs when it waged lightning military campaigns in 1995 which also resulted in the mass exodus of around 200,000 Serbs from Croatia. In 1998, nine years after the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy, the Kosovo Liberation Army, supported by the majority ethnic Albanians came out in open rebellion against Serbian rule. The international community, while supporting greater autonomy, opposed the Kosovar Albanians' demand for independence.¹⁶² But international pressure grew on Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, to bring an end to the escalating violence in the province. Threats of military action by the West over the crisis culminated in the launching of NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia in March 1999, the first attack on a sovereign European country in the alliance's history.¹⁶³

Slobodan Milosevic lost a presidential election in 2000 and refused to accept the result but was forced out of office by strikes and massive street protests, which

¹⁶¹ Sabrina Ramet. *The Three Yugoslavias: State-building and Legitimation, 1918-2003*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006.

¹⁶² Stephen Engelberg. "Germany Raising Hopes of Croatia, *New York Times*, December 12, 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/12/world/germany-raising-hopes-of-croatia.html> (retrieved 11.24.10). "Before the war, the Yugoslav Army drew its soldiers from conscription in all of the Yugoslav republics. Now it must rely on Serbian reservists and Serb irregulars who are poorly trained. A recent report by the monitoring mission concluded that the army was routinely shelling civilian areas."

¹⁶³ Marko A. Hoare. *A History of Bosnia: From the Middle Ages to the Present Day*. London: Saqi, 2007.

culminated in the storming of parliament. He was handed over to a UN war crimes tribunal in The Hague, and put on trial for crimes against humanity and genocide. Slobodan Milosevic was found dead in his cell in The Hague on March 11, 2006. His long-running trial had been hit by repeated delays, partly because of his poor health and no verdict had been reached.¹⁶⁴ A Dutch investigation concluded that he had died of a heart attack, dismissing claims by his supporters that he had been poisoned. In Kosovo reconciliation between the majority ethnic Albanians, most of them pro-independence, and the Serb minority remained elusive. Several rounds of UN-mediated talks have been held, without any significant breakthrough. The UN tried to find a solution for Kosovo's disputed status in 2006 but has not yet concluded. All efforts to hold free and fair general elections in December, 2010 failed.¹⁶⁵ The political and territorial status of an independent Kosovo still lingers in 2012.

Lessons Learned: The Case of Successes and Failures Reexamined

The United States emerged from its Civil War and subsequent Reconstruction period as a world economic power. National policies in the 1890s marked a distinctly changed condition in United States foreign policy reflecting in great measure the nation's emotions and personality.¹⁶⁶ Americans exhibited tremendous pride and confidence in the nation's industrial capabilities and in their democratic form of government.

¹⁶⁴ See Louis Sell. *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2002.

¹⁶⁵ Sabrina P. Ramet. *The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–2005*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006, 34–39.

¹⁶⁶ William L. Barney. *The Passage of the Republican. An Interdisciplinary History of Nineteenth-Century America*. Lexington: D.C. Heath & Co., 1987, 235–245.

With this came a “sense of superiority of American political and social values and America began to see the world as an arena open and waiting for the embracement of these ideals.”¹⁶⁷ The Spanish American War was a product of this rise to global power and, it can be argued, led to America’s first foreign nation-building effort. The reasons for entering this war and the later actions in the occupied territories are hauntingly similar to the conditions which 110 years later led to United States involvement in Germany, Japan, Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq.¹⁶⁸

However, in post-war Germany before the U.S entered the war, it had done its planning for nation-building. There was a general belief in the United States that the exclusive market policies of Germany and Japan had been one of the primary reasons of the war. Japan and Germany “had pursued a dangerous pathway into the modern industrial age and combined authoritarian capitalism with military dictatorship and coercive regional autarky.”¹⁶⁹ Addressing the political and economic principles of free determination and free trade, Roosevelt sought to set the conditions of the post-war world through the Atlantic Charter. The Atlantic Charter also served Roosevelt’s desire to restrain Great Britain’s imperialistic tendencies.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷ Martin Kyre and Joan Kyre. *Military Occupation and National Security*. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1968, 52.

¹⁶⁸ See Paul Kennedy. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. New York: Vintage, 1989, 358. America’s participation in WW I and II came as a great economic prosperity to the United States, unlike the other nations that were involved in those wars.

¹⁶⁹ G. John Ikenberry. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, 173.

¹⁷⁰ Lucius D. Clay. *Decisions in Germany*. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1950, 11.

Likewise in Japan the United States sought to achieve the same basic goals as those in Germany: “demilitarization, decartelization, destroying militant nationalism, and democratization.”¹⁷¹ A military Government was established under General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP).¹⁷² The challenges confronting MacArthur were similar to those faced by the commanders in Germany. MacArthur’s task was simplified somewhat because the United States was the only occupying force and therefore not subject to the complexities caused by the four occupying forces in Germany. Although clashes did occur with the Soviet Union, particularly as the Cold-War gained momentum, MacArthur was generally unencumbered in carrying out United States policy.¹⁷³

In the initial years after the end of World War II and throughout the Cold-War, nation-building by the United States was primarily concerned with creating buffer states that could stem the tide of communism. This was widely termed as ‘democratization’. In the cases of Germany and Japan, “it stood for demilitarization (and denazification in Germany), establishment of democratic institutions, and reeducation of the entire country’s population.”¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ Robert Wolfe. *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984, 37.

¹⁷² William Sebald. *With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation*. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1965, 72-74.

¹⁷³ Philip Towle. “Cold War.” In Charles Townshend. *The Oxford History of Modern War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, 160-168.

¹⁷⁴ Karin Von Hippel. “Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation-Building.” *The Washington Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (2000): 95-112. Also see Hippel. “Back-pedaling in Iraq: Lessons Unlearned.” *Conflict, Security, and Development* 4, no. 1 (2004): 79-89.

Part of the reason that these two nation-building efforts were successful was due to the fact that “the United States mobilized extraordinary resources to transform America’s war-time enemies, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, into liberal democracies.”¹⁷⁵ But in reality, it was far less important that Germany and Japan be democratic than that they be capitalist and rich.”¹⁷⁶ These two cases owe much of their success to the fact that most of the facets of the state (economy, governmental structures, national identity, civil society, security, etc.) were already in place, albeit deteriorated. These two nations point perhaps the most successful and extensive examples of nation-building ever seen.

Unfortunately, later US led efforts in places such as Vietnam, Lebanon, El Salvador, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq have met with mixed results. The relative failures of these nation-building efforts is largely due to the international community’s tendency “to settle for the dampening of violence, not to devote to nation-building the resources or time that would be needed for it to succeed.”¹⁷⁷

Henceforth, nation-building cannot be a half-hearted endeavor, unless the external actor is committed to a balanced approach and devoting an adequate amount of resources and time to making the nation-building effort work, it is doubtful that a complete

¹⁷⁵ Gary T. Dempsey. “Fool’s Errands: America’s Recent Encounters with Nation-Building.” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 12, no.1 (2001): 57-80.

¹⁷⁶ Noah Feldman. *What We Owe Iraq: War And the Ethics of Nation Building*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, 7.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 19.

transformation can be achieved. The aforementioned nations also encountered difficulties because “most of the needed elements (as mentioned above in regards to Germany and Japan) were never in place or only in a very rudimentary amount.”¹⁷⁸

In the end it is all but impossible to create a nation out of a hollow state structure. During the Cold War the goal of nation-building was not so much as to completely rebuild a nation’s infrastructure, but rather to make a state stable enough to act as a counterweight against communism. During the Cold War the US and the Soviet Union each and, in some cases, both “propped up weak states for geopolitical reasons; but denied such support, these and other states disintegrated.”¹⁷⁹ Part of the reason for such disintegration was the fact that the external actors “focused on the creation of state allegiance rather than on the creation of states themselves.”¹⁸⁰

During the Cold War period, “the objective was to create nations that would, by a complex combination of external pressure and the financial self-interest of elites, take (America’s) side in a global war and be useful to us in it.”¹⁸¹ But after the end of the Cold War, the aim of nation-building began to change. Once communism had been defeated and the Soviet Union was no longer perceived as a threat, the United States altered both the nature and purpose of its nation-building efforts.

¹⁷⁸ Amitai Etzioni. “The Limits of Nation-Building.” In *How Patriotic is the Patriot Act*. Ch. 6. New York: Routledge, 2004, <http://crab.rutgers.edu/~goertzel/EtzioniNationBuilding.html> (accessed 10.20.09).

¹⁷⁹ Dominique Vidal. “A Guide to Nation-Building.” *Le Monde Diplomatique* (December 2003), <http://mondediplo.com/2003/12/10rand> (accessed 09.12.10).

¹⁸⁰ Gary T. Dempsey. “Fool’s Errands: America’s Recent Encounters with Nation-Building.” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 12, no.1 (2004): 60.

¹⁸¹ See Noah Feldman, 2004, 8.

As mentioned earlier, the goal of nation-building had now become the creation of reasonably legitimate, reasonably liberal democracies. In turn, this was meant to enhance international peace and security, with an economic system that is accountable and just. For much of the 1990's, nation-building was carried out under the guise of 'democracy promotion'. This was a somewhat altruistic effort on behalf of the United States and its allies that in the end served to "justify eight years of interventionist foreign policy."¹⁸² We saw various efforts to transform failed states into democratic allies were undertaken in places such as Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia to name a few. In the case of Somalia the nation-building effort ended in disaster when the U.S. suffered military casualties and promptly put an end to the nation-building 'experiment' there.¹⁸³ After this incident, the somewhat idealistic nature of nation-building and the U.S.'s responsibility to democratize the world began to be called into question. Consequently, the United States and the United Nations' failure in Rwanda was a setback to massive and collective responses of the international community to major humanitarian crises that imploded in places like Liberia, Sierra Leone and Rwanda.¹⁸⁴

These long and painful crises, however, created a new paradigm shift in the international system, requiring the West and other influential nations like Japan and

¹⁸² Dempsey, 2001, 62.

¹⁸³ See Stephen Zunes. *Somalia as a Military Target*. Washington, DC: Foreign Policy in Focus, January 11, 2002.

¹⁸⁴ The end of the Cold War triggered new hot wars and regional chaos. Rwanda and Burundi were engulfed in ethnic cleansing, while Liberia and Sierra Leone plunged into bloody civil wars. Former President Charles Taylor of Liberia has finally been sentenced to fifty years in jail on May 30, 2012 in The Hague for aiding and abetting in the war in Sierra Leone. This is the longest sentence ever handed down by the International Criminal Court. Victor Bout, the merchant of death, one of the leading dealers of illegal arms to many fragile regions is also in American prison for 25 years on April 5, 2012.

South Korea to accept the establishment of genuine democratic states favorable to their interests. The United States finally saw the urgency of genuine democracy given the rapid ascent of terrorism during the last decade, amidst 9/11. In this respect nation-building has now become a form of conflict prevention. It is no great secret that failed states are often breeding grounds for terrorism. Indeed, “the breakdown of the state can cause economic, social, and political upheavals and, giving rise to major humanitarian disasters, destabilization of entire regions and even turn them into sources of transnational terrorism.”¹⁸⁵

Given this, it is in the interests of the external actors to ensure that any nation-building efforts be seen through to completion. As Feldman describes it, “our objective must be to build stable, legitimate states whose own citizens will not seek to destroy us.”¹⁸⁶ This leads us to an important discussion around the Christian involvement in the process of nation-building. Though a secular nation, most Americans identified with their religious conviction in decision making.¹⁸⁷ This means that in dealing with the task of nation-building or failed states, the Christians ought to be key partners in this global effort. We now know that the war on terror and the hunt for Osama Bin Laden cost the

¹⁸⁵ Jochen Hippler. *Nation-Building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation?* London: Pluto Press, 2005, 4.

¹⁸⁶ See Noah Feldman, 2004, 8. Also see Feldman’s *Divided by God*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005, 10-13.

¹⁸⁷ Robert D. Putnam and David E. Campbell. *American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010, 4-8. Also see report from the Pew Forum on Religion and Politics, www.pewforum.org (accessed 10.15.10).

United States at least \$3 trillion¹⁸⁸ over the past fifteen years, counting the disruptions he triggered on the domestic economy, the wars and heightened security aroused by the terrorist attacks he masterminded including the covert missions to hunt him and other members of his organization. I certainly believe that such financial and human resources that were wasted in Afghanistan and Iraq could have been spent on a Global Marshall plan that could positively transform the world in terms of global and domestic security; strong economic, cultural, scientific, political and social cooperation and growth. This is indeed the challenge and way forward—to turning failed states into authentic nations.

Clearly, we've seen throughout our historical analysis, that the failure of the international system to fully engage nations that are distressed by internal and external strife can lead to calamitous situations. Therefore, the colonial era in which mainly Western Europeans powers over reached their political and economic agendas by the occupation of other cultures, peoples and their resources created a world of the “weak” versus “strong”, a wedge between the “haves” and “have-nots.” Further, the system created an unjust evolutionary chaos, leading to the partition of borders, cultures, and society in unprecedented fashions.¹⁸⁹ In this reconfiguration and artificial engineering of the world order, the world could only be construed through the prism of East-West divide. Their so-called wars were known as World Wars. However, the end of the post-

¹⁸⁸ Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes. *The Three Trillion Dollars War*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2008. This book focuses on the war in Iraq and the economic costs involved. Also see Tim Fernholz and Jim Tankersley. “The Cost of Bin Laden: \$3 Trillion over Fifteen Years.” *The National Journal*, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-cost-of-bin-laden-3-trillion-over-15-years-20110505?page=1> (accessed 04.05.11).

¹⁸⁹ Robert I. Rotberg. “The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention and Repair,” in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, 42-46.

Cold War era world did little to create a new Westphalian era. Instead, the unipolar world has seen more human rights violations, genocides, wars, and pandemic—culminating into an era of failed states, that threatens the very foundation of civilization.¹⁹⁰

Sadly, one of the most curious aspects of Post-Cold War and Post 9/11 world are the egregious terror, genocide and the many forms of injustices that have become so difficult to comprehend or assigning guilt to the perpetrators. As events that we know as war crimes, genocide, or dictatorships come to light, we learn that millions have been tortured and killed. We also have learned that many thousands have carried out the killing, that a smaller proportion of people have organized it, and that individuals in high office have ordered it or sometimes that one person only has ordered it.

Eventually, we also have learned that endless multitudes of people were bystanders during those horrible crimes and atrocities both internationally and domestically. We have discovered that these people saw, heard, or knew about the violence, injustice that led to mass killing being carried out ‘in their name’, but that they largely did nothing. We find that a small minority—like Sister Shirley Kolmer in Liberia and Paul Rusesabagina of Hotel Rwanda, perhaps tried to help or rescue the victims, but that the vast majority exercised what has come to be known as ‘passivity’ or ‘indifference’, but which is in fact an active choice to doing nothing—injustice. The situations described above apply in many cases of modern failed states and the crimes committed against the innocents, and the difficulty of assigning guilt in these cases can

¹⁹⁰ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998, 32.

be gleaned from the painful process under way in the UN international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, and the DRC in The Hague and its equivalent for Rwanda, situated in Arusha.¹⁹¹ We are left to ask ourselves—where have we stood (as Christians) when millions were killed and made to suffer, while others lingered in abject depravity—why did we not see that our neighbors were beyond our own race, cultures, tradition, and geographical locations? Are we not as responsible like the very few who have been directly charged with responsibility? I assert that our reactions and inaction as the international community and human beings over the centuries have been one of failed interventions and neglects. Nevertheless, our only option in the midst of the perilous task and challenges in nation-building is genuine intervention and stability for those failed states to recover and reconcile their bitter pasts.¹⁹² In turns, it makes the world much more safe, stable, and sustainable for all of us.

¹⁹¹ Philip Gourevitch. "Forsaken, Congo Seems Less a Nation Than a Battlefield for Countless African Armies." *New Yorker* (September 25, 2000): 53, 60. Also see José E. Alvarez, "Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda," *Yale Journal INT'L Law* 24 (1999): 365, 462.

¹⁹² Stefan Mair. "A New Approach. The Need to Focus on Failing States," *Harvard International Review* 29, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 52–55.

CHAPTER THREE

CORE CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND THE PROTESTANT RESOURCES FOR
ENGAGING WITH THE CRISIS OF FAILED STATES

Core Christian Theological and Ethical Roots: The Biblical Heritage

In this chapter I will give an overview of the core Christian ethical principles of love, justice, hope, and the common good and relate them to the pressing problem of failed states and the suffering they cause. My methodological and historical analysis will be informed firstly by the Wesleyan Quadrilateral,¹ in which we bring to bear four key sources—Scripture, reason, experience, and tradition—as guiding principles for our understanding of Christian socio-ethical and theo-political responsibility. My application of love, justice, hope and the common good is deeply informed by the views of Reinhold Niebuhr’s Christian realism, which I argued, is of deep significance in the current context of Christian engagement in a world torn by political, social, and economic calamities.

Love

Within the Christian tradition, love is one of the three theological virtues.² When Jesus was asked what the greatest teaching of the law is, he replied, “Love the Lord your

¹ Albert Outler, a United Methodist theologian, was a major architect in the formation and interpretation of what we now considered as the Wesleyan Quadrilateral, namely, the use of Scripture, Reason, Tradition and Experience in our hermeneutics and moral actions in life. See Thomas Ogden. *The Wesleyan Theological Heritage: Essays of Albert C. Outler*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Press, 1990.

² The theological virtues are faith, hope and love (charity), articulated by The Roman Catholic Church. They are the foundation of Christian moral activity; they animate it and give it its special character.

God with all your heart and with all your soul and with your entire mind. This is the first and greatest commandment. And the second is “Love your neighbor as yourself.”³ The term love has come down across the centuries with several meanings, including eros (romantic) love, or philia (friendship).

Within the Christian context, there is agape, the love of God that compels us to love everyone, particularly enemies. This view of love is well articulated by Andres Nygren who concluded that “agape is the center of Christianity, the Christian fundamental motif par excellence.”⁴ Agape is not primarily an emotion, although it often involves the emotions, and is supported by them. It is primarily a commitment or obligation to care about someone or something. Agape is reasonably the divine, unconditional, self-sacrificing, active, and volitional love that is foundational to Christianity.⁵

In Paul’s letters, he writes, “Love is patient; love is kind; love is not envious or boastful or arrogant or rude. It does not insist on its own way; it is not irritable or resentful; it does not rejoice in wrongdoing, but rejoices in the truth. It bears all things,

They inform and give life to all the moral virtues. They are infused by God into the souls of the faithful to make them capable of acting as his children and of meriting eternal life. They are the pledge of the presence and action of the Holy Spirit in the faculties of the human being. They dispose Christians to live in a relationship with the Holy Trinity.

³ Matthew 22:36-40.

⁴ See Andres Nygren. *Agape and Eros*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, 48. Nygren asserts that his primary objective was “to investigate the meaning of Christian love” and “illustrate the main changes it has undergone in the course of history” (pp. 27, 39). For him, agape is a paramount principle in Christian theology and piety.

⁵ Ibid., 31-32. Nygren makes a distinctive claim of agape, the Christian conception of love, which is contrasted from non Christian concepts of love. Agape and Eros, for example, according to Nygren, originally had nothing to do with each other, because they belong to two “entirely separate spiritual worlds, between which no direct communication is possible.” In addition, each type of love suggests a different attitude toward life.

believes all things, hopes all things, and endures all things.”⁶ Most people misinterpret love to mean unrelenting emotional feeling for one’s country, religion, race, ethnicity and career. Such limitations of the meaning of love have led to great crimes and atrocities committed in the name of love. Hitler’s Nazism, White supremacists, Hutu and Tutsi genocide, Islamic Fundamentalism, Christian exclusionism, narcissistic love, United States exceptionalism, and many forms of extremisms are born out of such distorted notions of love. Most Evangelical Christians and Muslims are often time guilty of labeling nonmembers as infidels or animistic, an absolute narrow-minded claim on the narrative of love and truth. On his last night with his disciples before his crucifixion, Jesus said to them, ‘I am giving you a new command. You must love each other, just as I have loved you. If you love each other, everyone will know that you are my disciples.’”⁷

Jesus in his ministry had given his disciples a perfect example of love in his relationship with them. He then commanded them to do the same. He said, “And over all these virtues put on love, which binds them all together in perfect unity.”⁸ It is interesting that the command to “love one another” is found at the heart of every passage of ethical instructions which Paul gives.⁹ It is as if he regards other commands as merely an explanation of what it means to love. We are commanded to do many things for each other in the New Testament, but the command to “love one another” appears sixteen

⁶ 1 Corinthians 13:14

⁷ John 13:34, 35

⁸ Colossians 3:1

⁹ See Romans 13:9; Galatians 5:13, 22; Ephesians 5:2; Colossians 3:14; I Thessalonians 4:9.

times. Therefore, love becomes an ethical obligation that Christians are called to embrace unconditionally—which I assert must be the driving force for nation-building.

It is this concept of love as agape that is fundamental to Reinhold Niebuhr's philosophical and theological discourse. He holds to the pure ethic of Jesus which is love.¹⁰ The responsibility of the church then, is to relate God's love in a meaningful way to the moral problems of our society. Unfortunately, Niebuhr insists that Christianity seems to lack an ethical relevancy. He insists that "the refusal of the Christian Church to espouse pacifism is not apostasy and that most modern forms of pacifism are heresy."¹¹

So for Niebuhr, getting involved in nation-building, especially ending the regimes of tyrants, (in his days, Hitler, Fascism, and Nazism) would require the decisive and collective participation of Christians. On Germany, he wrote that "it is not possible to defeat a foe without causing innocent people to suffer with the guilty... It is not possible to engage in any act of collective opposition to collective evil without involving the innocent with the guilty. It is not possible to move in history without becoming tainted with guilt."¹² The Judeo-Christian creation myth in the Genesis account helps us appreciate tension and reality of our world and sinful nature of humanity. Yet, in spite of

¹⁰ Reinhold Niebuhr. *Love and Justice: Selections from the Shorter Writings of Reinhold Niebuhr*. Edited with an introduction by D. B. Robertson. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1957, 253.

¹¹ Niebuhr's essay on "Why the Church Is Not Pacifist" was recently reprinted in *The End of Illusions: Religious Leaders Confront Hitler's Gathering Storm*, ed. Joseph Loconte. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, 135.

¹² Reinhold Niebuhr. "The Bombing of Germany," in *Love and Justice: Selections from the Shorter Writings of Reinhold Niebuhr*, ed. D. B. Robertson. New York: Meridian Books, 1967, 222. This article was originally published in *Christianity and Society* (Summer 1943).

our depravity, we remain hopeful, knowing that we are saved by the final form of love which is forgiveness.¹³

Hope

In Christian thought, hope is one of the three theological virtues. It points exclusively toward the future, as a realistic desire and expectation. Hope is not a wishful thinking; rather, hope is a firm assurance regarding things that are unclear and unknown.¹⁴ Hope is a fundamental component of the life of the righteous.¹⁵ Without hope, life loses its meaning¹⁶ and in death there is no hope.¹⁷ The New Testament idea of hope is the recognition that in Christ is found the fulfillment of the Old Testament promises and hope.¹⁸ Christian hope is rooted in an eschatological vision of the world, where we have hope of the resurrection of the dead¹⁹ and the redemption of the body and of the whole creation.²⁰ This description of hope is a powerful motif for all the Christian community. It is quite interesting that in Greek mythology of *Pandora's Box*²¹, all evils

¹³ Reinhold Niebuhr. *The Irony of American History*, 63.

¹⁴ See Romans 8:24-25; Hebrew 11:1, 7.

¹⁵ Proverbs 23:18.

¹⁶ Lamentations 3:18 and Job 7:6.

¹⁷ Isaiah 38:18, Job 17:15.

¹⁸ Matthew 12:21 & 1 Peter 1:3.

¹⁹ Acts 23:6.

²⁰ Romans 8:23-25.

²¹ Read Hesiod's *Theogony, Works and Days*. New York: Shield, 1988. In the Ancient Greek mythology, Pandora was a beautiful woman with extraordinary beauty. Every god conferred her with a talent to make her perfect. Aphrodite gave her beauty, Hermes made her eloquent and Apollo presented her with the gift of music. Finally, Zeus gave Pandora a box, in which there were disasters and plagues. One

escaped the lid of the basket but for one—hope. Like other cultural traditions, hope plays a pivotal role in creating optimism even in the midst of uncertainties and turbulent times. In my personal experience, when I was severely abused and nearly killed at a check point during the Liberian civil war, it was such hope, even in the midst of uncertainties, that kept me positive. Additionally, hope gives us the desire that something is realizable even though there is a probability that one might not achieve it. Hence, for hope to be effective it must be approached from a balanced perspective—where optimism is fused with realism. In this way, there is no deep disappointment and relapse to fear. A good example was the 2010 American midterm political elections in the USA, where pro-Obama's supporters who voted overwhelmingly in 2008 for him on the popular mantra of hope and change were disillusioned and refused to engage the midterm election process. I believe they were unrealistic in their hopes by failing to understand the need to persevere by indefatigably engaging the political process, which in essence defines the socio-economic policies of the nation and the world at large. In Niebuhrian argument, they failed to see the reality of a world in its complexity that is driven by self interest.

day, when Pandora was all by herself at home, she could not resist her curiosity and opened the box Zeus had given to her. However, there was nothing but all kinds of catastrophes in the box. From that time on, human began to suffer from all kinds of disasters such as disease and plague, misfortune and misery, selfishness and greed, madness and jealousy, pomposity and cruelty. In panic, she immediately closed the box and hope was left in the box. Hope was secretly placed in the bottom of the box because Athena did not want to see the destruction of humans. Therefore, even though people go through all the sufferings, they are able to keep hope in their heart and stay hopeful about their life and future.

Justice

Justice is considered as one of the four cardinal virtues in Christian thought.²² From a biblical perspective it is primarily concerned with conduct in relation to others, especially with regard to the rights of others.²³ It is applied to commerce, where just weights and measures are demanded.²⁴ It is demanded in courts, where the rights of rich and poor, Israelite and sojourner, are equally to be regarded. Therefore judges and witnesses cannot be influenced by sentiments and popular beliefs: “Justice, justice shalt thou follow.”²⁵ In a larger sense justice is not only giving to others their rights, but involves the active duty of establishing their rights.

The majority of references to justice in the Bible actually relate to a person’s legal rights. The sage or wise one exhorts us to “[s]peak up for those who cannot speak for themselves, for the rights of all who are destitute. Speak up and judge fairly; defend the rights of the poor and needy.”²⁶ He or she is talking about the legal rights of the poor and destitute. When Absalom expressed his desire to be a judge so that “everyone who has a

²² Emil Brunner. *Justice and the Social Order*. New York and London: Harper, 1945, 18f, 33, 46ff, 73f, 83, 96. Brunner, *The Divine Imperative*, 210, 337. Justice is here taken in its ordinary and proper sense to signify the most important of the cardinal virtues. It is a moral quality or habit which perfects the will and inclines it to render to each and to all what belongs to them. The others are Prudence (wisdom), Courage (fortitude), and Temperance (moderation).

²³ See Josef Pieper. *The Four Cardinal Virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1954, 45, 54-57.

²⁴ See Leviticus 19:35,36; Deuteronomy 25:13-16; Amos 8:5; Proverbs 11:1; 16:11; and Ezekiel 45:9,10.

²⁵ See Deuteronomy 16:20 ; compare 16:18-20; Exodus 23:1-3, 6-9.

²⁶ Proverbs 31:8- 9.

complaint or case could come to [him] and [he] would see that [they get] justice.”²⁷

Absalom is talking about the courts upholding a person’s legal rights. When Amos declares that the people “oppress the righteous and take bribes and ... deprive the poor of justice in the courts,”²⁸ he is clearly referring to their legal rights being denied.

The Hebrew word most often rendered as ‘just’ or ‘justice’ in the Old Testament is *mispat*. It occurs four hundred twenty-four times in four hundred and six verses,²⁹ and when rendered as ‘just’ or justice, it is used in numerous ways including as a reference to conformity with the law.³⁰ It is used also to refer to moral uprightness rooted in God’s character,³¹ doing the right thing³², and justice in legal disputes.³³ It can also refer to laws or statutes,³⁴ legal rights,³⁵ legal proceedings in general,³⁶ correct weights and measures,³⁷ specified or prescribed offerings,³⁸ a judge’s decision/verdict,³⁹ and a

²⁷ 2 Samuel 15:4.

²⁸ Amos 5:7, 10-12.

²⁹ Morphological search performed with GRAMCORD 2.4x on Groves-Wheeler Westminster Hebrew Morphology v. 3.1.

³⁰ See Genesis 18:19.

³¹ Psalms 106:3.

³² Genesis 18:25.

³³ Exodus 23:6.

³⁴ Exodus 15:25, 21:1.

³⁵ Exodus 21:9.

³⁶ Numbers 35:12, Isaiah 3:14, Deuteronomy 1:17.

³⁷ Leviticus 19:35-36.

³⁸ Leviticus 5:10, 9:16, Numbers 29:6, 18, 21.

sentence of punishment.⁴⁰ In the New Testament, the Greek word *krisis* occurs forty seven times in forty six verses and mostly refers to divine judgment, especially in respect to the ‘day of judgment.’⁴¹ The word *ekdikesis* is rendered as ‘justice’ in three verses,⁴² but like the word’s use elsewhere, it carries the connotation of vengeance and punishment.

From the above, it is clear that when English translations of the Bible employ the word ‘justice,’ the intended meaning is not any form of distributive justice but conformity with the law, legal rights and judgments, moral uprightness and in some cases retribution. Governments, then, in performing their role of maintaining justice, must ensure that no one is above the law,⁴³ that everyone regardless of the social status, maintains their legal rights, and that laws and statutes created are fair and just.⁴⁴ They also must insure that law breakers are adequately punished, and that sufficient remedies are available to victims. This biblical understanding of justice aptly illustrates how Christians must exercise careful discernment when considering the application of justice to problems, their root causes, and best solution for any social, political, spiritual and economic concerns.

³⁹ 1 Kings 3:2.

⁴⁰ 1 Kings 20:40.

⁴¹ Matthews 11:22, 12:41.

⁴² Luke 18:7, 8, 2 Corinthians 7:11.

⁴³ Job 34:17-19.

⁴⁴ Isaiah 10:1-2.

Common Good

The crux of the common good within biblical or Christian thought resonates in the Judeo-Christian Sacred writings and other religious traditions. Paul writes that “now to each one the manifestation of the Spirit is given for the common good.”⁴⁵ In the Catholic tradition, the universal common good is specified by the duty of solidarity, “a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good, a willingness to lose oneself for the sake of the other instead of exploiting them.”⁴⁶ In the face of structural sin, solidarity requires sacrifices of our own self-interest for the good of others and solidarity places special obligations upon the materially wealthy and powerful nations and people of the world. In a special way, the common good requires solidarity with the poor who are often without the resources to face many problems, including the potential impacts of environmental degradation and failed communities and nations.

Our obligations to the global human family transcend space and time. They tie us to the poor and vulnerable in our midst and across the globe, as well as to future generations. The commandment to love our neighbor invites us to consider the poor and marginalized of other nations as true brothers and sisters who share with us in this global ecosystem. Though God commands us to have dominion and subdue the earth, this is not a permission to dominate and exploit. Therefore, human dominion⁴⁷ is a special

⁴⁵ 1 Corinthians 12:7.

⁴⁶ Pope John Paul II, *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*, no. 3, 1987.

⁴⁷ Genesis 1:28; and Psalm 8.

responsibility that ought to reflect God's way of ruling as a shepherd king who takes the form of a servant wearing a crown of thorns.⁴⁸

The government or international community is intended to serve God's purposes by limiting or countering narrow economic interests and promoting the common good. This requires regulating the paying of taxes to enable government to carry out these and other purposes that are appropriate expression of our stewardship in society, rather than something to be avoided. Many governments often fall short of these responsibilities which I assert have led to the current problems of failed states.

A Historical Analysis of Protestant Christian Social Ethics

The Methodist Movement and Social Christianity

The Methodist movement founded by John and Charles Wesley on the campus of Oxford University is rooted in Anglicanism. These brothers along with some of their friends sought to bring a revival to Anglicanism. To them, salvation and holiness were essential for the reign of God.⁴⁹ The movement began as a group primarily concerned about organizing small groups or cells in practicing a spiritually disciplined lifestyle, the reading of scripture (bible studies), rather than engaging in theological (speculative) or philosophical debates. To understand John Wesley, one must always bear in mind that he lived and died as an Anglican. Historically, the Church of England developed a method known as the *via media*, an attempt to bridge the gap between Roman Catholicism and the Reformation, yet remained open to the development of their own church.

⁴⁸ Philippians 2:7.

⁴⁹ Theodore R. Webber. "Rights and Liberties," *Politics in the Order of Salvation*. Nashville: Kingswood Books, 2002, 333-352.

Moreover, Wesley was quite aware of the influence of individualism that permeated the Enlightenment era—where religion became privatized. This was of deep concern for him. In his interpretation and application of scripture, Wesley and his friends practiced a communitarian lifestyle, where “social holiness” and “social witness” were rooted in the call to social justice with Jesus Christ as the model. Thus, the poor and deprived people of the slums of England deeply influenced Wesley and his movement.⁵⁰ Effectively, Wesley was able to attract the lowliest of societies such as slaves, poor, sinners and destitute during the Great Awakening, a period of great Christian revival and evangelicalism in Europe and the Americas.

However, Methodism distinguishes itself from Calvinism and Lutheranism by positing that faith alone could not justify this new relation with God forever. We needed another form of grace—Sanctifying grace of the Holy Spirit upon the believer who must also be responsive to this dynamic process by his or her action (*praxis*). This continuous movement of renewal is what Francois Fenelon described as *progressus ad infinitum* (“my progress is without end”).

Wesley as a “religious synthesizer” incorporated this rich element of sanctifying grace from Aquinas’s teaching on sanctification. It is described in the *Summa Theologica* (*Prima Secundae Partis*) as the lifelong process in the journey of the believer whereby the fullness of the image of God in him or her is brought to bear fruits.⁵¹ It is this deep eternal

⁵⁰ Richard P. Heitzenrater. *The Poor and the People Called Methodists 1729-1999*. Nashville: Kingswood Books, 2002, 15-38.

⁵¹ See Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274): *Summa Theologica, Prima Secundae*. His magnum opus, the *Summa theologiae*, was enormously influential as the summation of his thinking, the basis of Thomist philosophy and theology. *Prima secundae*, completed in Rome in 1269, opens by proving that God is

grace in the heart of the Christian that ought to sustain a social and spiritual angst against injustice. On this basis, the adoption of the Social Creed of Methodism attributed to its close attention and response to the lives of the millions of workers in factories, mines, mills, tenements and company towns in the 18th and 19th centuries. It was through the Methodist Federation for Social Service that in 1908 The United Methodist General Conference advocated that the church proactively address the pressing social crisis in many communities that had lingered on for so long during harsh economic times.

The key strategy was to secure adoption of a statement on “The Church and Social Problems.” Proponents of the Social Creed came up with a list of eleven social reforms the group believed the church should champion, including the abolition of child labor and an end to the sweatshop system.”⁵² The Social Principles have become an intrinsic part of the United Methodist Church’s outreach in addressing human issues in the contemporary world. They are rooted in a sound biblical and theological foundation as historically demonstrated in United Methodist traditions.

The Social Principles are a call to moral responsibility intended to be instructive and persuasive in the best of the prophetic spirit. However, the UMC did not make them legally binding but morally demanding on Methodists’ consciences, requiring a prayerful and studied dialogue between faith and practice.

In dealing with political matters, the statement declared:

indeed the goal of man, Questions 1-5, then continuing to discuss human acts, their causes and consequences, Questions 6-21, the passions, Questions 22-48, habits and whether virtues are habits, Questions 49-70, vice and sin, Questions 71-89, human and divine law, Questions 90-108, and grace, Questions 109-114.

⁵² The *Interpreter Magazine*, April 1988.

While our allegiance to God takes precedence over our allegiance to any state, we acknowledge the vital function of government as a principal vehicle for the ordering of society. Because we know ourselves to be responsible to God for social and political life, we declare the following relative to governments.⁵³

It also addresses the political economy by categorically emphasizing the responsibility of governments to demonstrate sound and effective economic policies and practices that can lead to the flourishing of the human community. This call is based on the need for governments to be attentive and responsive and to be stewards of the resources that are needed for safe guiding our lives and that of the natural environment. It reads:

We claim all economic systems to be under the judgment of God no less than other facets of the created order. Therefore, we recognize the responsibility of governments to develop and implement sound fiscal and monetary policies that provide for the economic life of individuals and corporate entities and that ensure full employment and adequate incomes with a minimum of inflation. We believe private and public economic enterprises are responsible for the social costs of doing business, such as employment and environmental pollution, and that they should be held accountable for these costs. We support measures that would reduce the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. We further support efforts to revise tax structures and to eliminate governmental support programs that now benefit the wealthy at the expense of other persons.⁵⁴

It also made a profound statement on the social community by categorically advocating for equality and rights based on human dignity. The core of this social action premised on the notion that we are all endowed with these inalienable rights and therefore

⁵³ Neil M. Alexander. United Methodist Social Principles. The Political Community. Paragraph 164, in *The Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church*. Nashville: UM Publishing House, 2008. The UMC is the first Christian denomination to write a social creed addressing political, social, economic, and cultural issues in a wholistic perspective.

⁵⁴ Ibid., paragraph 163.

valuable in the eyes of God. As such, the church must treat and protect the rights of all people regardless of creed, gender, race, culture, or beliefs. It reads:

The rights and privileges a society bestows upon or withholds from those who comprise it indicate the relative esteem in which that society holds particular persons and groups of persons. We affirm all persons as equally valuable in the sight of God. We therefore work toward societies in which each person's value is recognized, maintained, and strengthened. We support the basic rights of all persons to equal access to housing, education, communication, employment, medical care, legal redress for grievances, and physical protection. We deplore acts of hate or violence against groups or persons based on race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religious affiliation, or economic status.⁵⁵

Categorically the root of Methodism's socio-political actions is traced from its founders to the formulation of the Wesleyan Quadrilateral, a phrase coined by Albert Outler.⁵⁶ When the Evangelical United Brethren and the Methodist Episcopal Church merged as the United Methodist Church in 1968, one of the most pressing issues was the formation of a doctrinal statement to replace both denominations' respective statements of faith. When one speaks of Wesley's Methodism, the word "method" seems implicit. Method is a "procedure or principle used in any organized discipline or in organizing."⁵⁷ Methodology is the way in which we can arrive at a solution or obtain knowledge. Because the application of methodology is a scientific or philosophical enterprise, it is quite interesting that Wesley's movement became identified as "Methodist." This was due in part to his penchant for organizing the movement so effectively and diligently

⁵⁵ Ibid., paragraph 162.

⁵⁶ Albert Outler, a United Methodist theologian, was a major architect in the formation and interpretation of what we now considered as the Wesleyan Quadrilateral.

⁵⁷ Donald A. D. Thorsen. "The Wesleyan Quadrilateral," *An Overview of Wesley's Theology*. Lexington: Emeth Press, 2005, 31.

dealing with practical matters of faith and social issues affecting the individual and community as a whole.

For Wesley, scripture was divinely inspired during the Patristic period of the Early Church. For him, the writers of the scriptures were “immediate instruments” of God’s revelation. However, he clarified that inspiration was not a matter of “instantaneous expression” on the minds of the writers. He acknowledged the limitation of human beings in apprehending such revelation as experienced through our language, arts, forms and activities. However, these limits could never affect the primacy of scripture over all other sources of authority. Through the power of the Holy Spirit, scripture bears witness of God’s divine purpose of creation, bringing scriptural truth (gospel) to the heart of humanity as—*testimonium Spiritus Sancti interrumpit*.⁵⁸

However, the Enlightenment promoted human autonomy and freedom allowing humans to see the ‘self’ as individualistic and answerable to none. So when religious or scriptural norms are imposed by the church on the lives of ordinary Christians it creates tension of loyalty. Should one follow the teaching of the church or be guided by the state? This unresolved tension is seen throughout the political, social, and economic arenas of various Western and Eastern societies. What this tension amounts to is the appropriation of the teaching in the lives of individual Christians through their traditions, experiences and reasons. Often times, disillusioned members are forced to leave the church when they feel excluded for failing to adhere to the authority of scripture.

⁵⁸ See John Calvin’s work. *Institutio Christianae Religionis*, 1536. He uses the expression *testimonium Spiritus sancti* only once in a reference to the text of Scripture, where Hezekiah was praised by the testimony of the Holy Spirit because he destroyed the brazen serpent.

In dealing with this quandary, Wesley insisted that scriptural teaching is relevant for all ages because it affirms both church and state (secular) as institutions where God is at work.⁵⁹ So, for the Wesleyan movement, the reclamation of the ancient faith is a confirmation of the scripture—as the living word in which God encounters all of creation. Thus, scripture, as the meta-narrative, is an invitation to humanity to participate in God’s redemptive plan for all of creation.

For Wesley, tradition meant Christian antiquity. He personally defined it as “the religion of the primitive church, of the whole church in the purest ages”⁶⁰ as revealed in scripture. He cautioned his preachers not to depart from such antiquity. However, he was quite aware of the traditional biases associated with problematic passages that needed correct interpretation through reason and experience. He writes, “If any doubt still remains, I consult those who are experienced in the things of God, and then the writings whereby, being dead, they yet speak. And what I thus learn, that I teach.”⁶¹

Wesley also was aware of the tension associated with the reformation. As an Anglican, he steered clear from the extremes. In so doing, he appropriated teachings and practices from different religious traditions. At times he was accused by his detractors of “popery” for paying too much attention to hierarchical structure of the Roman Catholic Church. On other occasions, he insisted the right tradition of the church is the application of the scripture as advocated by the Reformation. However, he avoided the “doctrinal

⁵⁹ Theodore R. Webber. “*Rights and Liberties*,” *Politics in the Order of Salvation*. Nashville: Kingswood Books, 2002, 333.

⁶⁰ Donald A. D Thorsen. “*The Wesleyan Quadrilateral*,” *An Overview of Wesley’s Theology*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1993, 151.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 153.

anarchy of Protestantism.”⁶² For Wesley, being open to other traditions was a form of reconciliation among Christians. Therefore, as long as those traditions supported his general principle of biblical orthodoxy, he incorporated them into his theological framework and practices. In essence, Wesley began an early ecumenical movement where he saw various traditions as branches of the same tree.

The Lockean influence of Wesley’s epistemology is especially apparent in his embrace of the *tabula rasa*. Locke, in his writing *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* posited that human beings are not born with “innate ideas.” He argues instead that the mind is analogous to a blank slate (*tabula rasa*), on which the senses make impressions, i.e. empiricism. In fact, Frederick Dreyer notes, that Locke’s essay was one that Wesley embraced as a student at Oxford and on occasion recommended it as “suitable reading” for devout Methodists.⁶³ However, Dreyer also notes that Wesley’s acceptance of Lockean epistemology was exacerbated by the fact that he was a committed Christian.⁶⁴

While Enlightenment sentiments about rationality and reason have long been interpreted as being antithetical to religious experience in general and the Christian faith in particular, Wesleyan thought thrived in this era. One of the reasons for this is because, as Brantley notes, the dialectic of empiricism and evangelicalism brought together the emotion and intellect. Wesley, unlike some of his clergy and religionist contemporaries, was able to find common ground between his versions of Christian theology with many

⁶² Ibid., 156.

⁶³ Frederick Dreyer. *The Genesis of Methodism*. Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 1999, 22.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

of the secular philosophical precepts of his day without losing the integrity of either.

Brantley states, “Although empiricism is natural and evangelicalism is spiritual, the great principle of empiricism is that one must see for oneself and be in the presence of the thing one knows, applies as well to evangelical faith.”⁶⁵

Reason as a tool is an essential element in one’s articulation of the scripture.

Wesley was aware of the rising suspicion of scripture during the Enlightenment on the broader Christian community. Historically, the church authority felt threatened by reason (scientific knowledge) for fear that it eroded confidence in the authoritative nature of scripture and tradition. Unlike the authority, Wesley saw reason as a “tool” needed for human flourishing. As noted earlier, he was greatly influenced by British empiricists. For the “empiricists, experiences (empiricist comes from the Greek word meaning “experience”) of the senses are the source of all knowledge.”⁶⁶ But from a Wesleyan’s view, reason alone could not be a source of all knowledge. Miles posits that, “While reason alone is useless without data from experience, data alone is useless without the tool of reason. Without reason we cannot understand the data revealed in creation or scripture.”⁶⁷

How does reason shape our thinking in the matter of faith? Wesley regarded reason to be consistent with faith. By this he meant that it was important for nurturing an authentic Christian. Wesley asserted that any “Unreasonable person who claims to be a

⁶⁵ Richard Brantley. *Locke, Wesley and the Method of English Romanticism*. Gainesville: Florida University Press, 1984, 1.

⁶⁶ Rebekah L. Miles. “The Instrumental Role of Reason,” *Wesley and the Quadrilateral: Renewing the Conversation*, edited by Stephen Gunter. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1997, 78.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

Christian is no more a Christian than he or she is an angel. So far he or she departs from true genuine reason, so she departs from Christianity.”⁶⁸ In reality, Wesley’s appeal to reason was an attempt to counteract those who felt threatened by its application. Interestingly, Miles observed that Wesley mentioned reason more often than the other forms of authority with exception of scripture—often pairing reason with scripture. He once remarked, “Use no other weapons than those of truth and love, of scripture, and reason”.⁶⁹

Influenced by Aristotelian and Empiricist philosophies, Wesley held the belief that human knowledge originated from human experience. In Pauline’s language, “God has written these thoughts on human hearts.” Wesley’s favorite quote was “*Nihile est in intellectu quod non fuit prius in sensu*,” i.e., nothing in the understanding, which was not first perceived by the senses,⁷⁰ but acknowledging that spiritual senses, the knowledge of God could still be acquired even without the physical senses. Through a *via media*, he appropriated a platonic view of the existence of God operating in a spiritual realm independent of the physical. In this way, Wesley encouraged his followers to cultivate spiritual insight into the knowledge of God as revealed by the Holy Spirit.

In reconciling these two schools of thought (Empiricism) and (Platonism), he is credited for the development of what is known in the Methodist circle as a

⁶⁸ Ibid., 79.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 80.

⁷⁰ Miles, 90.

“transcendental empiricism.”⁷¹ It is “This unconditioned condition by which the given is given...the given sees as “immediacy” that which is given to our senses...It is the immanence of the empirically given prior to any mediation of conceptual thought of the perceiving subject.”⁷² In essence, what the given sees as “immediacy” is the cohabitation of Wesley’s spiritual senses and the physical senses—a fusion of Platonism and Aristotelian thoughts.

As a revivalist, Wesley took the role of human experience quite seriously. Because of this, critics often considered his movement as enthusiasts—those acting out of their raw emotion. He dismissed their charges on the ground by claiming that experience must be validated by the other sources, especially reasoning. Experience becomes the total verifiable account of the lives of others that have been passed down as tradition. Yet, experience must be tested by the past experiences (traditions).

The Catholic theologian Margaret Farley succinctly articulates Wesley’s perspective. She acknowledges that what we now have as scripture is in essence, “human experience being shaped and interpreted.” She notes that “there would be no theology or ethics were there no religion and morality, aspects of experience whose meanings need[ed] to be understood and articulated.”⁷³ Farley’s assertion does make sense if our “claim to truth is at stake.” Wesley urges us to tests these experiences with other sources such as scripture. Experience becomes the source that enables us to appreciate all of

⁷¹ Ibid., 92.

⁷² Beth Metcalf. *Transcendental Empiricism* (Paper Delivered on Deleuze), <http://users.rcn.com/bmetcalf.ma.ultranet/Transcendental%20Empiricism.htm> (accessed 04.10.10).

⁷³ Margaret Farley. *The Role of Experience in Moral Discernment, Christian Ethics*, edited by Lisa Cahill and James Childress. Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1996, 137.

creation and the traditions of past. He wrote “We are incapable of loving God until we first experience God’s love for us.”⁷⁴

Lastly, experience allows us to value our human subjectivity in light of the experiences of others. As Farley observes, the disagreement usually associated with experience is not a matter about “differences in experience but about whether or not some person’s experiences should be allowed at all as a source for social or communal discernment.”⁷⁵ In addressing this problem, Wesley encouraged his members to always verify all of human experiences in light of scriptural truths.

Wesley offers us the prospect of love, justice, hope and the common good—for building and mobilizing all voices and communities. By adopting the stance of “open heart, open mind, and open doors,” Wesley saw Christianity as an invitation for all to participate in the narrative of God’s redemption for creation. This is a call for inclusiveness and consensus building where new voices are heard, thereby “offer[ing] the kind of public criteria needed for legitimizing new points of view in a rapidly changing culture.”⁷⁶ Wesley’s message embodied by the spirit of solidarity is a call to praxis,

⁷⁴ Randy Maddox. *Responsible Grace: John Wesley’s Practical Theology*. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994, 117.

⁷⁵ Farley. “The Role of Experience in Moral Discernment,” *Christian Ethics*, edited by Lisa Cahill and James Childress. Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1996, 147.

⁷⁶ Thomas E Frank. “History Theology, and the Discipline,” *Polity, Practice and the Mission of the United Methodist Church*. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2002, 141-158.

shaping our orientation of how we can love and respect our neighbors [and strangers] and protect the entire environment.”⁷⁷

The United Methodist Church holds that the living core of the Christian faith was revealed in Scripture, illumined by tradition, vivified in personal experience, and confirmed by reason. These theological and ethical sources within Methodism have enabled me to make sense and gain insight of a world so complex and diverse. Therefore, the quadrilateral is applicable to the Christian understanding of the problem of failed state and how we ought to be involved in nation-(re)building, the most pressing concerns in our world at this present time.

The Modern Root of Christian Socio-Political Actions

As John Atherton posits, the modern root of Christian political actions especially within the Protestant’s tradition in addressing pressing social and political issues can be traced to three movements, namely, “Christian Conservatism,” “Social Christianity,” and “Theological (Christian) Realism.”⁷⁸ Christian Conservatism, which predates social Christianity, has had significant influence in both British and American politics, but also on the world. Most notably, Margret Thatcher of England and Ronald Reagan and President Bush senior and President Bush junior have dominated Western political economy for more than three decades. It is rooted in the 1798 seminal work of Parson Malthus, *An Essay on Principle of Population as it Affects the Future Improvement of*

⁷⁷ Philip J. Wogamann. *The Doctrine of God and Dilemma of Power, Trinity, Community, and Power*, edited by M. Douglas Meeks. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2000, 36-38ff.

⁷⁸ See John Atherton. *Christian Social Ethics. A Reader*, Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1994.

Society, in response to faith and the market economy.⁷⁹ It strongly places premium on an unregulated market, but ironically acknowledging the “disruptive effect of economic change and its effect on the society and the vulnerably disposed. Hence its remarkable characteristics are “based on free market, democracy, limited state power, strong military, moral values, a selective amnesia of the market limitation, and opposition to socialism.”⁸⁰

On the other hand, “Social Christianity” has its root in America, since the end of the American civil war and the beginning of the industrial revolution and urbanization. It was a response to address the new problems that led Henry Ward Beecher to state that “Now that God has smitten slavery unto death, he has opened the way for the redemption and sanctification of our whole social system.”⁸¹ In the midst of this perplexing and challenging time, the Church in America realized that it must radically make some changes in the church’s life and prophetic witness in an evolving world order—masterminded by the juggernaut of modernity in the name of industrialization and massive urbanization. Notable figures like F. D. Maurice, Charles Kingsley, Walter Rauschenbusch, Reinhold Niebuhr and most recently Philip Wogaman became champions of the social gospel movement.⁸² These changing realities within America triggered an alarm bell for the growing disparities in the midst of wealth creation. For example,

⁷⁹ Ibid., 40.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ *Christian Social Ethics*, 22. Also see C. H. Hopkins, *The Rise of the Social Gospel in American Protestantism, 1865-1915*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940, 9.

⁸² *Christian Social Ethics*, 23.

In the decade after 1880, the population of Chicago increased by more than 100 percent, with all the associated problems of poverty, unemployment, bad housing, vice, political corruption... [due to such] processes of industrialization in general, and industrial conflict in particular...accompanied by growing and vast inequalities of income and wealth...It represented a stark challenge to the prevailing belief that all life...was part of a divinely-regulated social order.⁸³

This problem brought about the reappropriation of a Christian ethical and theological perspective in engaging a world manifesting unchristian principles. These reformers combined “pastoral work, preaching, practical involvement, theology and spirituality as a wholistic and effective strategy for remedying the social ills of their society.”⁸⁴ This meant rejecting the dominating Protestant theology that supported *laissez-faire* capitalism and particularly unrestricted market system. It opposed a Calvinistic view of individualism and orthodoxy, that focused on fundamentalism and a transcendent God far removed from the people.⁸⁵ Thus, the reformulated view of Christianity was a conglomeration of two focal points for understanding the immanence of God and Christology for the realization of God’s Kingdom on earth:

First, it meant coming to terms with liberal theology developed by Horace Bushnell... [with] emphasis on God’s immanence, on God at work through the world...It necessitated a profoundly solidaristic view of human. It involved too, the acceptance of Jesus as a person in light of faith, but also through the use of reason as biblical criticism...along with the view of the atonement as an example of love rather than a legal transaction...Secondly, the reformulation involved taking the world seriously as God’s arena. This required the major recognition of, and

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 24.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

contribution to, the rise of sociology as a major medium for interpreting contemporary context.⁸⁶

This view of Christianity articulated an open mind to secularism and scientific method for analyzing data and responding effectively to the pressing issues confronting society. The Golden Rule was seen as a universally accepted commandment that all society could accept, specifically the application of stewardship and *agape* in all of human interaction. It was Rauschenbusch who profoundly impacted this movement, by interweaving “a radical Christian socialist tradition, even though the gospel continued to be dominated by the social reformist tradition.”⁸⁷ In his work, *Christianizing the Social Order*, Rauschenbusch advocated for a Christian social order built on democracy that rested on the family church, education system, and politics—all tied to the economic wellbeing of the community.⁸⁸

However, the devastation that the economic and international politics wrought on the global scale—for example, the Great depression in the 1920s and the outbreak of World War II in 1939 saw the emergence of “Christian realism,” posing a challenge to the social gospel movement. “Theological realism,” a term coined by Walter Horton emerged as a critique to the “ethos and theology” of a liberal church. It debunked the central belief of the social gospel—that it was possible to change people so that society could become better for the Kingdom of God. Centrally, proponents of theological or

⁸⁶ Ibid., 25.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 27.

⁸⁸ Walter Rauschenbusch. *Christianizing the Social Order*. Charleston: Nabu Press, 2010. This work was a critique of capitalism. His critics viewed his work to be too secular and lack the depth of insights, as it failed to recognize immanent God was active in creation. But he countered, that God’s kingdom is wholistic and therefore is attentive to the economic wellbeing of humanity.

Christian realism argued that humanity was too sinful and finite—and prejudiced by race, class, status, and nationalism.⁸⁹

Socially, full Christian love was unattainable on earth. This meant that the “self-interest of groups was a matter of power, therefore, the appropriate moral response needed to be based on justice and not love...So the Jesus ethics , so powerful in the social gospel , had now become an impossible possibility.”⁹⁰ Distinctively, Christian realism articulated its appropriation of realities based on pressing concerns of “war, ideology, class, egoism, and depression and not the social gospel’s faith in man that provided the context.”⁹¹ Consequently, a new understanding emerged in the interpretation of Christian symbols, vital for one’s belief and action. In summary, this new Christian realism argues that:

[t]hey [Christian symbols] were seen to illuminate the dramas of the context as the creative tension between love and justice, the sinful and creative inclinations of man [and woman], and personal and the social...Theological realism was to be a dialectical relationship between realities and faith which challenged all theological and political idealism, and all unrealistic idealists and cynical realists. It allowed a theological interpretation of events which spoke to people bound up in them, and provided the common basis for action to an audience wider than the Church.⁹²

⁸⁹ *Christian Social Ethics*, 30. Also see D. B. Myer. *The Protestant Search for Political Realism 1919-1941*. U of California Press, 1960, 240-1.

⁹⁰ *Christian Social Ethics*, 29-30.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁹² *Ibid.* The public space was open for all people beyond the Christian for dialogue and concerted effort in addressing the pressing issues on political, economic, social, scientific and other developmental challenges facing the world.

Roosevelt's New Deal was in tone with the vision of Christian realism's emphasis on the common good. Poignantly, it rejected the extremes of both *laissez faire* and state socialism. It is noted that Roosevelt even identified himself as being as radical as the Federal Council of Churches, the brain child of Christian Realism.⁹³ It is ironic that neo-conservatives as well as liberals are today identifying their ideology with Christian realism. Niebuhr himself denounced conservatism—particularly a conservatism that defended unjust privileges.⁹⁴ Moreover, this movement has always acknowledged and advocated for what it calls the middle axiom—a creative tension that existed in human affairs, especially in religion and politics. Therefore, the just God is the only one who could exert full justice and moral judgments on all of creation. Let us now examine our primary scholar, Reinhold Niebuhr in navigating the themes of love, justice, hope, and the common good. Our emphasis shall also focus on his articulation of Christian realism and his critique of power politics and how a dominant culture or powerful nation like the United States could avoid the pitfall of power and genuinely engage the issues of shadowed or failed states, in need of wholistic nation-(re)building.

Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism

Eric Patterson succinctly articulates the meaning of Christian realism and how it can illuminate our understanding of present political, social, and economic dilemmas. He questions the validity of “Christian realism [to] provid[ing] an intellectual framework for

⁹³ Ibid., 31.

⁹⁴ R. Niebuhr. *Man's Nature and his Communities*. New York: Bles Press, 1966, 16.

approaching political theories as well as real-world policy alternatives.”⁹⁵ He asks, “Can Christian realism suggest concrete proposals for the vexing issues of contemporary life, such as the war on terrorism, violent ideologies, genocide, and nurturing stable political institutions?”⁹⁶ Affirmatively it does. Hence, “Christian realism is a vibrant intellectual approach for evaluating political phenomena that starts with considerations of power, order, security, and responsibility.”⁹⁷ So as a Christian realist one must apply analytical tools in understanding the nature of power politics and its role in defining the political, social, and economic orders that affect the domestic and global affairs of our world. It also identifies the strengths and weaknesses of our human agency in the political context.

Accordingly, Patterson quotes Roger L. Shinn, who described Christian realism as:

The ethic ...in its serious appropriation of biblical motifs and classical doctrines: the uniqueness of biblical revelation, the sinfulness of man and society, the judging and redeeming activity of God, the faith in justification by a divine grace that produces works worthy of repentance, the distinctive quality of Christian love. It was realistic in its criticism of naïve idealism or utopianism and its confrontation with the brute facts and power struggles of the contemporary world. This Christian realism, at least at its best, was not an artificial combination of two unrelated motifs. It was realistic in its appropriation of Christian faith, and it was Christian—often recovering orthodox traditions neglected in the modern church—in its realism...constantly sought the relation between the good news of the gospel and the daily news of the world.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Eric Patterson. *Christianity and Power Politics Today. Christian Realism and Contemporary Political Dilemmas*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, 3.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid. Also see Roger L. Shinn. “Theological Ethics: Retrospect and Prospect,” in *Theology and Church in Times of Change: Essays in Honor of John Coleman Bennett*, ed. Edward LeRoy Long, Jr. and Robert T. Handy. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1982.

⁹⁸ Patterson, 3.

Therefore, Christian realism is committed to understanding and involvement in politics based on a realistic assessment of life. It is out of such development, that Reinhold Niebuhr analyzed the role of Christianity in an increasingly secular world. He proffers that Christianity in its humility ought to promote repentance, which is necessary for the Church to repent of its historic sins, but it also must assert a prophetic voice regarding the moral content of social and political issues and remind people and governments everywhere that their actions and motives are judged by God. Politics must be seen as ordering a moral compass which can be influenced by Christianity's ability to inspire hope in the midst of political and economic downturn. "Just as the Christian gospel calls the proud to repent, it assures those who despair of a new hope."⁹⁹ Niebuhr also advocates that Christianity must provide answers to the meaning of life and history, and that the contradictions of human experience can find consolation. He writes that "through it [faith] we are able to understand life in all of its beauty and its terror, without being beguiled by its beauty or driven to despair by terror."¹⁰⁰

Niebuhr profoundly shaped Christian realism and for that matter, Christian social thinking and political actions of our time. It is no surprise that both McCain and Obama during the 2008 United States presidential elections, claimed to be heavily influenced by Niebuhr. How could two political candidates and parties espousing totally different agendas come to this conclusion? In our examination of some significant Niebuhrean themes, we shall see how his analysis speaks to the current issues of nation-building.

⁹⁹ Reinhold Niebuhr. "The Christian Church in a Secular Age," in Brown's *The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr*. Hartford: Yale University Press, 1987, 84-85.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 85-86.

Niebuhr, for example, asserted that there is no ‘Christian’ economic or political system that could be formulated as a panacea for world problems. However, he believed, there must be a Christian attitude toward all systems and schemes of justice. This requires us to have a critical attitude toward all claims, systems and schemes. The key question we ought to raise is whether such systems will contribute to justice in a concrete situation.¹⁰¹

He writes:

On the other hand a responsible attitude, which will not pretend to be God nor refuse to make a decision between political answer to a problem because each answer is discovered to contained a moral ambiguity of God’s sight...we are men not God; and we are responsible for making choices between greater and lesser evils, even when our Christian faith, illuminating the human scene, make it quite apparent that there is no pure good in history; and probably no pure evil either.¹⁰²

While acknowledging the dignity of the person, Niebuhr also admonishes us to recognize the sinful nature of the person—“that his [or her] lust and ambitions are a danger to the community; and that his rational processes are tainted by the taint of his [or her] own interests.”¹⁰³ Therefore, he warns us of holding any absolutes because they are subjected to change and may only serve the interest of a few or particular section of society. He sums:

In short, the health of our communities is best served if faith, humbly accept treasures of wisdom which may be mediated to the community by those who do not share their faith, and welcome those policies of communal justice which are designed to correct the aberrations of men.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ *Christian Social Ethics*, 214.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 219.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 224.

Niebuhr then can be considered a critically important resource of wisdom for our time. His writings and actions bear witness to the issues he dealt with in a dynamic and humbling ways, a man who avoided all forms of extremes. But his critics may consider him to be relativistic in his thoughts. Contrarily, such claims are unsubstantiated, because as we shall see, in his life long journey, Niebuhr took a stance on every issue he articulated in the public sphere. It is this attitude, ingrained in the Socratic Method and the prophetic witness that those engaging in Christian ethical and theological discourses, ought to emphatically appropriate.

Christian realism is a clarion call to be actively engaged in global issues as decisive as nation-building. Niebuhr believed that the basic presuppositions of the Christian faith are political on the side of their application. “To deny this,” he argued, “is to be oblivious of one aspect of historic existence which the Renaissance understood so well: that life represents an indeterminate series of possibilities and therefore of obligations to fulfill them.”¹⁰⁵ In reality, Niebuhr, like Wesley, sees his theological disposition as a reflection on political and social actions.

As we are realizing daily, the world has become a web of interconnected relations and no one can remain completely isolated and at the same time narrowly self-interested in amassing countless economic wealth and power at the expense of the rest of the world. We now know that the little child in the remotest part of the world is equally human; and we must do all that it takes to help him or her reach her full human potential. In Niebuhr’s term, we must approximate some form of justice; for following in the views of

¹⁰⁵ Reinhold Niebuhr. *The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 190.

Aquinas and Augustine, it is extending love for neighbor; and for me, it is embracing God's radical justice—which is wholistically tied to all forms of virtues that enable us to create utopia—the combination of Augustine's *City of God* and *City of [hu]man* here in this globalized world.

Further, Reinhold Niebuhr the Christian realist, redefined how religiously minded Americans could realistically deal with the world. In his seminal work, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, Niebuhr analyzed the human condition facing societies and nations. He argued that even though the individuals may strive to be moral collectively, human beings are compromised and prone to immorality, and even evil.¹⁰⁶ Because of his complex reasoning about the world, God, and human nature, many critics and admirers had difficulties to ideologically decipher his position. Though identified as a pacifist for a while, he vociferously advocated for American engagement in World War II. He also was a pro-Cold War supporter, but vigorously rejected the Vietnam's war as an extension of that conflict. He wrote that “civilization depends upon the vigorous pursuit of the highest values by people who are intelligent enough to know that their values are qualified by

¹⁰⁶ Reinhold Niebuhr. *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study of Ethics and Politics*. Knoxville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002. In this work, Niebuhr critiques the power structure and its effect. He asserted that politics lacks ultimate value and instead, is relative. Thus to insist on an ultimate view of politics, is an act of idolatry, assuming a kind of perfectionist standard that can never be realized. For despite the possibilities for improving the temporal world, and, beyond, based on the affirmation of hope and redemption, Niebuhr expressed a profoundly tragic sense of history that runs against American optimism. Also see *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics*, London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1941., where he argues that from a realistic perspective, Jesus' ethic is not applicable to problems of society (61); it's an impossible ideal (70, 127) No matter how well we can grasp the ideal, we can never fully grasp it because our reason is always informed (clouded) by our survival instinct. (127) Yet, our task is to (71) reduce anarchy to some kind of immediately sufferable order and unity set these tentative and insecure unities and achievements under the criticism of an ultimate ideal (71). Necessary social order can be attained, but never pure peace, justice or order (98).

their interests and corrupted by their prejudices.”¹⁰⁷ In his view, human societies and human nature, as he acknowledged, is not just a matter of moral and immoral choices, but between external forces in history. “Politics,” as Niebuhr observed, “will to the end of history, be where conscience and power meet, where the ethical and coercive factors of human life will interpenetrate and work out their uneasy compromises.”¹⁰⁸

So how do you work out the tension of human history and its contradictions that persist? For Niebuhr, this tension is never ending until there is an eschatological intervention, but we must keep on trying to reduce the injustices and brutality to a manageable form. This is what he described as the paradox and irony of history. So the central question he poses is who are my neighbors and our response to their needs? For him, it was the Christian love that culminated into our responsibility for approximating some form of justice on earth.

Niebuhr insisted that love obligates us to accept the best principles it can for the ordering of society. Often it is necessary to give priority to one principle over another. One such general principle is justice. Agape, the love of God is inseparable from justice, which is not distinctively Christian. Love then defines the mutuality of active care for another; justice therefore, is the impartial consideration of all parties concerned without giving preference to special interest over the general community. Justice thus, is the mediating principle between absolute love and the power principles of society—the relative embodiment of love in social structures. He then asserts that for large groups the

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 23-26.

¹⁰⁸ Niebuhr. *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, 4.

highest goal is justice rather than love.¹⁰⁹ Hence, the relation between love and justice is dialogical, mutual and dialectical. In this description, justice is the realization of an active love affair where God's selfless love ought to reflect how we are to love our neighbors, strangers, and ourselves. Love complements the concept of justice by partly fulfilling and partly negating justice. In Niebuhr's construct this relationship permeates in three levels.¹¹⁰ First, love is implicitly the *sine qua non* of justice. In the Christian tradition, the love of God enables Christ to die for us, because we have all fallen short of the glory of God (Romans 3:23). In essence, the love of God creates equilibrium, an intrinsic element for justice: "Thus equality is love in terms of logic."¹¹¹

This form of love is our ability to be empathetic to the experience and conditions of others. It is in the spirit of *Umbuunti* and the "I-Thou" relationship. This is what Niebuhr called "imaginative justice."¹¹² Second, love becomes the motivating principle for the establishment of justice. This means that love is actively finding means to elevate justice to a higher form of perfection based on agape. Our natural reason, as important as it is, cannot do this alone because it is subject to the corruptions of self-interest.¹¹³ Therefore, in our limitations the self is in need of God's love, which requires, grace,

¹⁰⁹ Niebuhr. *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, 24. Also see June Bingham. *Courage to Change: An Introduction to the Life and Thoughts of Reinhold Niebuhr*. Lanham: University Press of America, 1993, 195.

¹¹⁰ Niebuhr. *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, 247ff.

¹¹¹ Niebuhr. *Reinhold Niebuhr: Theologian of Public Life*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991, 207.

¹¹² Niebuhr. *Love and Justice: Selections from the Shorter Writings of Reinhold Niebuhr*. New York: Scribner's, 1958, 13.

¹¹³ Niebuhr. *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of its Traditional Defense*. New York: Scribner's 1957, 15.

humility, and contrition. Our contrite spirit is the recognition of our social and sinful nature which demands justice in order to create an impartial and harmonious community.¹¹⁴ Third, love mutually demands the instrument of justice to fulfill its moral obligation for the individual and the community. Love thus becomes an end and justice as a means. In this schema, “The love which creates community must be tentatively violated,” in order “to give the community the bones of authority for the flesh of its [sisterhood] brotherhood.”¹¹⁵

This view on love and justice by Niebuhr is best described by Howard Patton, who asserts that:

Justice is not a fully satisfactory goal in itself because it falls short of love, being dependent upon coercive power on the one hand, and requiring rational calculations in the balancing of rights against rights of others, in a complicated social interrelation, and in the wider community. In comparison, love is free, creative, and redemptive. Justice therefore, is the attempt to institutionalize the moral demands of love.¹¹⁶

Patton, in his analysis of Niebuhr’s theological and ethical views, states that when love goes into action in society, it gives rise to specific schemes or principles of justice. The function of justice is a second best way to prevent one life from taking advantage of another.¹¹⁷ For Niebuhr, there is a realistic tendency for us to think more highly of

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 44.

¹¹⁵ Reinhold Niebuhr. *The Self and the Dramas of History*. New York: Scribner’s, 1955, 201.

¹¹⁶ Niebuhr. *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, 2: 24.8. Also read Howard G. Patton. *Reinhold Niebuhr*. Baylor University, 1977. Full text online, Ch. 5, 2-4, <http://www.religion-online.org/showchapter.asp?title=3279&C=2739> (accessed 07.10.10).

¹¹⁷ Ibid., Ch.5, 3.

ourselves than we ought to think. Love therefore, cannot be an alternative to the “pushing and shoving” which justice requires.¹¹⁸

In our interactions, political structures and pressures remain necessary in conducting human affairs. These are the necessary socio-political actions needed to hold the ruling elites accountable to the masses. In essence, this is social justice which is needed as a corrective vision for conducting the economic, social, and political affairs of the society as a whole. Further, Niebuhr insists that “we need a great deal of this ‘second-rate’ goodness to get along with one another.”¹¹⁹ He then contends that “the will to power” which ironically seeks justice, is at times guilty of the very insecurity it seeks to eliminate. That is, “the will to power in short, involves the ego in injustice.”¹²⁰ Therefore, “the moral and social behavior of individuals and of social groups, national, racial, and economic; and that this distinction justifies and necessitates political policies which a purely individualistic ethic must always find embarrassing.”¹²¹ Correctly, Niebuhr concludes that the larger the group, the more difficult it is in attaining justice. So, the issue is not how well we are able to articulate the concept of love and justice but its application. Patton summarizes Niebuhr’s thought:

Niebuhr said that the question of what is right in love and justice is usually clear. The real problem is what is possible in the light of man’s self-centeredness and intransigence. Hence Niebuhr argued for the principle of prudence. The application of love to schemes of justice must prudently

¹¹⁸ Ibid. Also see Mary Elsbernd and Reimund Bieringer. *When Love is not Enough: A Theo-Ethic of Justice*. Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2002, 163.

¹¹⁹ Niebuhr. *Love and Justice*, 26.

¹²⁰ Niebuhr. *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, 192.

¹²¹ Niebuhr. *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, xi. Also see Niebuhr, *Love and Justice*, 15.

take account of the human factor. Where group loyalties are involved, for example, coercion is often the only means of attaining justice. This holds true even for those men who most adequately embody agape. Love, persuasion, reason, and insight may mitigate and transcend the social struggle, but they cannot eliminate it.¹²²

We see this pattern transcending various religious and secular (political and social) traditions where privileged groups insist on claiming the moral high ground on the functioning of society—by imposing their values or ideology on the greater community. As Niebuhr wrote, this “is the very heart of the problem of Christian politics: the readiness to use power and interest in the service of an end dictated by love and yet an absence of complacency about the evil inherent in them.”¹²³ Illustrative of Niebuhr’s critique, Patton traces Niebuhr’s historical disposition to a number of factors—first, namely the heritage of Protestant pietistic individualism, which negates the application of love to justice. Secondly, Niebuhr recoils from the vague affirmations of dominant orthodox and liberal streams of Christian ethics and of secular moralism (both in its Marxist and liberal versions), that misconstrues the application of love directly to justice without taking account of original sin. Thirdly, Niebuhr appreciates but critiques the Roman Catholic heritage’s natural law theory that he argues, relegates love to the realm of perfection while the church rationally defines the nature of Christian justice. The error here, for Niebuhr, lies in the Church’s uncritical regard for the purity of reason. Fourth,

¹²² Ibid., Ch. 5, 3-4.

¹²³ Niebuhr. *Christian Faith and Social Action*, 241.

Niebuhr affirms the socialist Christian positions on the application of justice to society, but submits this socialist tradition to the criticism of the law of love.¹²⁴

As a realist, Niebuhr constantly reminds us of the ever changing tide of history—especially alerting us to be attentive to the world around us, a world in constant flux, where domestic and international relations are paramount. He admonishes us of “our dreams of managing history” as a source of a potentially dangerous path that many powerful nations have threaded. Though, he saw the United States as powerful and virtuous nation, Niebuhr warned of the attitude of “pretension” as a particularly undesirable state of mind for a powerful state. On this note, he equivocally chastised the United States for exhibiting such negative tendency in its effort to wield global power and influence. On this critical note, he saw the Bible as a powerful historical and moral source for drawing great lessons for nations, leaders, cultures, and society in general. He warns:

The prophet never weary of warning both powerful nations...of the judgment which waits on human pretension. The great nation, Babylon, is warned that its confidence in the security of its power will be refuted by history... [because] the pretensions of virtue are as offensive to God as the pretensions of power.¹²⁵

According to Niebuhr, conflict and tension are permanent features of history. While social improvement is possible, the justice of this world is born in strife and is always provisional, fragmentary, and insecure. He recognized the potency of social sin affecting all of history. So humanity cannot by itself correct these problems; even by

¹²⁴ Patton. *Reinhold Niebuhr*, Ch. 5, 2.

¹²⁵ Niebuhr. *The Irony of American History*. New York: Scribner, 1985, 160.

surrendering to God, human is still imperfect; though reason can illuminate ethical standards and practices, but ironically, it can also create the capacity to rationalize selfishness.¹²⁶

This self-centered egotism transcends self-interest and is often driven by class, race, clans, groups, genders, and nations against nations. For Niebuhr, this fundamental problem is due to the lack of moral self-transcendence of individual members, which in essence, is a social sin rooted in pride.¹²⁷ Niebuhr's critique of the group's egoism is well articulated by Christine Firer Hinze who writes:

Their limited capacities for self-reflection and self-criticism restrict groups' moral behavior primarily to the pursuit of survival and power. Worse, a group (family, class, nation, corporation) can co-opt members' morally-praiseworthy loyalty and altruism into the service of collectively selfish or destructive ends. Groups themselves are incapable of self-sacrifice; leaders, obligated to advance their members' collective interests, never have warrant to altruistically override them...In group life, then, possibilities for moral heroism are virtually nil, but the potential for injustice much greater.¹²⁸

Niebuhr contends that nations and classes have limited understanding of the people they harm by their unjust policies and lack of appreciation for the often complicated laws and institutions through which such injustice is perpetuated. They are more inclined to embrace rationalizations of self-interest rather than the Socratic method or being prophetic witnesses on socio-political and economic matters. These facts, for Niebuhr, explain why dominant groups rarely yield their privileges except when put

¹²⁶ Niebuhr. *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, Vol. 1, 213.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Christine Firer Hinze. *The Drama of Social Sin and the (Im)possibility of Solidarity: Reinhold Niebuhr and Modern Catholic Social Teaching*. London: Sage Publication. *Studies in Christian Ethics*, 22.4, 2009, 452, <http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav> (accessed 03.10.12).

under pressure by some countervailing social force. And we find this to be so true in the current crises that have engulfed our world—be it the so-called war on terror, the genocide in the Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Syria, and instability in Zimbabwe.¹²⁹

Reinhold Niebuhr also insists on the necessity of politics in the struggle for social justice because of the sinfulness of human nature, that is, the egotism of individuals and groups. He sees the limitations of reason to solve social injustice by moral and rational means, “since reason is always the servant of interest in a social situation.”¹³⁰ This is the center of his critique of liberal Christian theology, which strongly believes in the rational capacity of humans to making themselves to be moral. Niebuhr also traces the root causes of social conflicts and injustices to the ignorance and selfishness of humanity. Therefore, the natural impulse is to rebuild or renew our communities or nations by proactively improving our human intelligence and benevolence.¹³¹ But, for Niebuhr, the increase of education and intelligence is no guarantee of a corresponding increase in benevolence.

This view challenges the Christian notion of focusing only on selfishness instead of ignorance as the root of injustice. He writes, “[They] religious idealists have given themselves to the hope, that the purer religion would increase the benevolence and decrease the egoism of the human spirit” while the rationalists hold that an increase in the

¹²⁹ Niebuhr. *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, 76-78.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, xiv-xv.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 23.

intelligence of men and women would minimize injustice, selfishness, and ignorance.”¹³²

That is why he declared that “the hopes and expectations of an ideal society through the development of the moral capacities of the individual men [and women], have proceeded from and been encouraged by the religious, as well as the rational [and the] idealists.”¹³³

This is the world of authentic realism where Niebuhr fuses a working relation between the secular and religious in the quest of supporting moral ideals in a realistic understanding of the world. Even though religion aims for the absolute, in making the case for the ethical, it must be credited for its insights in pointing at humanity’s sinfulness and preoccupation of the self.¹³⁴ In this world of the religious minded person—in search of what Martin Luther King, Jr. dubbed the “beloved community,” one becomes committed to working for the virtues of love, justice and hope in a world where the disenfranchised are enabled and empowered by the good neighbors in a selfless and altruistic manner. It’s in this regard that Niebuhr writes that:

If religion be particularly occupied with the absolute from the perspective of the individual, it is nevertheless capable of conceiving an absolute society in which the ideal of love and justice will be realized. There is a millennial hope in every vital religion. The religious imagination is as impatient with the compromises, relativities and imperfections of historic society as with the imperfection of the individual life.¹³⁵

He sets up what amounts to a moral dualism between individuals and groups by drawing a radical distinction between individual and group morality, and by accepting

¹³² Ibid., 23.

¹³³ Ibid., 51.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 54.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 60.

group egoism as our inescapable reality. According to him, individuals are morally capable of considering the interests of others and acting prudently when they sense conflicts of interest between themselves and others. That is, individuals can be unselfish. Societies, however, find it virtually impossible to handle rationally the competing interests of subgroups. Societies, he argues, effectively gather up only individuals' selfish impulses, not their capacities for unselfish consideration toward others. According to Niebuhr, this collective egoism of individuals-in-groups is overwhelmingly powerful. "In every human group there is less reason to guide and to check impulse, less capacity for self-transcendence, less ability to comprehend the needs of others, therefore more unrestrained egoism than the individuals, who compose the group, reveal in their personal relationships."¹³⁶

Additionally, Niebuhr insists that "all social co-operations on a larger scale than the most intimate social group requires a measure of coercion"¹³⁷ and "every group, as every individual, has expansive desires which are rooted in the instinct of survival and soon extend beyond it. The will-to-live becomes the will-to-power."¹³⁸ This means that "...society is in a perpetual state of war."¹³⁹ Therefore, he suggests a compromised form of society, "in which there will be uncoerced and perfect peace and justice, but a society in which there will be enough justice, and in which coercion will be sufficiently non-

¹³⁶ Ibid., xi-xii.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 3.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 18.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 19.

violent to prevent this common enterprise from issuing into complete disaster.”¹⁴⁰ To cope with this struggling situation of society, reason and religion ought to find a common ground based on achieving the common good of society. So the role of reason is important in forming social justice. As he admits the dual character of “human beings are endowed by nature with both selfish and unselfish impulses...His reason endows him with a capacity for self-transcendence.”¹⁴¹ Moreover, Niebuhr asserts “Harmonious social relations depend upon the sense of justice as much as, or even more than, upon the sentiment of benevolence. This sense of justice is a product of the mind and not of the heart. It is the result of reason’s insistence upon consistency.”¹⁴²

This means that moral reason in relation with religion becomes intrinsically valuable in Niebuhr’s perspective especially in dealing with social problems as a method to reduce the influence of selfishness through contrition and the spirit of love. He stresses the role of the religious imagination, which helps to unite the absolute and the finite physical world. “The religious conscience is sensitive not only because its imperfections are judged in the light of the absolute but because its obligations are felt to be obligations toward a person. The holy will is a personal will.”¹⁴³ “The religious sense of the absolute qualifies the will-to-live and the will-to-power by bringing them under subjection to an

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 22.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 25.

¹⁴² Ibid., 29.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 53.

absolute will.”¹⁴⁴ He concludes that the spirit of love cannot prevent social conflict, so it is inescapable to use the instrument of coercion as we aim for the application of justice as a critical societal and international norm.

Niebuhr developed his concept of love as a pure, highest form of morality further in his magnificent book, *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics*. He develops his position in contrast as he sees it to the weaknesses and delusions of “orthodox Christianity,” modern “liberal Christianity” and Marxism. The first identifies the transcendent will of God with doctrines and downplays myths by rationalization or scientific inquiry. The second abandons the ethic of Jesus and functionally absolutizes secular, relative standards of morality. The third is, he holds, a secularized religious view that takes the proletariat as the final judge instead of God. For Niebuhr, myth is meaningful in the sense that it involves the paradox between the Infinite and the finite, and it should be considered seriously, not literally. The ethic of Jesus shows the pure form of God’s love so that it cannot be realized in this present human existence, but only when God changes this world to the perfect harmony of the Kingdom of God.¹⁴⁵

Therefore, he understands love in its social application as an “impossible possibility.”¹⁴⁶ That is even though love is important in all of human affairs (its “possibility”), it is so difficult to fully implement in this world of conflicting interests. Moreover, in as much as love is the highest attainment in life, “people living in nature

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 63.

¹⁴⁵ Reinhold Niebuhr. *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics*. New York: Seabury Press, 1979, 36.

¹⁴⁶ Niebuhr. *Love and Justice*, 11. Also see Niebuhr, *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics*, Ch. 4, titled: The Relevance of An Impossible Ethical Ideal.

and in the body will never be capable of the sublimation of egoism and the attainment of the sacrificial passion, the complete disinterestedness which the ethic of Jesus demands (impossibility).”¹⁴⁷ Instead of the direct application of the law of love to political and economical reality, he suggests the use of the principle of justice. “Yet the law of love is involved in all approximations of justice, not only as the source of the norms of justice, but as an ultimate perspective by which their limitations are discovered.”¹⁴⁸

Niebuhr on Current World Affairs and Failed States

What would Niebuhr say today about failed states and the international failure to adequately address them? I argue that since nation-building ought to seek an ethical grounding from a Christian perspective, it ought to be balanced and realistic by avoiding a false allure of a simple solution in our quest of rebuilding failed or collapsed states. Niebuhr would critique any idea of seeking simplistic resolution to complex problems that often involve the process of nation-building. For him, this attitude has been the tragic path of many imperial and colonial powers (Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Japan, etc.), including the United States since the post World War II period. Niebuhr would insist that without adequate diagnosis of the complexities and conflagrations of global issues, this virtuous America, like past imperialists, has been pursuing often times its agenda with

¹⁴⁷ Niebuhr. *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics*, 19.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 85.

tragic disregard of the nature of the international problems and its own role of flaring those conflicts. For example, *Wikileaks* openly disclosed (declassified) that America's support for dictatorial regimes in many parts of the Arab World has been a source why so many in various parts of the world have come to view the United States as hypocritical, unjust, and undemocratic. So too are the Russians and Chinese, all in the name of power politics and narrow self interests. Case in point, the current crises in Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt exposed the very heart of America's failed policies of propping up puppets and friendly dictators such as Hosni Mubarak and the Royal House of the Saudis who have quashed the aspirations and hopes of their people for so many decades. We also see Russia and China reigniting the old Cold War feud over Syria.

However, as the world's leading Super Power but greatly being challenged by China, Niebuhr would encourage America to use its influence and power smartly, in order to advance the cause of justice and the common good. It requires careful reading in history of other great powers that have exerted power politics— negatively or positively, as seen through imperialism, colonialism, and post World Wars and the Cold War, in order to avoid similar tragic paths. In such case, America ought not to justify its moral or military action on an amoral and selfish reason—claiming for example, that the war on terror is primarily an effort, to preventing Islamic radicalism or extremism from the seat of political and economic powers. This propaganda was reminiscent of President George W. Bush's regime, unlike Obama's regime that sought a collective global effort in dealing with crises of failed states. In Niebuhr's warning, America virtues of championing it's version of democracy and economic system to the rest of the world

ought to avoid any kinship with the vices of the very extremism, for example, of Osama Bin Laden and others that continue to promote the purge of their society from infidels. Prophetically, Niebuhr warned us against such a catastrophic alliance of good and evil that can lead to more evil acts as exemplified in Iraq and Afghanistan, where America's pursuit of justice have led to more death, destruction of American soldiers and of Afghanis and Iraqis citizens; even directly and indirectly creating a global economic meltdown since the Great Depression.¹⁴⁹

Nevertheless, I am certain that Islamic society and others such as African, Asian, and South American nations would gradually come to terms (whether through evolution or revolution—or what I call evolutionary revolution) with the need to pursuing a society that is just, hopeful, loving and democratic. As a process, it would be an arduous task involving the United States and the international community, since so many of these nations and their peoples have been suppressed and had very little experience with democratic processes. It is at this juncture that Niebuhr seems to infer that for the sake of justice, we must not shy away from the use of [smart] power in order to bring about God's love and mercy to others who are faced by momentous challenges due to state collapse and failed states. He draws from the Christian motif of suffering, royalty and power. In this view, Niebuhr does not want us to accept the notion of helplessness and weakness as many Christians have resigned to accept in international affairs. He writes,

¹⁴⁹ Reinhold Niebuhr. *The Irony of American History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952, 147. With the trillions spent in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is sad to know that domestically, many national projects of nation-building in America have been ignored. Students' educational debts have surpassed credit card debts. Yet, these are the very people the USA need to sustain its future prosperity and self-interests.

Could anything disprove and invalidate the Messianic claim more irrefutably than this ignominious death? He [Jesus the Christ] was weak and powerless. He had saved others but could not save himself...All this mockery and derision is the natural and inevitable response to the absurdity of weakness and suffering in a royal and divine figure...common sense assumes that the most significant and necessary attribute of both royalty and divinity is power.¹⁵⁰

I must admit through my observation and experience, America has never shied away from the use of power—power politics or smart power in the last hundred years through the use of its political, military and economic endeavors. In this regard, the United States of America has been realistic in its understanding of power or the use of force in pursuing its goals. For Niebuhr, America exemplifies the paradox within the Christian articulation of political power. He writes, “the image of Christ crucified is, of all Christian images, the one that contains the full paradox of human doubt and human faith, the focal point of the temporal and the eternal...essentially challenged and most essentially triumphant.”¹⁵¹ How then does one resolve this absurdity of the divine weakness or powerlessness within the context of nation-building? From inference, Niebuhr seems to suggest that God’s self-imposed weakness of his love doesn’t diminish God’s powerfulness—which in essence is God’s goodness. Therefore, “a truly holy God must be both powerful and good” because “impotent and limited goodness is not divine” and “cannot be worshipped...but power without goodness cannot be worshipped either. It

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 21.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 22.

may be feared, or possibly defied...¹⁵² This Christian articulation of power must also be mindful of misconstruing power in a negative sense.

Such negative view of power has the tendency to create disinterestedness on the role of Christians in securing or working for a harmonious political and economic order in this world. In concurrence, Niebuhr writes,

The acceptance of goodness of power in Christian faith is intimately related to its whole “nonspiritual” interpretation of life... The created word as such is good; and all forms of creation represent various strategies of power. Life is power... [and] not the cause of the evil in it; and the power of the creator is not a contradiction, but an aspect of [God’s] holiness... But we cannot escape the responsibilities of power by preoccupation with these corruptions... Power is not evil of itself; but evil incarnates itself in power and cannot finally be defeated without the use of power.¹⁵³

Our understanding and application of power then from Christian realism must be a part of our mission in comprehending a world that ought to reflect the justice and loving nature of God. This means that wherever injustice and the manifestation of evil acts permeate, we as Christian ought to be active participants in curbing or restoring the dignity of others through the use of power—and by avoiding the spiritualization of our vision of power “which assume that the only hope of virtue among us is to disavow power... [in order to] achieve the spiritual power to defeat evil.”¹⁵⁴

This balanced view of power as articulated here by Niebuhr, is at the core of the current Christian debate and conflicting ideological divides between those who argue for disengagement on world issues on the one hand, to those who advocate a world of

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 25.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

physical engagement with all pressing issues confronting our world—as an eschatological and theo-ethical tasks. As a mission, the Christian cannot sit and be indifferent to the wrongful use of power by the state, corporations, non-state actors, and other international agents. Christians rather, ought to help shape the dialogue on the use of power in ways that promote justice and the common good. To this Niebuhr avers:

In any immediate situation neither man nor God can defeat a powerful defiance of the order of the world without using power to set the limits of that defiance. There is no purely spiritual method of preserving minimal justice and order in a world, for the world is not purely spiritual. Power is the basis of justice in history as it is of order in the entire natural world.¹⁵⁵

Moreover, justice within the context of nation-building, where defiant rulers are defeated, in Niebuhr's view is a form of divine justice, however obscured and confusing as seen through out human history. He adds, that justice and wrath have a negatively redemptive effect which illuminates us that there is a limit on how long those rulers can continue to perpetuate their evil regimes.¹⁵⁶ However Niebuhr also contends that:

...punishment may prompt men [and women] and nations to despair as well as to repentance...[as] there can be no repentance if love does not shine through the justice...whatever the inadequacies of forgiveness and love may be in the operations of human justice, men [and women] ultimately face divine forgiveness as well as divine wrath... justice is good and punishment is necessary. Yet, justice alone does not move men [and women] to repentance. The inner core of their rebellion is not touched until they behold the executor of judgment suffering with and for the victim of punishment.¹⁵⁷

It is this view of justice on earth that has been either downplayed or overplayed in our world of defiance and hypocrisy. So often, when nations like the US and its European

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 29.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

allies seek to exact justice on other nations, they are met with deep suspicion and criticism as in the case of the Iraq war. Niebuhr also insisted that we must be mindful of coercive factor in society even though, he admits is both necessary and dangerous by seriously complicating the goal of achieving both peace and justice.¹⁵⁸ Emphatically, he analyzed historical events that exemplify the failure to achieving a cohesive social order and justice in our world due to the misapplication of the factor of force. The failure lies in either “to eliminate the factor of force entirely or to an undue reliance upon it.”¹⁵⁹

Reinhold Niebuhr’s Realism—A Redux

In making a good society or rebuilding failed states, Niebuhr is on point by asserting that “society will probably never be sufficiently intelligent to bring power under its control... [because] the stupidity of the average man [or woman] will permit the oligarch, whether economic or political, to hide his [or her] real purposes from the scrutiny of his [or her] fellows and withdraw his [or her] activities from effective control.”¹⁶⁰ Therefore, the future peace and justice of society...depend upon, not one but many strategies, in all of which moral and coercive factors are compounded in varying degree...that it is safe to hazard the prophecy that the dream of perpetual peace and brotherhood [and sisterhood] for human society...[that] will never be fully realized...[in our life time].”¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ Niebuhr. *Moral Man Immoral Society*, 20.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 20-21.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 21.

I concur with Niebuhr that “the ability to consider or even to prefer the interests of others to our own is not dependent upon the capacity for sympathy...[but] depends upon the sense of justice as much as or even more than the sentiment or benevolence... the sense of justice is a product of the mind and not the heart.”¹⁶² Therefore, reason tends to check selfish impulses and to grant the satisfaction of legitimate impulses in others.”¹⁶³

This view of the sinfulness and self-interest of human beings necessitates the need for reason and faith to be complementary of each other in shaping our understanding and dealing with complex issues that affect the social, economic, and political lives of our communities. These are real world problems that shaped the Methodist Movement and helped define its “Social Principles.” It also gave impetus to Social Christianity and Niebuhr’s Christian Realism. If our Christian virtues of love, hope, and justice can shape the common good, then the moral responsibility is upon us to act in reversing the failure and tragedy of nations. It means we must be attentive, active, and responsive in this world as an eschatological and moral mandate.

Niebuhr like Wesley is not in search of an ideological perfect society as articulated in most of Plato’s writings. Rather, it is the world of reality where Augustine’s *Civitas Dei* intersects with *Civitas Terrena*.¹⁶⁴ In this world order, Niebuhr like

¹⁶² Ibid., 29.

¹⁶³ Ibid. Herein, Niebuhr quotes L. T. Hobhouse, *The Rational Good in the Analysis of the Function of Reason in the Moral life*. It is similar subject that John Wesley dealt with in his analysis of the use of reason in this life.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 126-127. *Civitas Dei*, The City of God and *Civitas Terrena*, The City of the World are commingled with the former being dominated by self-love and the latter by the love of God. St. Augustine bases his construct on biblical principle of the family, commonwealth and the world, unlike the classical thought of a world that can be actualized by reason only.

Augustine, cautions us to be mindful of an utopian worldview, believing that we can make this world better by having a common humanity, language or reasoning because the world we live in is characterized by tensions, frictions, competitions of interest and overt conflicts to which every human community is exposed.”¹⁶⁵ It is a world of humanity where we are capable of doing good or evil to one another.

This is the real world of struggle and injustice and of death and destruction. It is “constantly subjected to an uneasy armistice between contending forces, with the danger that factional disputes may result in bloody insurrection at any time.”¹⁶⁶ What the world needs is not just Cicero’s justice but a common love based on collective interest maintained by the use of smart power. In Augustine’s world, power politics is at play, as large society and dominant groups seek social and political power. This view of reality in Augustine’s and Niebuhr’s articulation transcends oligarchic, military, or democratic systems of governance—in a world of various interests where the dominant power group sets the agenda for the commonweal as exemplified in America’s hegemony in our current global politics.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 127.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 127-128. In Augustine’s view he challenges Cicero’s conception of an ideal justice where the commonwealth is characterized by the compact of justice. Niebuhr sees this Ciceronian ideal as a moralistic illusion that realistically fails to measure the “dangers of tyranny to the dangers of anarchy. Augustine in his realism asserts that we cannot make the flesh cease to lust against the spirit in this present life, but with God’s help we can keep from succumbing to the flesh – body and soul at war with each other. *The City of God*, 19.4, 677.

However, as Augustine infers, let our self-interest take consideration of others so that there is a collective self-interests that supersedes our narrow self-interest.¹⁶⁷ In this sense, the love commandment—the love of God, *amor dei* and the love of neighbor, in spite of its limited classical interpretation, ought to be seen in our modern context as embracing both God and the neighbors as an essential ethical obligation. Therefore, we become actively involved in the flourishing of all people—especially those living in failed states that need to experience authentic nation-building—where rights and responsibilities are *sine qua non*.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 134. It must be noted that Augustine places the onus on the visible Church as this perfect society and virgin –the manifestation of the *Civitas Dei*. But his view is criticized by others. However, to his credit, he was espousing a world-view of his time where the church was a powerful political force.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES AS BRIDGE ETHICS

The Roman Catholic Account of the Common Good and other Resources

David Hollenbach, a Roman Catholic Jesuit priest, brings great insight to compliment the “Christian realism” as articulated by Reinhold Niebuhr. Hollenbach’s unique understanding is exemplified through his personal and professional experiences and interactions with Africans and peoples of other developing nations, where he empathizes with their struggles and aspirations. He argues that there must be a new commitment to the common good in addressing issues that confront the middle class and the poor in cities and the globalized world. As such, the common good ought to be one that “challenges cultural, racial, ethnic, national definitions of who count as part of the community.”¹

Certainly this inspiration is drawn out of his intellectual commitment and rich Catholic faith. His interpretation of the modern Catholic vision of the global common good is rooted in love, justice and hope and solidarity, oriented towards the good life of the individual and the larger community. In the tradition of Aristotle and the Stoics, the good life is oriented to goods shared by and with others—that is the common good of the larger community.

¹ David Hollenbach. *The Common Good and Christian Ethics*. New Studies in Christian Ethics. (no. 22). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, xiv.

Hence, the good life and quality of the person's life is inseparable from that of the society.² In retrieval of the church's social and political engagement beyond the Second Vatican Council, Hollenbach makes a historical case. He writes:

The fact of such involvement is nothing new...the special place granted the church in the Roman Empire by Constantine, the investiture controversy of the Middle Ages...all show that the church has not been a stranger to the world of politics in the past.³

As seen through history, the Church has been a catalyst in the transformation of our world in its response to many pressing social and political issues—hence, the Church helped produce some of the finest educational institutions, hospitals, and many social services the world has ever known. It is on this basis of the Church's historical narrative, that Hollenbach envisions this new phase of engagement that is realistic, hopeful, and achievable. Firstly, Hollenbach acknowledges the importance of pluralism, which forces the church to recognize its social mission as rooted in its faith and identity.⁴ This bold reflection by the church also requires introspection of its vision and how such task can be pursued in the midst of plurality or diversity in our global community of characters and ideologies. Hollenbach writes:

This context calls for careful discernment of the relations between the Christian vision of society and contemporary political ideologies and careful reflection on how the universal mission of the church is to be embodied in the... diverse nations and culture of the globe.⁵

² See Martin Ostwald. *Nicomachean Ethics*. Upper Saddle: Prentice Hall, 1962.

³ Hollenbach. *Justice, Peace, and Human Rights: American Catholic Social Ethics in a Pluralistic Context*. New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1988, 3.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., 4.

This evolution of the church in its role in the world can be traced to the many social teachings and encyclicals issued by many of the modern popes. One easily recognizes how the earlier writings were heavily influenced in concept and language by the natural law ethics of scholastic philosophers such as Aquinas and Anselm. Thus, Hollenbach acknowledges that pre-Vatican II writings are insufficiently based in biblical, Christological, eschatological, or ecclesiological groundings of the church's social role.⁶ But based on the reality of the time the church found itself, especially during the Enlightenment, in which human autonomy based on reason had far more broader appeal, posed serious challenges to the authority of the church. It was based on such conflicts and uncertainty that that Vatican I (1869-70) strongly affirmed the full compatibility of faith and reason.

On such basis, Leo XIII affirmed that Christian faith had an affinity with human reason because it “adds greatly to its nobility, keenness, and stability.”⁷ Nevertheless, this was an apologetic strategy of the church in which the church could consider anyone unreasonable and unfaithful if they rejected the teachings of the pope in the proper ordering of society.⁸ In reality the church was caught unawares. Therefore it became antagonistic to the end product of the time—liberal democracy and secularism, which

⁶ Ibid., 4. Hollenbach argues that the preconciliar social teachings were more focused on philosophical ideals rather than biblical and theological. This action of the church was to emphasize the power of human reason in discovering God's manifest destiny or design for the socio-cultural aspirations of humanity by means of experience. The natural law thus became an important aspect of the Roman Catholic Social teaching.

⁷ Ibid., 4-5. Also, read *The Social Teaching of Leo XIII*. Ed. Etienne Gibson. New York. Doubleday Books, 1954, 38.

⁸ Ibid., 5. Hollenbach points at the tension that arose from the church's position on faith and reason. He poignantly illustrated that the argument of the church was anachronistic and theologically unsatisfactory.

Hollenbach claimed were “regarded not only as betrayal of faith but as cultural heresies as well.”⁹

However, this perspective of the church is a matter of the past. Instead, the church had come to accept its redefined role in an ever-changing world where it must be prophetic and actively engaged in all issues confronting our world. Hence, we are confronted with the conflict of cultural pluralism and social conflicts, which Vatican II succinctly diagnosed.

Although the world of today has a very vivid sense of its unity and how one person depends on another in needful solidarity, it is most grievously torn into opposing camps by conflicting forces. For political, social, economic, racial, and ideological disputes still continue bitterly, and with them the peril of a war which would reduce everything to ashes. True, there is a growing exchange of ideas, but the very words by which key concepts are expressed take on quite different meanings in diverse ideological systems.¹⁰

Like Niebuhr, Hollenbach recognizes that we cannot simply rely on scientific achievement and our intellectual prowess by reason of the natural law alone. The reality is that we are all shaped by our various cultural identities and geographical locales. Therefore, to harbor the idea of a unified and organic world, based on human moral reason would be a utopianism at its extreme. It would be based on such complexities and conflicting ideas of the world that Hollenbach argues, that the church ought to be visible and operative in all spheres. He states,

If the church is intent on making a contribution to the debates about social, political, and economic life, it must state forthrightly and publicly its own most basic convictions about the nature and destiny of human being. It

⁹ Ibid., 5.

¹⁰ *Gaudium et spes*, no 4.

must respond to the most basic questions about the meaning of human life in its social teaching as well as in doctrinal theology.¹¹

In this reconfiguration of the church's vision of, and mission to, the world, there is a deeper appreciation and acknowledgement of the role of Scripture and its theological and doctrinal significance in shaping our view and action toward the rest of the world. For example, the Vatican Council in its articulation of the social mission and identity of the church explicitly emphasized "the healing and elevation of the dignity of the human person, the building and consolidation of bonds of solidarity in society, and the endowment of daily human activity with a deeper meaning and worth."¹²

How then can we as Christians read such a biblically-driven mandate that transcends a single community and refuse to act in defense of the innocent or defenseless, for the natural environment? Why should our faith only be limited to the soup kitchens, Salvation Army, Catholic Relief or UMCOR (United Methodist Committee on Relief)? Are we not obligated to encourage our governments to be involved in socio-ethical and theo-political issues as intrinsic as nation-building efforts if human dignity and solidarity require us to take action for those that have been disenfranchised and seek the same life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness?

For Hollenbach, human dignity is rooted in the creation of human persons in the image of God (though reaffirmed by the natural law), where freedom, intelligence, and conscience are in the reach of all persons. This belief resonates with the council's theological affirmation that the mission of the church also extends to building up bonds

¹¹ Hollenbach, 6.

¹² *Gaudium et spes*, no 4.

of community and mutual interdependence among all people, which is rooted in the love of God and neighbors. Our dignity rooted in our personhood then is realized only in genuine community that secures such right.¹³ On such basis, the council insisted that “the social mission manifests the fact that God’s saving grace draws persons into communion of solidarity with one another...until that day on which it will be brought to perfection.”¹⁴

The church becomes a living sacrament promoting the Kingdom of God through its work of charity, its prophetic voice for the disenfranchised as it “promotes a process of wholesome socialization and the association in civic and economic realms.”¹⁵ In essence, the church is physical and real and confronts the enormity of a sinful world by engaging in “the affairs of the Polis.” However, with its historical past it is embroiled in controversies and other vexing issues such as slavery, imperialism, crusades, and other past transgressions. Hollenbach rightly cautions us to “distinguish our social mission from religious imperialism or theological triumphalism.”¹⁶

As observed, the world is so diverse with multiple points of views that it would seem so arrogant to insist that the Catholic community or Protestant’s theological vision of world order holds an absolute and universal truth. Rather, what our ethical and theological task entails as articulated by the council is “seeking a Christian interpretation of social reality and proposing concrete directions for Christian social action...[that] can

¹³ Hollenbach. “The Common Good Revisited.” *Theological Studies* 50:1 (March 1989): 70.

¹⁴ Hollenbach. *Justice, Peace, and Human Rights*, 8.

¹⁵ *Gaudium et spes*, no 32.

¹⁶ Hollenbach. *Justice, Peace, and Human Rights*, 9.

be developed only through dialogue with the various interpretations and proposals present in a pluralistic society.”¹⁷

On the role of justice, Hollenbach sees it as constitutive to the mission of the church. However, the question we are faced with is how can it be articulated or applied? Based on the generally accepted ancient phrase, *suum cuique* – “to each his due,” there are multiple of meanings or pluralism even within the Christian context. The notion of justice ranges from respect towards structured systems; to duty based on one’s ability, obligation and distribution based on merit or excellence [*arête*]; to the demands of equal liberty and opportunity for all.¹⁸ With this multiplicity of interpretations of justice what was the intention or implicit and explicit meaning of justice during the 1971 Synod of Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church in their reflection as declared?

According to Hollenbach:

Action on behalf of justice and participation in the transformation of the world fully appear to us as the constitutive dimension of the preaching of the Gospel, or, in other words, of the Church’s mission for the redemption of the human race and its liberation from every oppressive situation.¹⁹

In our analysis of the Synod’s statement of justice in the life of the Christian church, how do we realistically and practically make sense of this bold declaration of these bishops without allowing it “from falling into the limbo reserved for slogans and platitudes?”²⁰ In concurrence with Hollenbach, we ought to clarify the meaning of justice

¹⁷ Ibid., 13.

¹⁸ Ibid., 17.

¹⁹ Synod of Bishops. *justitia in mundo*, no.6.

²⁰ Hollenbach. *Justice, Peace, and Human Rights*, 17.

within the context of this declaration. Firstly, this demand for justice through preaching the Gospel is in no shape or form advocating for “an updated version of medieval Christendom.”²¹ That is, we do not seek to idealize our understanding of justice in a narrow sense but to see it in a practical and applicable way. To idealize justice within such narrow theo-political framework would be tenuous and dangerous as well documented in the history of Christianity and world politics.

Rather, the notion of justice sustained by the Catholic tradition is based on relational and mutual love and respect for all peoples across race, class, and gender. As articulated by Hollenbach, “[justice] is based on the conviction that one cannot specify the meaning of *suum cuique* without examining the social relationships, patterns of mutuality, and structures of interdependence that bind human beings together in communities.”²² In this regard, justice is social in nature as it promotes interdependence of all people through obligation and duty that encompasses freedom and dignity for all people in a pluralistic world. Hollenbach writes:

Respect for freedom and dignity, therefore, involves more than no interfering with the activity of persons. Obligations of justice include positive duties to aid persons in need, to participate in the maintaining of the public good, and to share in the efforts to create the kinds of institutions that promote genuine mutuality and reciprocal respect.²³

Taken in our current context of the demand and aspirations of the Arab and African worlds and other places that are experiencing upheavals and becoming hotbeds

²¹ Ibid., 19.

²² Ibid. Hollenbach makes the argument through historical analysis that the root of the modern tradition of justice as adopted by the Synod is rooted in biblical, Augustinian, and Thomistic thought which is based on the respect for human rights and dignity, even though these rights are always “relative.”

²³ Ibid.

for failed states, it is our moral duty, according to this document, to be persistent in promoting such social good that comes from freedom and dignity. It requires us speaking about and participating in the necessary war and protests that have brought changes in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. To sit on the fence or to become disengaged from the world is to accept the carnage unleashed by brutal leaders and regimes. Such inaction makes us guilty as the good people who did nothing.

Instead, we are being urged by the major encyclicals to understand the social nature of humanity from the philosophical and empirical appeals. Furthermore, these documents frequently stress the inter-connection of love that is rooted in the obligations of justice.²⁴ This emphasis on love as observed by Hollenbach has twofold connections: firstly, there is a continuous concern for respect for individual human persons in their uniqueness and their concrete needs. Therefore, human rights and human dignity are intrinsic factors that elevate the Church's role in promoting *agape* as it is ultimately grounded in concrete persons and situations requiring our action. In this trajectory, Hollenbach insists that "justice is rooted in the fact the very existence of a human person confronts others with [a] certain ought that demands respect and support."²⁵ What enables us to act then in the midst of the struggles and needs of others is love which is willing to foster and support the "other's subjectivity, selfhood and freedom."²⁶

Secondly, Hollenbach argues, that the norm of *agape*, through the church's tradition, promotes interpersonal and social mutuality within the framework of justice.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., 20.

²⁶ Ibid., 20.

Yet, we are aware of the distinction between justice and love, with the former being attentive to concrete situations or particularities while the latter is unconditional.

Hollenbach asserts:

Justice calls for social relationships and a kind of social organization that open the way of the fulfillment of the person which only occur in unity and solidarity with others. Mutual interdependence is not merely a physical, psychological, or economic fact. It is a moral obligation. This interdependence can only be realized only in that form of solidarity and mutuality that Pius XI called social love.²⁷

Henceforth, we can affirm that from the Roman Catholic tradition, as articulated from the social teachings of the church, justice is rooted in the social nature of humanity where the notion of love [*agape*] enlivens the realization of justice in concrete terms. Justice concerns mutuality and reciprocity based on moral obligation. “What is due to a person or a group is to be determined by the kinds of relationships that shape and influence the life and action of that person or group.”²⁸ In concrete terms, human dignity is of paramount or ultimate concern as it promotes the commonweal through mutual participation in the political, social, and economic affairs of our world.

In its specificity based on rational appeal, the Roman Catholic Church intentionally “proposed certain specific rights, such as the rights to life, food, housing, assembly, etc., as concrete demands for justice and as equally binding on all persons

²⁷ Ibid. Hollenbach stresses that love elevates justice by giving it a lively substance. He cites Aquinas in *Quadragesimo anno* in which Aquinas claimed that even though justice alone could remove social ills and conflict, but it could never bring peace of mind and heart if there was no mutual bond of minds and hearts of members in promoting the common good.

²⁸ Ibid., 21.

regardless of their religious convictions.”²⁹ It is this concrete demand and articulation of justice through the church that obligates Catholics to promote the freedom of all people and nations from the grips of tyranny and hypocrisy. This call to solidarity is mutual or social love which, in essence, is grounded in our Christian understanding of justice within our social nature.

This authentic participation of the church is further exemplified through the life and experience of Ignatius Loyola who himself was a product of his era, where he was “drawn by circumstance and grace from a life of self-glorification to clear-eyed realism oriented to God’s glory.”³⁰ Just like all United Methodists are called to reflect and live (through the application of scripture, tradition, experience and reason), Ignatius brought to bear his experience, observation, methodology and insights as influential in shaping his Christian orientation of the world. Based on these foundational groundings, the Ignatian spirituality has offered a fuller and more realistic assessment of the Church in a real world, in which “God is present in and to every aspect of our human living an loving...[as] God is fully present in every molecule of the universe. The challenge is to find God where God is and not where we think God ought to be.”³¹

In our challenge God is interested in the building of human communities and nations from the state of fragility to authentic stabled nations where humans can experience the fullness of peace, freedom, dignity, and aspirations. It is this Ignatian

²⁹ Ibid., 22.

³⁰ Kelvin Burke and Eileen Burke-Sullivan. *Ignatian Tradition: Spirituality in History*. Minneapolis: Liturgical Press, 2009, xxii.

³¹ Ibid., xxxvi.

service to God and the Gospel, where Catholics are called to respond to a world, where humanity dwells in poverty, ignorance, and oftentimes, violence. *Ad maiorem Dei gloriam*, literally translated as “to the glory of God,”³² is the mantra that moves us to an active participation in a broken world. As exemplified in Ignatius Loyola’s own life, an inspiration for us as Christians, we learned that in this momentous call we are challenged to be “faithful, attentive, and generous in redressing the greatest or most demanding needs to which [we] are sent, the labor itself, whether spiritual; material, intellectual, or social, and the relationships that arise from such service, provide both an encounter with the risen Lord and any necessary penance and self-abnegation.”³³

This Christian oriented task demands a performance realized through our full participation in service for others in this world and it is captured in eight core principles articulated within the Ignatian tradition.³⁴ These intrinsic Ignatian beliefs define how we can realistically deal with pressing issues that confronts our world. Therefore, we reorient and rebut a literal reading of Philippians 3:19-20 where St. Paul writes, “Their minds are occupied with earthly things. But our citizenship is in heaven.” Burke thus counters that:

³² Ibid., xxiii.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ In summary the eight principles of the Loyola tradition are: 1. God’s *a priori* love, love manifested in all person, 2. God’s *unique operation* in and with each person, is God’s unique gift of vocation to each person to be used for the betterment of the community, 3. *To be fully human requires spiritual freedom*—this is a historical call to participate in the reign of God through mercy and justice. 4. *Human life comes to fruition* through Obedience to God’s will. 5. *The enemy of human life works to block our freedom, disrupts our obedience, and undermines our humanity*. To be free is to be authentically human. For Ignatius the enemy is any force or power, whether personal or corporate, that works within persons, culture, or nature to diminish the way of mercy, justice and compassion. 6. *Finding God in all things*—is an incarnational nature of God. For Ignatius, it was important that we read the signs of the time and responded to it appropriately. 7. *An Apostolic Focus demands or obligates us to action* in the world on behalf of God’s reign, according to one’s vocation and one’s talents. 8. *Companionship in and with Christ* requires us to practice the act of prayer, in service for others and work for the struggle for justice and mercy in our life.

Taken literally and out of context, this injunction might lead to extreme religious sectarianism where the sacred and profane never overlap. In contrast, Ignatian spirituality seeks God precisely in the world. It courageously engages worldly issues and affairs. It aims always for the *magis* but it does not for that reason shy away from controversy of conflict, from political, economic, or cultural concerns, from all that goes by name “the secular.” Rather, it seeks God precisely in the world, in wide range of symbols and languages accessible to various peoples, realms, and regions of life and thought....therefore citizenship in heaven finds a body in an through genuine citizenship in the world...[which] requires a prophetic stance when worldly values conflict with values of God’s kingdom, when human injustice imprisons the truth, when ideology, selfishness, and hatred threaten to turn God’s world into hell.³⁵

In essence, we are citizens of St. Augustine’s *civitas Dei* and *civitas terrena* where both cities commingled. It is where the love of God and of the neighbor is of paramount concern and the guiding principles for engaging the world in all affairs. Nevertheless, we must be aware of the tension inherent between the two cities. Yet, our call to service takes us to uncomfortable places and complex issues that confront our world. In this challenge, nation-building becomes in my view a pressing need that ought to be central and at the forefront of our task for rebuilding failed states, the breeding grounds for injustice, desperation, violence, and apathy. This task in essence, requires smart and timely intervention militarily and diplomatically where humanitarian needs are at the greatest—to establish stable government, institutional development, democratic society, and economically viable nations that promote the wellbeing of all people in respective of their race, religions, gender, orientation and status in life.

³⁵ Ibid. “Citizenship and Prophecy,” 61.

Furthermore, *Pacem in Terris* poignantly uplifts the theory of the natural law in concise terms. It states that our natural rights come from our nature as persons.³⁶ In addition, humanity is endowed with intelligence and free will and also made in the image of God [*Imago Dei*]. Because of our dignity we have natural rights to life, bodily integrity, and means suitable to the proper development of life. We also are entitled to security in the case of illness, inability to work etc. It urges us to respect one's own person, one's reputation, freedom of speech and intellectual inquiry, and pursuit of art.³⁷ However, it argues that the natural rights are within the context of limits laid down by the moral order and the common good. These rights include the sharing the benefits of culture (e.g. education, honoring the good according to the dictates of our own conscience) and the right to practice our own religion,³⁸ making one's own decision about what kind of lifestyle – family or religious vocation.³⁹ The family is seen as the essential cell of society; it has natural rights—advocating for provision for the family in social and economic matters and parents' right to support and educate their children.⁴⁰ It also advocates for the dignity of work without coercion and our duties in the preservation of life. Our lives ought to correspond to the right to a decent standard of living, where we

³⁶ Pope John XXIII. *Pacem in Terris* (1963), Papal Encyclicals. www.papalencyclicals.net/John23/j23pacem.htm (accessed 5.11.11), 9-10. The encyclical also makes demands for just working conditions (19, 20), the right to own private property (21), assemble and associate (23), freedom of movement (25), participation in public affairs (26), juridical protection of rights (27)...one's ability to act freely (34). All of these rights are directly tied to human rights and the principles of democracy.

³⁷ *Pacem in Terris*, 12.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 13-14.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 16-17.

are to respect the rights of others recognize and observe mutual rights and duties, act responsibly, because a society established on force is inhumane.⁴¹ Our lives ought to correspond to the right to a decent standard of living, where we are call to respect the rights of others, by recognizing and observing our mutual rights and duties to act freely and responsibly, because a society established on force is inhumane.⁴²

The encyclical also makes the case that authority comes from God alone. In essence, “authority derives its obligatory force from the moral order. So, the dignity of a civil authority is due to it sharing to some extent in the authority of God.”⁴³ Therefore “civil authority must appeal primarily to the conscience of individual citizens.”⁴⁴ Since no one can oblige inner acts because of dignity, the state may oblige people in conscience only if their authority is “intrinsically related with the authority of God and shares in it... Therefore, to obey a just law is to obey God.”⁴⁵

Moreover, the common good is the responsibility of individuals and groups to make their own specific contributions to the common welfare.⁴⁶ In this regard, the state ought to promote both the material and spiritual welfare of the citizens.⁴⁷

⁴¹ Ibid., 30-31.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid., 47.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 48.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 49, 50, 51.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 54.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 57.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 62.

Hence, governments must respect human rights and act in accordance with them.

It should also “coordinate social relations so that the exercise of one’s rights doesn’t threaten the exercise of another’s rights nor hinder them in the fulfillment of their duties.”⁴⁸ The role of the government is seeking to bring about a situation in which individuals can easily exercise their rights and fulfill their duties, where all share in the common good, although in different ways according to each tasks, merits, and circumstances.⁴⁹ Thus, the common good is chiefly guaranteed when personal rights and duties are maintained⁵⁰ with respect or attention to the social and economic progress of citizens.⁵¹

Pacem in Terris also promotes states’ rights and duties in relations between countries. It argues that all countries share an equal natural dignity, just like all humans enjoy an equal natural dignity.⁵² The relations therefore between countries must be regulated by truth and justice⁵³ in fostering the common good for all peoples. This act of mutuality emphatically states that developed countries should aid those in the process of

⁴⁹ Ibid., 63, 53.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 62.

⁵¹ Ibid., 63.

⁵² Ibid., 89.

⁵³ Ibid., 98.

development.⁵⁴ Therefore, it is absolutely unjust to oppress other countries in search of development of one's own resources.⁵⁵

Pacem in Terris also argues that through the rule of truth, justice and sincere cooperation, and not by coercion or force of arms, ought to be the manner in which international relations is conducted. Arms race should cease and therefore no country may unjustly oppress others or duly meddle in their affairs and exercise political domination over nations it considered weak and vulnerable.⁵⁶ It supports a global public authority such as the UN whose agenda is to promote the universal common good.⁵⁷ It asserts that the fundamental objective should be the safeguarding and promotion of the rights of a human person. However, there must be limits such as avoiding or usurping national sovereignty or powers. But the principle of subsidiarity applies—that is doing the things that individual nation-states are incapable of doing alone.⁵⁸

Clearly, we can make the case that nation-building—the restoration of wholeness and dignity to so many millions of people and their environment requires a massive response and participation of Christians. It's is a theological and ethical task that ought to be perceived as an act of genuine respect for justice, equality, and fairness. It's a call to living out the Christian virtues which is rooted in the love for neighbors, strangers, and the others. It is wholistic and transcends boundaries, race, nationalities, cultures, and

⁵⁴ Ibid., 121.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 92.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 120-125.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 137.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 138-141.

ideologies. It's a realistic and justifiable act of appropriating the common good in real time and experience.

Michael Novak also brings a concise Roman Catholic articulation of the notion of the common good to this work. He draws on past historical and philosophical tradition that currently shape the contemporary Catholic social thought. He is concerned about how the church can adequately address and understand the democratic principles and the market economy inherent in capitalism, the nexus of global political economy—the heart of failed state or nation-(re)building.

In particular, Novak makes the case that the Catholic Church during the nineteenth and early twentieth century set itself against liberalism as an ideology but it has slowly come to admire liberal institutions such as democracy and free markets.⁵⁹ Part of the problem, Novak insists, can be traced to the church's failure to understand economic issues and their effect on a global scale. He writes,

Religious leaders and theologians are awakening to the fact that their accustomed periodicals have ill-prepared them for this hour. Books on church and state, religion and politics, religion and the arts, religion and psychiatry and religion and sex outnumber books on theology and economics by a very large factor...To create a new subdiscipline of theology, "a theology of political economy," will take a generation of hard work.⁶⁰

Nevertheless, the Catholic vision of social justice and liberal institutions, are now finding common grounds in spite of shared differences between the outcomes of the liberal institutions vis-à-vis, the philosophies of the liberal thinkers who first espoused

⁵⁹ Michael Novak. *Freedom with Justice: Catholic Social Thought and Liberal Institutions*. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989, ix.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 4.

them.⁶¹ For Novak, institutions are ever evolving and finding meaningful ways of historically advancing which undergirds genuine but often unpredictable development from the genesis of these intuitions.

One may argue that liberal institutions in conformity with adequate Catholic philosophy of the human person, its deep sense of community, and its long-experienced respect for “intermediate associations” or “mediating structures” offer our world a genuine appreciation for community, human dignity, and progress.⁶² These structures are what enable us to see more profoundly our need and longing for community and institutions that foster growth, accountability, human flourishing, and safe environment—without which, we become individualistic, ahistorical, irrational, and confined to a world of nothingness. That is we become inadequate and selfish in our undertakings.

In this historical development of the Roman Catholic Church, economic development and the protection of human rights have become deeply enshrined by the teachings of the Church.⁶³ Historically, these principles are traced to liberal institutions

⁶¹ Ibid., 4-5.

⁶² Michael Novak. *Toward a Theology of the Corporation*. Baltimore: University Press of America, 1990, 11. The term mediating structures is traced to Peter L. Berger and Richard John Neuhaus. Mediating structures is defined as “those existing between the individual and the state.” Novak’s focal point is on neighborhood, the family, the church, and the voluntary association, structures rooted in the private sector in contrast to “the middle structures as those existing in both the governmental and the private sector, as articulated by Johannes Althusius in political science.

⁶³ Michael Novak. *The Catholic Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. New York: Free Press, 1993. Novak explains how the modern papal thought and Catholic tradition evolved to reflect this richer interpretation of capitalism. Novak argues that Weber missed the mark by defining the spirit of capitalism too narrowly and attributing it to Calvinistic attitudes rather than to a range of values that were actually shared by many types of Christians and Jews. To replace the Protestant Ethic, Novak espouses a Catholic Ethic that appreciates the social dimensions of capitalism and stresses the creativity, liberty, and responsibility of the individual. Novak argues that capitalism depends on a culture characterized by inventiveness, discovery, cooperative effort, social initiative, and openness to change, adaptability, generosity, experimentation, and voluntary participation. This kind of capitalism is inherently social, brings

rather than to a socialist option, which official Catholic teaching from Roman sources strongly criticizes on economic affairs.⁶⁴ Yet the only confirmed reading or misreading into socialism comes with John XXIII and Paul VI, especially *Populorum progressio*, where economic issues are addressed as a collective human endeavor.⁶⁵ But Pope Paul clearly clarified any socialist interpretations of this encyclical in a subsequent document *Octogesima adveniens*.⁶⁶ This letter emphasized the Church desires to see the full flourishing of all peoples. In addition, it recognizes scientific advancement as intrinsic to the development of our lives but lacks completion of humankind. It also asserted that to solve the multitude of problems facing humanity today the Church must be vigilant in working for the common good which requires greater justice in the sharing of goods nationally and internationally. Moreover, Novak argues that the goal of political power must be the common good, but in the political process there is often a legitimate variety

companies and other voluntary associations into existence, nourishes virtues such as honesty and hard work, and enriches the lives of the participants. This is the type of capitalism that the Catholic Church began to recognize in 1891 in Pope Leo XIII's encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*.

⁶⁴ Michael Novak. *Catholic Social Thought and Liberal Institutions. Freedom with Justice*. New York: Transaction Publisher, 1989, 34.

⁶⁵ *Populorum Progressio*. On the Development of Peoples Paul VI, 1967 Encyclical Letter of Pope Paul VI promulgated on March 26, 1967 is an encyclical written by Pope Paul VI, focusing on “the development of peoples” and that the economy of the world should serve [hu]mankind and not just the few. It was published on March 26, 1967. As part of the Catholic Social Teaching, it emphasized the right to a just wage; the right to security of employment; the right to fair and reasonable working conditions; the right to join a union; and the universal destination of resources and goods.

⁶⁶ *Octogesima Adveniens*. Apostolic letter of Pope Paul VI to Cardinal Maurice Roy, on the 80th anniversary of the encyclical *Rerum Novarum* was written 1971 to Cardinal Maurice Roy, the President of the Council of Laity and of the Pontifical Commission on Justice and Peace on the eightieth anniversary of the encyclical *Rerum Novarum*. Pope Paul VI noted that many new social problems confronted society including urbanization and movement away from largely agrarian societies, the challenges of living and working in a city, discrimination, the ability of workers to form associations and find employment, and the ability to emigrate.

of possible options. We must be aware that the same Christian faith can lead to different commitments.

However, Christians must articulate the common good by being involved in the building up of a just world at the local level in their communities. This notion of the common good is based on Jacques Maritain's interpretation, which argues for democratic capitalism as a tripartite arrangement—a market-based economy, a democratic polity and a pluralistic and liberal moral-cultural system.⁶⁷ Democratic capitalism is a system of natural liberty which forms the basis for a genuine form of communitarian free association, recognizes individual creativity and initiative, seeks to produce virtuous people, and reinforces habits consistent with Judeo-Christian tradition.⁶⁸

In his comparative analysis of capitalism and socialism, Novak asserts that the socialists were mistaken to think that they could create a good person which will then create a good society. For a proponent of socialism, this can be done through a good

⁶⁷ See Jacques Maritain. *The Person and the Common Good*. Fort Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973. In this seminal work, Maritain seeks to know whether the individuals exist for the community, or the community exist for its individuals. Maritain argues that the citizen is both above and below his collective; he does this by distinguishing the citizen considered as an "individual" from the citizen considered as a "person". As an "individual", the citizen has his own needs and wants that distinguish him from his fellows. As a "person", he can reach out of himself through knowledge and will, he can make a gift of himself through love, and he stands personally before God and laws by his free will and moral sense. The common good trumps the individual, but not the person. What does "common good" mean? First, it must be truly common; the common good is not the sum of individual goods. Examples would include a local environment, a cherished tradition or historical memory, or a cultural masterpiece. Each of these things is numerically one, and each belongs to all members of the community and no one in particular. The supreme common good is God's Divine Nature, which each of the three Persons possesses in its fullness. Second, the common good, or at least the most important part, is distinctly moral. (This may seem to set the person definitely on top over the community, but remember that communal love is a big part of "personality", and that morality is itself a means to participate in the community of the Holy Trinity.) Third, the common good must be personally appropriated by the members of the community. It is not sufficient for the members to all benefit from a good, as when all the bees benefit from the organization of the hive. Maritain points out that there can be no truly public good except among persons.

⁶⁸ Michael Novak. *The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism*. Lanham: Madison Books, 1990, 56-57.

government that is led by an elite group with *gnosis*. Realistically, this is an illusion that that has an appeal to Christianity where socialist redistribution parallels Christian charity.⁶⁹ This redistribution in reality is “grotesque parodies of Christian community...that is not truly a Christian promise...It offers redistribution and abundance and on this promise it simply cannot deliver.”⁷⁰ Sadly, this has been the reality in present day North Korea. Based on this socialistic premise, Novak writes,

...there cannot be a good society unless there are good people...But the notion that a handful of true believers, can by manipulating the mass of people, create a good society inhabited by good people is pernicious nonsense.⁷¹

Contrarily, capitalism has a rationalistic analysis of the world, where individual creativity must be encouraged in the generation of wealth.⁷² In its morphological structure, capitalism makes the case for human incentives based on self-interest that is tied to production and distribution. Since production and distribution are not autonomous, human incentives are what create wealth.⁷³ Socialist economics assume that there is no problem of production, rather it is with distribution. But its philosophy is unattainable in a realistic society.

Distinctively, capitalist society in its genuine nature (not the one promoted mainly by the United States during the Cold War when it supported tyrannical rulers who

⁶⁹ Michael Novak. *Capitalism and Socialism: A Theological Inquiry*. Washington DC: AEI, 1979, 8-11.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 8.

⁷¹ Ibid., 11.

⁷² Ibid., 9-12.

⁷³ Ibid., 12.

repressed the very freedom inherent in capitalism and democracy) tends to be dynamic unlike socialist societies that are static. He writes that “Socialism, invented in the nineteenth century, and failing in the twentieth century has sought refuge at last in the myths of the eighteenth century.”⁷⁴

Realistically, Novak argues, that capitalism succeeds because it is able to convert individuals’ private ambitions into the creation and distribution of wealth so that everyone has a solid material base.⁷⁵ Additionally, capitalism demands freedom in order to function and thus liberates those who live under it; socialism ostensibly supports such liberation but, in fact, restricts freedom as observed in many former communist countries. In capitalist society, the government maintains the public morals and encourages its citizens to improve their conditions materially through economic growth that create a sense of comfort and happiness by reasonably accommodating individual self-interests. It is (self-interest) as Novak argues, that produces economic growth. In this comparative analysis, he concludes,

Socialists believe economic growth is obtainable by having everyone place the common good before self-interest. In contrast, capitalism is not all utopian about human motivation. It recognizes that people will better their condition only if they have an interest in bettering their condition...capitalism considered self-interest as something that must not be repressed but restricted to area of economics by the moral codes established by Judeo-Christian tradition.⁷⁶

Similarly, Novak makes the case for poor in Third World countries to be brought into the capitalist system. He believes that foreign aid, when given, should primarily be

⁷⁴ Novak. *The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism*, 41-51.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 189-236; 315-332.

⁷⁶ Novak. *Capitalism and Socialism: A Theological Inquiry*, 23-24.

given directly to ordinary people—not in the form of welfare payments but in the form of education, training, and credit for the launching of small local businesses. Within capitalist nations, Novak calls for local initiatives to assist those in need. He warns that care must be taken to make sure that assistance programs do not lure the able-bodied into dependency. Assistance should encourage the building up of assets and not the prolongation of dependency. Therefore, we must as Christian, encourage wealth creation especially in communities and societies where inequalities are high.⁷⁷

Furthermore, in observance of Jacques Maritain's work, *The Person and the Common Good*, Novak expands on the traditions of Catholic social thought of the common good with the liberal emphasis upon the free person and maintains that the liberal tradition of personal liberty has its own implicit doctrine of the common good. Whereas an individual is merely a member of a species, a person is an individual with a capacity for insight and choice, and, therefore, is both free and responsible.⁷⁸ The purpose of every human person is to be with God in an eternal communion of insight and love. It follows that communion in perfect insight and love with God is both the common good of humankind and the personal good of each. For God, an absolute person, there is an absolute coincidence of common and personal good. It follows that on earth the common

⁷⁷ See Michael Novak. *This Hemisphere of Liberty: A Philosophy of the Americas*, 61. Novak makes the case that wealth creation must be seen as a participation in the work of the Creator and as a participation in the eternal life of God.

⁷⁸ Michael Novak. *Free Persons and the Common Good*. Lanham: Madison Books, 1989, 30-35.

good of persons is to live in as close an approximation of unity in insight and love as humans might attain.⁷⁹

To learn and achieve the common good, persons need institutions suitable to the task. American liberalism makes the protection of individual rights central to the idea of the common good and allows for the development of institutions that nourish cooperation without requiring prior agreement with respect to final ends or personal motivations. The common good consists in treating each person as an end and never solely as a means. As observed by Novak, in order to achieve both personal rights and the public good, he insisted that the framers of the American constitution chose not to impose a moral-cultural system. Rather, they left the construction of such a system to institutions distinct from government. The American founders' idea of a limited state, whose power is restricted by a written constitution, is based on the idea of the inviolability of personal rights. They upheld the consensus that the common good is not attained solely nor primarily by the government but by social institutions beyond the scope of the state.⁸⁰

Moreover, the purpose of government is to provide opportunities for individuals to exercise their own freedoms. In this regard, the common good consists of mutual cooperation and appreciation of all. In Novak's inference, things can be done publicly without being done governmentally. In this case, the common good is far greater than the political good. Therefore, the main and most able instrument of attaining the common

⁷⁹ Ibid., 32-35.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 41-74.

good is not the state but society at large in its full range of social institutions, and not the autonomous individual but the communitarian individual.

Furthermore, Novak draws a comparative analysis of both Madison and Tocqueville's views to illustrate how factions and self-interest rightly understood are able to serve the public good.⁸¹ He writes that "each has been given by God the capacity to create more in a lifetime than he or she consumes. This causes economic progress. If people create more than they consume, the world will be better off because of each life."⁸²

Accordingly, Novak asserts that the common good is actually many goods that are often in direct conflict. As realistically or accurately observed, free persons typically have diverse visions of the common good (as typified in the United States political systems) where political candidates speak as if all Americans are in agreement with their views.⁸³ The reality is that each person in a free society is responsible under the veil of ignorance for his own conception of both his own good and the common good.

On this basis, Novak asserts that the common good of any modern and pluralistic society is something usually unplanned, unenforced, and unintended but achieved through the participation of all citizens seeking their self interests but aware of the

⁸¹ See Alexis de Tocqueville. *Democracy in America*, ed. J. P. Mayer, trans. George Lawrence. New York: Doubleday, 1969, 506-29. Tocqueville makes the case that Americans overwhelmingly believe that their actions are based on the principle of self-interest. However, an "enlightened self-love continually leads them to help one another with... time and wealth for the good of the state." Also see Novak. *Free Persons and the Common Good*, 48-49.

⁸² Novak. *Free Persons and the Common Good*, 48.

⁸³ These politicians usually speak on the campaign trails or political debates that "the American People want this or that," failing to realize that they are only speaking for a constituent or politically based interests.

common good for all. So what does the common good mean to Novak? He categorically identifies the common good to mean: (1) a liberating framework of institutions designed to liberate free persons; (2) a concrete social achievement; and (3) a benchmark that reminds us that no level of common good as concrete social achievement has as yet met the full measure of legitimate and moral expectation. In other words, we are seeking that perfection.⁸⁴

Novak further redefines social justice as a personal virtue, where the old vision of social justice as he argued, is guiding rule asserted by the state. Social justice, so defined, is not a virtue. Rather, it gives the state the authority and power to bring about a legal social order. This is the understanding of social justice that Friedrich von Hayek attacks as an arid, abstract, ideal enforced by an all-powerful state which encourages dependency and submissiveness. I assert that this is not the concept of social justice that Pius XI made canonical in 1931 in *Quadragesimo Anno*. What Pius intended was not the corporate welfare state but the revitalization of civil society or the Great society by the principle of association.⁸⁵

In this case, Novak, like John Wesley, amplifies this view by reinterpreting social justice as a distinctive virtue of free persons associating themselves together (forming

⁸⁴ Novak. *This Hemisphere of Liberty*, 107-23. See also Thomas Gilby, ed. and trans., *Saint Thomas Aquinas: Philosophical Texts*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. Novak makes the case that a true community respects free persons, capable of developing and knowing and loving--two human capacities that are oriented toward community.

⁸⁵ Frederich Von Hayek. *Law Legislation and Liberty: The Mirage of Social Justice*, Vol. 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976, 88, 109. The Great Society arose through the discovery that men can live together in peace and mutually benefiting each other without agreeing on the particular aims which they severally pursue. The discovery that by substituting abstract rules of conduct for obligatory concrete ends made it possible to extend the order of peace beyond small groups pursuing the same ends, because it enabled each individual to gain from the skill and knowledge of others whom he need not know and whose aims could be wholly different from his own.

cells or communities). To be a free person is to know and love others in community. Novak believes that a community is true when its institutions and practices enable persons to multiply the frequency of their acts of knowing and loving. The purpose of a true community is to nourish the full development of each person among its members. It is also in the nature of each person to be in communion with others.⁸⁶ In essence, this is the practice of social justice, which means activism, organizing, and trying to make the system better. Social justice is exercised as a social habit when men and women join with others to change the institutions of society. Novak explains that the habit of social justice has as its aim the improvement of some feature of the common good.

Novak observes that envy must be defeated and the best systematic way to defeat it is through economic growth and open access. True social justice begins by removing systems of political allocation and group favoritism. Multiculturalism is currently being used to single out certain cultures for special status and discriminatory treatment. For, him love ought to be an intrinsic principle in the creation of a political economy. Love is *caritas*—a realistic possibility. He writes,

One thing should perhaps be stressed about *caritas*. It is realistic. To love is to will the good of the other as other. To will, not what you wish for the other, nor what the other wishes, but the *real* good – which neither of you may yet recognize. Love is not sentimental, nor restful in illusions, but watchful...ready to follow evidence. It seeks the real as lungs crave air.⁸⁷

Categorically, *Caritas* is realism in Novak's argument. It requires a realistic judgment of the world in dealing with the conditionality we faced on a daily basis.

⁸⁶ Novak. *This Hemisphere of Liberty*, 107-23.

⁸⁷ Novak. *The Love That Moves the Sun - Caritas and Capitalism*. Reprinted in *Catholicity*, 2, <http://www.catholicity.com/commentary/mnovak/08746.html> (accessed 09.15.11).

Contrarily, any love “based upon appearances, illusions, and sentimentality is the opposite of *caritas*” because as Novak insists, “a civilization of *caritas* is a civilization acutely aware of, and provident for, human sinfulness.”⁸⁸ In this realism of love, we are aware that we must never sacrifice the good for the perfect as we attempt to be hopeful in our approximation of justice and participating in the common good of society. In particular, *caritas* calls forth our participation in the affairs of the world, though imperfect as it might be. This “love that moves the sun and all the stars is ours to give to others.”⁸⁹ It affects the social, cultural, economics, and political systems of our world. Therefore, it is imperative that we understand the sinful nature of human beings, laden with narrow self-interests. Our tasks then require a critical examination and possibly preventing the overuse of such powers in order to bring about a sense of responsible freedom for all people. Clearly, Novak emphatically asserts on:

...separating the three great human powers: economic, political, and cultural. Since every person sometimes sins, we wish to prevent any one person (or group) from coming into possession of all three powers. The point of differentiation into three is to check the errant ambition, each of the others... The first is liberation from torture and tyranny through civil and political liberties. The second is liberty from poverty and want through economic liberties. The third – and most basic – is liberty of the human spirit, through religious liberty, liberty of the press, the liberties of inquiry in the arts and sciences, and the free exercise of the moral authority of conscience.⁹⁰

In this Catholic spirit, Novak, like Hollenbach, and consistent with the Encyclicals, is championing the cause for the primacy of our moral responsibility towards

⁸⁸ Ibid., 2.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 2-3.

the common good, which in essence, is the building of just and liberating communities and societies—where people can flourish and exercise their creative spirits and gifts. Consequently, when our political, economic, social, and cultural institutions fail us, we lose the inner core of the authentic self—which is the collective individuals forming the *polis*—nations of our world.

We must therefore, have a corrective vision of our world, avoiding the absolutes and dogmatic posturing (based on arrogance and ignorance) amidst reasonable evidence. We must stand on the side of the good where reason, tradition, experience, and Scripture can interactively guide us towards the task of (re)building a just, hopeful, loving world where the common good is at the crux of all that we do. By partaking in such responsible actions, based on being attentive and responsive, we are indeed building a bridge ethics, informed by secularism and our Judeo-Christian heritage.

Consensus on the Common Good: Catholicism, Protestantism, and Secularism

We can genuinely assert that the term “common good” within the socio-political tradition of our Christian moral and philosophical understanding, is deeply rooted in Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas’s constructs. It is premised on the genuine good (*bonum honestum*) rather than secondary or tertiary goods. However, it also recognizes the importance of these general goods. In essence, the good of the community and other groups which supersede an individual good, is in reality the common good (*bonum commune*) in this classical view. In this concept, human beings are understood to be rational and political animals, grounded in moral reasoning that affect our deeds in an intelligible manner as we navigate in this interdependent world. This intelligibility makes

human action as distinct and distinguishable from instinctive behaviors.⁹¹ Therefore, human moral reasoning becomes a key component of the sum of the common good—in which our deeds are based on rational thought processes. This is well articulated by V.B. Lewis, who writes that,

Reasons, on this view, are not merely justifications, but causes.... understood to be goods. The basic meaning of good here is simply ‘desirable.’ The centrality of reasons understood as goods allows us to criticize action both internally (does it really achieve the goal set for it by the reason?) and externally (is the reason a good reason?). The external account and criticism of reason is possible because the proximate reasons/goods for any particular action can usually be referred to some more distant and general reasons/goods and all of them to some ultimate framework of intelligibility: the good...as such, the human good.⁹²

It is our ability to be rational in our thoughts and actions that humanity is charged with the responsibility to see the world in its connectivity and therefore exercise the virtue of stewardship, which transcends such goods as pleasure, power, dominance, honor, and fortitude.⁹³ It is out of such notion that Aristotle advocates for the complete human good, which he considered as happiness or flourishing (*eudaimonia*).⁹⁴ As Lewis notes, Aristotle’s formulation of happiness is concerned with a type of life characterized

⁹¹ Aquinas famously distinguishes in this respect between “human acts” and “acts of man,” the former being properly rational actions in pursuit of intelligible goods, the latter being mere behavior. See *Summa Theologiae*, 1a2ae, q.1, a.1.

⁹² See V. Bradley Lewis. *The Common Good in Classical Political Philosophy*. <http://faculty.cua.edu/lewisb/Common%20Good3.pdf> (accessed 04.20.10). He cites Alasdair MacIntyre’s work, *Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues*. Chicago: Open Court, 1999.

⁹³ William French. “Natural Law and Ecological Responsibility: Drawing on the Thomistic Tradition.” *University of St. Thomas Law Journal* 5, no.1 (Winter 2008): 20-24. While acknowledging the medieval giants like Aquinas, Anselm, St. Francis, Bonaventure, and others for affirming the humanity as part of the natural order, Professor French critiques the premium we placed on dominion and human centeredness. This has been an Achilles heels for Christians who socio-economic and political views have in great extent been part of environmental degradation and conflict resources.

⁹⁴ Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 1, chapter.5.

by rational activity in accordance with the virtues in a complete life.⁹⁵ Such quest for happiness allows us to pursue all virtues for the sake of the community where the individual's happiness is part of the whole within the *polis*. Lewis asserts:

If the human good requires the virtues, the development of the virtues, one's moral development, is the most important prerequisite for living the type of life that can be described as *eudaimōn*. Such development is impossible for one to pursue or achieve in isolation from other persons. This development requires the initial care provided by parents without, which no human being can even begin his or her moral development...of teachers, co-workers, and friends. It also requires an environment that includes the structures practices and the institutions to support them in pursuit of which one develops the virtues. Such things include not only schools, but athletic teams, chess clubs, and all the other human associations that provide the contexts for rational action through which persons aim at their good.⁹⁶

In addition, it's out of such interaction, complexities, and multidimensional activities, that require two types of coordination: "first, the individual person must integrate the various goods and pursuits that make up his or her daily affairs into the overall good that is happiness or flourishing and that gives life its end; second, these various practices, institutions and actions must be coordinated by the larger human community."⁹⁷ It is this second social dimension that Lewis argues is Aristotle's view of human being as a political animal; whereas, "the political community (the "city" or *polis* in Aristotle's description) is the pinnacle that coordinates the actions of persons and associations within the city. "This coordination of actions, practices, and institutions is

⁹⁵ Ibid., Book 1, Ch.7, especially 1098a, 7-18.

⁹⁶ V.B. Lewis. "The Common Good in Classical Political Philosophy." (3 November 2005), 2-3.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 3.

what we usually mean by the common good.”⁹⁸ So what we garnered is a complex network of coordination of the rational person pursuing his or her personal good in concert with the common good of others. Moreover, Lewis points at Aquinas ‘insights on the common good (*bonum commune*) by citing Gregory Froelich, who illustrates three ways the common good(s) is articulated in Aquinas’s thoughts:

First there are goods that are common by predication, that is things that are potentially and in the abstract good for anyone, like food, money, exercise, or knowledge. These are common goods in the sense... But when discussed in this way they do not refer to any actual things, but are rather abstracted... A second sense of common refers to common goods, that is, goods that are real and not abstract, but actually owned by everyone, although not enjoyed by anyone in particular unless distributed to them from the common stock, at which point they become private. The third sense of common good identified in Aquinas’s writings... [is] the political common good... [which] is the complete internal order of a political community, which, like the order of the army is both one and is also good for each citizen... The common good of any community, then, is an order of parts that explains and enables their coherence and activity without damaging their own internal integrity.⁹⁹

Of these forms or variations of the common good, it is the political common good that I argue is the centrality or the core of nation-building or rethinking the (re)building of failed states. It recognizes, affirms, and encompasses all goods—the individual,

⁹⁸ Ibid., 3. Lewis argues that philosophically the notion of the common good in classical term was consistent with the view of the authoritative Church documents on social ethics. He lists John XXIII, for example, who famously defined the common good as “the sum total of those conditions of social living, whereby men and women are enabled more fully and more readily to achieve their own perfection” in his 1961 encyclical, *Mater et Magistra*, §65. Definition of the common good is also cited in the Second Vatican Council’s Pastoral Constitution, *Gaudium et Spes*, §26, the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 2d ed., §1906, and the recent *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*, §164. Lewis also posits that the common good has sometimes been thought to shift emphasis from the common good as a genuine good to one that is secondary or instrumental to the good of the individual person. Such an interpretation, however, can only seem plausible if one ignores the repeated correlative statements about the social nature of man, e.g., John XXIII, *Pacem in Terris* §23; John Paul II, *Centesimus Annus* §47; *Catechism* §1879; *Compendium* §125.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 3-4.

private, secondary, collective, and particular goods—coordinating and organizing them in a multi-dimensional and productive manner in which the diversity and strength of various individuals and groups promote the wellbeing of the *polis*—which in our present realities refers to the local communities, nations and the world as a whole. It also seeks to bring law and order—based on rationality and the expression of all virtues in the interests of all. Notwithstanding, we must admit that the common good in this modern/postmodern sense is much more complicated and fragmented than in Aristotle’s *polis*.

The characteristic of this genuine political common good as suggested by Yves Simon and well noted by Lewis is:

Collective causality, i.e., that action can be traced to the community and not simply to individual members or parts... The second characteristic is that the actions of the community pursue a goal shared by the members... not by summing up the intentions of many individual persons or positing the existence of a super “organic” mind made up of individuals, but by the presence of... “we-intentions,” that is, the individuals who make up the community all think that “we believe: or “we intend” some goal.¹⁰⁰

A vivid illustration for this genuine common good is exemplified by the birth of South Sudan and the unanimous celebration and euphoria of the ordinary citizens of that newly formed nation, symbolized by the new national anthem, flag, songs, parades, and other national symbols. Additionally, the heroic victories by Team USA and Team Japan in the FIFA Women’s World Cup in Germany reaching the finals in 2011, clearly

¹⁰⁰ Read Yves R. Simon. *A General Theory of Authority*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962, 67-72. Also see Simon, *Philosophy of Democratic Government*, 48-50; 63-67. Understanding political society as the result of a hypothetical contract is, of course, an important feature of modern political philosophy, e.g., in the thought of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. Others have rejected the notion of the contract as superfluous, mythological or destructive of genuine community loyalty, e.g., Hume, Bentham, and Burke. On the disintegration of the notion of the common good in modern political philosophy see Louis Dupré, “The Common Good and the Open Society,” *Review of Politics* 55 (1993): 687-712.

demonstrates how an entire nation can rally for victory or mourn in disaster or disappointment. However, this communion or “collective intention” can be exploited as seen in Hitler’s Germany and the after effect. We are reminded to be mindful as the “community [functions] with a genuine common good and not merely a partnership instrumental to the partners.”¹⁰¹ That is, the community cannot be suffocated by a ruling class that only seeks its own narrow self interests, dominance, and privileges against the overall objective of the entire nation or community. This distortion of the common good can be pointed at the recent debt ceiling debate in America’s political climate that seriously polarized and negatively politicized a nation’s division based on class welfare and ill-informed ideologies.

St. Augustine significantly contributes to this work and in particular on the matter of the common good. His works brings great insights into understanding the struggle of sins, the need for redemption, and trusting in God. Through such works like *The Confession*—a narrative autobiography and *The City of God*, we are able to grasp a clarity on how his rich theological and philosophical worldview impacts our world—of its brokenness and its need for redemption. Clearly, he reminds us of the real world of struggle and injustice and of death and destruction. For him this world is “constantly subjected to an uneasy armistice between contending forces, with the danger that

¹⁰¹ Lewis. 9. He insists that “communion” as well as the previously mentioned “collective intentionality” can be phony or the product of coercion, either physical or psychological. Tyrannies live by such specious commonality. Therefore, he illustrates that the common good like many other good things can be faked and that tyrants seek the legitimacy suggested by the existence of the common good and thus seek to fake it where it doesn’t exist.

factional disputes may result in bloody insurrection at any time.”¹⁰² What the world needs is not Cicero’s notion of justice but a common love based on collective interest maintained by the use of [smart] power. In Augustine’s world, like ours, power politics is at play, as large society and dominant groups seek social and political power. This view of reality in the Augustinian and shaped vision and Niebuhr’s transcends oligarchic plutocracy, military, or democratic systems of governance—in a world of various interests where the dominant power group sets the agenda for the commonweal as exemplified in America’s hegemony in our current global politics.

However, as Augustine emphasizes, our reflection on self-interest must take consideration of others so that there is a collective self-interest that supersedes our narrow self-interest.¹⁰³ In this sense, the love commandment—the love of God, *amor dei* and the love of neighbor, in spite of its limited classical interpretation, ought to be seen in our modern context as embracing both God and the neighbors as an essential ethical obligation.¹⁰⁴ In this regard, to love one-self and the neighbors according Niebuhr in his

¹⁰² Ibid., 127-128. In Augustine’s view he challenges Cicero’s conception of an ideal justice where the commonwealth is characterized by the compact of justice. Niebuhr sees this Ciceronian ideal as a moralistic illusion that realistically fails to measure the “dangers of tyranny to the dangers of anarchy. Augustine in his realism asserts that we cannot make the flesh cease to lust against the spirit in this present life, but with God’s help we can keep from succumbing to the flesh – body and soul at war with each other (19.4, .677), The City of God.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 134. It must be noted that Augustine places the onus on the visible Church as this perfect society and virgin – the manifestation of the *civitas dei*. But his view is criticized by others. However, to his credit, he was espousing a world-view of his time where the church was a powerful political force.

¹⁰⁴ We observe that The City of God is about two cities—with each characterized by a distinct love. The City of God is marked a true love of God and with that, the appropriate loves of self and neighbor. Once you love God, as Augustine said, “you can do what you will.” In the city of man, the Earthly city is characterized by the world of self-love that often overwhelms our true love of neighbor. So in the City of God our loves centered in God align appropriately, unlike in The City of Man.

reading of Augustine is not just a simplistic endeavor as one might think. It is complex and an ethical duty. Niebuhr writes:

Augustine's doctrine of love as the final norm must be distinguished from modern sentimental versions of Christianity which regard love as a simple possibility...that all conflicts in the community would be avoided if only people and nations would love one another. Augustine's approach differs from modern forms of sentimental perfectionism in the fact that he takes account of power and persistence of egotism, both individual and collective, and seeks to establish the most tolerable form of peace and justice under conditions set by human sin."¹⁰⁵

In Augustine's assertion, we live in a world of paradox and conflict between classes in every nation or community. Therefore, to claim that we need justice in resolving all conflicts would be unrealistic. Rather, what matters most are the accommodations of peoples or various interest groups in addition to the collective interest of the commonweal—where the love of God and neighbor in a sense, becomes justice in which everyone is given his or her due in conformity to the national or collective interests of all.¹⁰⁶ Despite Augustine's own shortfall in articulating some aspects of his thought more efficiently, his realism is grounded in his anthropology that we are sinful beings with limitations and corrupted with pride. Yet, we do have the ability to transcend our limited space by understanding the need to be attentive to the collective interests of others.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 131. Niebuhr's view of Augustine complements his criticism of the liberal Christian Church and the Social Gospel movement which espoused the belief that through reason and optimism, we can strive to make this world perfect. Such ideology fails to take seriously the "power of self-love seriously" or power politics within the context of justice.

¹⁰⁶ Augustine is aware of the tensions and competitions of interest within the international arena. He asserts that no justice or laws can prevent these tension or overt conflicts if the dominant nations or group fail to recognize and make adjustment to their loyalty and its effect on other nations. The current North African and Middle East uprising is a case in point where America's self-interests undermined the freedom and progress of more than three hundred and fifty millions Arabs as its supported the so-called friendly dictators. See *The Essential of Reinhold Niebuhr*, on Augustine's political Realism, 134.

St. Augustine also makes the case for perpetual peace which is needed to affect the concept of nation-building. Briefly, in *The City of God*, he posits that “all beings instinctively desire peace...just as there is no [hu]man that doesn’t wish for joy...so there is no man that does not wish for peace.”¹⁰⁷ Therefore for Augustine, political life to a great extent is driven by people’s desire to have peace with one another. As he claimed, if “the city of man can’t be at peace with God they can be at peace with the law...which derived from the natural order is governed.”¹⁰⁸ But Augustine makes it clear that there are difficulties in living in the earthly city.

However, humans must be willing to negotiate and find compromises to our many “conflicting preferences.” He writes,

They [Humans] can achieve agreement on a set of rules that will allow them to live together peacefully...The City of God also desires to have peaceful coexistence with the city of [Hu]man until the end...so it’s the duty of the Christian to participate in the life of the city and promote harmony.¹⁰⁹

Rightfully, Augustine analysis of the difficulties in obtaining peace does not necessarily support the view of a hostile world that must be subdued by the strong and mighty in order to bring a coercive peace. This problem rather, is due to the selfish nature of human sin that exists in both cities. He asserts:

So the politics of life are seriously deficient...so there cannot be real peace on earth...it is total agreement in a state of true virtue and goodness, will

¹⁰⁷ St. Augustine. *The City of God*, 19.2.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 19.13.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 19.17.

come only when God has banished the underlying causes of our disagreement: sins and ignorance....¹¹⁰

Henceforth, in Augustine view, we must see the natural orderliness of our world. So we ought to work for the preservation of peace—though as earthly as it may be. The evidence for this earthly peace is the natural law, the law of nature that precedes all other laws and written in the hearts of every human being.

The notion of the common good is further complemented by Thomas Aquinas who I regard as one of the greatest Christian thinkers of all time. His vision deeply informs Hollenbach's, Maritain's and most Catholic thinking today regarding the common good. Indeed Thomas's vision can be seen impacting heavily on the Modern papal Social Encyclical Tradition beginning with Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* to a number of global challenges that require us to expand our understanding of the "common good" to include that of the entire global human family.¹¹¹ He brings great insight into the notion of nation-building and Christian participation by his ability to seek a *via media* of both sacred and secular philosophic truths in conjunction with Christian realism—thereby integrating other sources within a systematic and constructive manner in the tradition of Aristotle and other scholars. In particular, Aquinas' political and ethical conception of the common good (*bonum commune*) is grounded in our understanding of social and civic

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 19.25.

¹¹¹ Leo XIII in *Aeternai Patris* named Thomas Aquinas as the "official theologian" for informing the teaching in all Catholic seminaries and in so doing prompted the modern "Thomist Revival." Thomas's strong emphasis on the universality of natural law reasoning and of category of the common good are strongly evident in Pope John XXIII's most influential classic encyclical *Pacem in Terris*, where he stresses that the "signs of the times" point to the many global challenges that the human race faces.

life, that better enables us to envision the purposes of politics—that is happiness and the flourishing of the individual and society.

In his articulation of the common good, as applied both socially and politically in the lives of humans, Aquinas writes:

The human being is the best of the animals if virtue, to which he has a natural inclination, is perfected in him. But if he is without law and justice, the human being is the worst of all the animals....But human beings are brought back to justice by means of the political order. This is clear from the fact that among the Greeks the order of the political community and the judgment of justice are called by the same name: *dike*.¹¹²

Aquinas is certainly an advocate for a harmonious political order that is grounded on the individual, family and community, where there are differentiations of roles but all serving the common good of that given society. He adds,

It must be noted that this unity which is the political community or unity of the family is only a unity of order and not an unqualified unity. Consequently the parts which form it can have a sphere of action which is distinct from that of the whole; just as in an army a soldier can perform actions which are not proper to the whole army...¹¹³

In this analysis of the political community as applied to our Christian ethical duty, we must find the connection between love of God and love of neighbor as an intrinsic moral imperative. Hence, Aquinas makes the case that whoever loves someone, also loves those whom that other person loves. Therefore since God loves all men and women, everyone ought to receive the same end—that is to enjoy the friendship of God. Also, if human beings are to have the time and opportunity to consider the things of God, we need tranquility and peace. When people live together in love for one another, this

¹¹² *Commentary on Politics*, Book 1, c. 1, n. 33.

¹¹³ *Commentary on Ethics* 1, c.1.

removes most of the obstacles that prevent them from attending to the things of God. If our purpose and end is to love God, then we should love each other.¹¹⁴

Moreover, Aquinas argues, that the law of God is given to humanity to provide help where the natural law is insufficient. It is natural for all of humans to love one another. One sign of this is that we are guided by a certain natural instinct. When we see another human being in need, even if it is a stranger, our human instinct leads us to help that person. For example, if we see someone lost, we naturally give them directions. We ought therefore, to help all people, especially, the weak, as if every person was a friend. Thus, Aquinas believed that act of love is written in human nature; the law of God clearly directs us to love one another and as such, the laws that govern the polis must be in conformity with the moral laws of God. He writes:

Every law is ordered to this end, that it shall be obeyed by those who are subject to it... Since virtue is that which makes the person who possesses it good, it follows that the proper effect of the law is to make good those to whom it is given, whether in an absolute sense, or in a qualified sense. If the intention of the law-giver tends toward the true good, which is the common good regulated according to divine justice, it follows that by the law men become good in an unqualified sense.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ Also see *Summa contra Gentiles*, Book III, chapter 117.

¹¹⁵ *Summa Theologica I-II*, q. 92, a. 1, c.

Enlightenment Voices for Perpetual Peace and the Common Good

Furthermore, in the tradition of Augustine and Aquinas, John Locke¹¹⁶ concurs with the perpetual peace hypothesis grounded in the moral law. As a young man, he traveled to Germany and later observed that religious dissent was not the cause for political conflict based on religion. Rather, it was the outlawing of religious dissent that created conditions for political conflict that spiraled into religious violence. Thus, Locke concluded that any form of persecution posed a direct threat to peace and served as a distortion and an obstacle to salvation. In reference to the Christian religion mainly practiced in Europe amongst Protestants and Roman Catholics, he writes that “Toleration of all people is the chief characteristic... of the true church whiles those who punish people for their religious beliefs... have not really embraced the Christian religion in their hearts.”¹¹⁷

Locke also argues that what matters for the preservation of society are shared rules of social interaction rather than religion. He also recognizes that society may not necessarily concur on the same moral principles or rules, because of the difficulties in obtaining a consensus on all moral issues. For Locke, as Greg Forster writes in his book, *Contesting the Public Sphere*, “what the community needs to survive is agreement on the specific moral rules governing justice and social relations—rules against killing, stealing,

¹¹⁶ John Locke advocated and wrote extensively on natural rights, freedom, and reason and detested authoritarianism. Locke’s seminal works, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* concerns itself with determining the limits of human understanding in respect to God, the self, natural kinds and artifacts, as well as a variety of different kinds of ideas. It tells us in some detail what one can legitimately claim to know and what one cannot. Also see *Two Treatises of Government*, the *Letters Concerning Toleration*, *The Reasonableness of Christianity* and *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*.

¹¹⁷ See John Locke. *Letter Concerning Toleration*. Englewood: Prentice Hall, 1950, par.1.

contracts, etc.”¹¹⁸ Hence, Locke opposes theocracy or state sponsored church or religion within the public domain of politics. Further, Locke promotes a democratic system, based on representation and consent of the individual citizens, who he considered to be rational and independent. He also recognizes the anarchic system in which the world is built. In his comparison of Locke to the realists, Michael Cox writes,

The difference lies in the importance Locke attributes to duties to protect life, liberty, and property that support just commonwealths to maintain peace with each other, provided that their natural partiality and the poorly institutionalized character of world politics do not overcome their duties to accommodate.¹¹⁹

Like Augustine, Locke is aware of ‘a troubled peace, due to biases, partiality, and the absence of regular and objective system of adjudication and enforcement. But this must not be the cause of aggression in order to win the peace. Therefore in Locke’s schema, when there is mutual trust, governed by duties to the natural law, perpetual peace is attainable. Another peace proponent is Immanuel Kant¹²⁰, whose groundbreaking works guide this school of democratic principle—the hypothetical peace treaty. Kant

¹¹⁸ Greg Forster. *Contesting the Public Sphere*. IVP Academics, 2008, 157.

¹¹⁹ Michael Cox. *American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 29. This work is a series of essays from various traditions reevaluating America’s role and image in international system of global politics and economics. Of significance is the distinction between the two contending schools of thoughts: The political realist and the liberal or democratic communitarian in their worldview of international relations. These arguments are pertinent as America reassess its power in light of the current global issues confronting the entire world—from genocide, terrorism, economic meltdown to nation-building. Richard Brantley. *Locke, Wesley & the Method of English Romanticism*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1984, 1.

¹²⁰ Immanuel Kant develops his moral philosophy in three seminal works: *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals* (1785), *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) and *Metaphysics of Morals* (1798). Under this heading Kant is probably best known for his theory about a single, general moral obligation that explains all other moral obligations we have: the categorical imperative. A categorical imperative, generally speaking, is an unconditional obligation, or an obligation that we have regardless of our will or desires. A hypothetical imperative, by contrast, is a conditional obligation, one that we have only if we have some desire or other: if one wants x, one ought to do y.

posits that our moral duties can be derived from what he calls the categorical imperative, which can be formulated in three ways. The first formulation—the formula of universal law, states, “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”¹²¹ The second formulation the formula of humanity, states, “act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”¹²² The third formulation—the formula of autonomy, is a synthesis of the previous two. It states that we should so act that we may think of ourselves as legislating universal laws through our maxims. We may think of ourselves as such autonomous legislators only insofar as we follow our own laws.

Kant also sees the importance of personal and public morality. Kant stresses an ethics based on reason and the choice to live by its rules made by free, independent, self-reliant individuals in the modern state. But Kant is much more cautious about just what can and cannot be done, and he has no recourse to some utopian model. Kant fully acknowledges that what goes on in the name of politics is largely as Machiavelli described it: amoral self-interest.¹²³ At the same time, Kant holds out the hope that

¹²¹ Immanuel Kant. James W. Ellington [1785]. *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*. New York: Hackett, 1993, 30. See also, Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*. New York: Book Tree and Amazon Digital Book, 2011. Originally written in 1795. Kant makes the argument for the concept of perpetual peace to be a permanent fixture over a certain specific area or location. This has been the basis of our modern concept of international relations and world peace perpetual peace.

¹²² Ibid., 30.

¹²³ In his book *The Prince*, specifically book XVIII, Machiavelli recognizes that a prince who is faithful to his word, regardless of the situation, will be admired by the public, but that the honest prince is not always the most successful. Machiavelli then states that any promise that leaves a prince at a disadvantage should be broken. One of Machiavelli’s strongest arguments is that a prince must always appear virtuous, and the argument applies in the case of lying. The public needs to think that their leader

ethos—the moral guiding of political force must form a part of political action. Hence, Kant’s task, as one of the foremost Enlightenment moralists, is to show how in the modern state moral considerations are still of central importance as a means of guiding power.

Kant is attempting to address the old question—why should a powerful politician pay any attention to moral issues? In terms of the brief retrospective I have sketched, what Kant might be seen as attempting to show is that Machiavelli and Hobbes were wrong to think that the modern political state can simply be the focus of only *realpolitik*—that is power arrangements and strategies for efficient applications of power. As a moralist, Kant insists that politics is not just a matter of prudence (i.e., material success in getting one’s way in the daily conflicts of the political world). There must, by contrast, be what he calls “a limiting condition of politics,”¹²⁴ so that political affairs are in the command of the moral politician, “one who so interprets the principles of political prudence that they can be coherent with morality.”¹²⁵ This position is central to Kant’s call for universal peace, because, as he points out repeatedly, if all statesmen [or

upholds his or her side of deals, but the leader should secretly be making choices that benefit the country. Machiavelli is not saying that the prince should break promises that weaken him personally or his country. Kant would be outraged that a person in the eye of the public was supporting such actions. Regardless of how extreme a situation could be, Kant believes that honesty is always the best policy. But is there an exception to Kant’s rule? What if a Tutsi was hiding in my house and a Hutu extremist wants to kill her, should I not lie to save her life? Kant believes that lying does more harm than good, even if your lie isn’t caught at the moment you say it. It is sad that we live in a world where the ‘honest prince’ is not always the most successful, yet lies can be used as a necessary step, protecting the community from information that may create chaos and extreme panicky.

¹²⁴ Immanuel Kant and Allen W. Wood. *Basic Writings of Kant*. New York: Random House, 2001, 460.

¹²⁵ Kant. *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*. 1765. Translated by Campbell Smith. London, 1903, 128.

stateswomen] rely only on political prudence (on Machiavellian or Hobbesian principles), then there is no ground for any international cooperation, because power struggles between competing independent states will determine all politics. Only the clear recognition of a commitment to a universal rational moral duty can achieve the reconciliation he sees as essential to peace:

Even a continent that feels itself to be superior to another, regardless of whether or not the latter stands in the way of the former, will not fail to exercise the means of increasing its power, plundering and conquering. Thus, all theoretical plans for civil, international, and cosmopolitan rights dissolve into empty, impractical ideals; by contrast, a practice that is based on empirical principles of human nature and that does not regard it demeaning to formulate its maxims in accord with the way of the world [i.e., in accordance with universal moral laws] can alone hope to find a secure foundation for its structure of political prudence.¹²⁶

In summary, Kant infers that the common good is achievable when there is a moral responsibility based on universal principle of duty and mutual respect towards others. Such action can lead to perpetual peace that the world desperately needs to conduct the affairs of the state and international community.

H. Richard Niebuhr, Responsibility, and the Universal Community

In addition, H. Richard Niebuhr brings attention to this work in articulating the notion of the common good in his seminal work *The Responsible Self*, where he accurately and resolutely describes the moral life and Christian identity in a subtle interweaving and practical manner.¹²⁷ He is therefore essential to the understanding of

¹²⁶ Ibid., 130.

¹²⁷ H.R. Niebuhr. *The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1978, xi. Also see *Faith on Earth: An Inquiry into the Structure of Human Faith*. Hartford: Yale University Press, 1989, 14, 25. (H. R. Niebuhr argues that our moral responsibility primarily is not concern about what is good or right, but about what we ought to do in light of the pressing

how the individual self is morally beholden to the community at large. The premise of his argument, which he offers as a third possibility alongside teleological and deontological ethics, is responsibility: “the image of [hu]man the answerer, [hu]man engaged in dialogue, [hu]man acting in response to action upon him[self].”¹²⁸

In this argument, H.R. Niebuhr further asserts that human are not simply goal-seeking (teleological) nor simply rule-following (deontological) but responsive and being responsible: “What is implicit in the idea of responsibility is the image of [hu]man-the-answerer, [hu]man engaged in dialogue, [hu]man acting in response to action upon him or [her]self.”¹²⁹ Our moral responsibility is a solemn call demanding us to discern what is worth doing in light of what is actually going on. But, if, for example, a nationalistic commitment predominates, the notion of responsibility will be confined to the exclusivist framework of that commitment, lacking universality. An example is the most recent 2011 U.S. “Debt Ceiling Debate” which has done a great deal of damage to the entire global political-economy as evidenced for the massive loss of US stocks and fear for another recession under the Obama’s regime.¹³⁰ H. R. Niebuhr further asserts that our Christian disposition to responsibility ought to be a “radical monotheism”, in which

realities. We are urged to be attentive and responsive to what is going on.) The self acknowledges its potential identity and responds to the others. We then become consciously engaged and interactive with other—empathizing meaningfully with the suffering, happiness, struggles, hopes and aspirations of others.

¹²⁸Niebuhr, 56.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 56.

¹³⁰ The month long debate on raising the U.S. debt ceiling seemed to be an issue of bad politics rather than political prudence for improving the US or global economy. The country and the world watched in anger and frustration as the divided parties sought compromise to dealing with the US debt crisis. It was finally passed into law on August 2, 2011. U.S. stock fell to an all-time low by 500 points on August 4, 2011, the lowest since 2008.

we regard all human beings in the world, whether Christian or non-Christian, as our partners in this life experience because we are all called to participate in the “entire community of being.”¹³¹ Whatever participates in such a community has equal value derived equally from the only center of value without the presence of any privileged group: “It [i.e., radical monotheism] is the confidence that whatever is good, is good, because it exists as one thing among the many, which all have their origin and their being, in the One—the principle of being which is also the principle of value.”¹³²

Therefore, he insists, that Scripture can be considered as just and fair to the poor as well as to strangers, and neighbors through the expression of love.

This universal society constitutes the “spatial horizon” in which Christian reflections on responsibility are to take place. Christian reflections on responsibility are also to occur in the “temporal horizon” that is constituted by the universal history of an

¹³¹ Ibid., 47, also see p.79 on the “I-thou relationship”. This notion is well captured in the African concept *Umbuunti* and espoused by Desmond Tutu and John Mbiti: “I am because we are.”

¹³² Niebuhr. *Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, With Supplementary Essays*, 32. In *Radical Monotheism and Western Culture*, 1960, Niebuhr set forth, more fully than in *The Meaning of Revelation*, his conception of radical monotheism, by comparing it with polytheism and henotheism in the modern, non-mythological setting. Western culture is involved in a conflict of these three basic forms of faith. Polytheism offers many gods, i.e., many objects of devotion; so, the believer's loyalties are divided amongst various causes such as the family, economic success, scientific knowledge, and artistic creativity. Henotheism demands loyalty to one god as the priority over many gods that may have the same rank. In the modern setting, henotheism expresses itself in the exaltation of one social group to the exclusion of others, and its examples include racism, nationalism, fascism, and other forms of extremism. Monotheism, by contrast, asserts that there is only one God as the value-center. So, a community of radical monotheism is an open society. If political life is ordered by polytheistic and henotheistic patterns of devotion, there are problems. Polytheists point out that humans are not equal about their contributions to economic success, or to knowledge, or to creativity in the arts. Henotheistic loyalties such as racism and nationalism also reject the principle of equality in light of their faith in the supremacy of a particular race or nation. The egalitarianism of radical monotheism is fiercely attacked by polytheistic and henotheistic loyalties, but it should not be defeated in its crucial battle of faith. For it is to bring forth the positive transformation of our ethics.

all-encompassing divine activity involving creation and redemption.¹³³ Niebuhr's view, therefore, is not Christian ethics as such, which would defensively examine the Christian style of life within the framework of the Christian confession. It is rather an ethics of global responsibility in a world of drama, complexities, conflicts and yet, in search of the good. It is this chaotic world that our moral responsibility towards the self and the community is at play. Our task is to strike a balance that enables the good to be fulfilled.

Paul Tillich on Christian Realism

Christian realism is also greatly influenced by Paul Tillich, who saw the firsthand carnage and physical destruction as evidence of the moral decadence of humanity in defense for absolute autonomy. His passionate concern for freedom made him an early critic of Hitler and the Nazi movement, and in retaliation he was barred from German universities in 1933. The chaotic situation in Post-War Germany served as a determining factor in his analysis that Western civilization was indeed nearing the end of an era. His practical response to this crisis was to join the religious-socialist movement, whose members believed that the impending cultural breakdown was a momentous opportunity for creative social reconstruction, a time that Tillich characterized by the New Testament term *kairos*, signifying a historical moment into which eternity erupts, transforming the world into a new state of being. Out of his narrative and that of others, the troubled Tillich sought to make sense of the chaos and anarchy of his era. He wrote:

“The concept of the borderline might be a fitting symbol of the whole of my personal and intellectual development. It has been my fate, in almost every direction, to stand between alternative possibilities of existence, to

¹³³ Niebuhr, 56-58.

be completely at home in neither, to take no definitive stand against either.”¹³⁴

From this personal experience, which shaped his identity, one can describe him as dealing with many “ultimate concerns”—from faith and reason, theology and philosophy, Christianity and socialism, religion and culture, and anxiety. For Tillich, humanity is faced with two issues, namely—humanity’s separation from God and the perpetual judgment under God. The crisis in humankind is an eternal one that results from being a spiritual animal who exists tensely on that borderline of life.¹³⁵

The second issue which he describes as the “Protestant principle,” concerns itself with “religious obligation” and the “religious reservation.” The religious obligation, in Tillich’s analysis, is to work God’s will on earth, to establish justice and love in economic and social relations as means to bring an eschatological redemption to the world.¹³⁶ On the other hand, the religious reservation is to protest against any absolute claim to truth made in the name of a relative, historical reality—whether that reality be a totalitarian state, a religious institution, a dogmatic creed, or a social movement—and the possibility to be loyal to the Protestant principle without belonging to a Protestant, or any other church.

Tillich, like Reinhold Niebuhr, was mindful of the inevitability of society’s potential for idolatry—the worship of certain institutions and beliefs as having absolute

¹³⁴ Paul Tillich. *Interpretation of History*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1936, 36.

¹³⁵ Read Tillich. *The Protestant’s Era. Boundaries of Belief*, March 1949. Also available online: <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/the-protestant-era-by-paul-tillich/> (Accessed on 05.16.11).

¹³⁶ Read Tillich’s article. *The Religious Situation*. In this argument, Tillich argues that the self must not be confined. This was a polemic to romanticism. For him, the new metaphysics must be realistic, in opposition to critical philosophy it must be a “*belief-ful realism*.”

and unquestionable validity, as being at long last the final word. For Tillich, what ought to be this “Protestant principle” is a realistic understanding that the only absolute truth is that humanity can never attain absolute truth—because the “the final word” is always with God and it comes as a judgment upon us. In reality, Tillich is aware of the many challenges, evils, suffering and pains that we must endure, including the idolatries manifesting themselves as absolute truth. It is in this realm of contestation of whose narrative of the truths becomes the battle ground—which defines the human condition.

Like Niebuhr, Tillich made a distinction between realism and idealism, in which the former deals with real life issues that confront us physically. He thus asserts that:

Self-transcending realism is a universal attitude toward reality. It is neither a merely theoretical view of the world nor a practical discipline for life; it lies between theory and practice. It is a basic attitude in every realm of life, expressing itself in the shaping of every realm.¹³⁷

In this view Tillich sees history as real and independent in its interpretation of reality. So we live in a temporal world that is a battleground between the forces of good and evil, powers that are expressed in mythology or rationality. Nevertheless, from an ontological perspective the world is good.¹³⁸ Therefore, the ultimate goal of humanity is to reach self-realization within and above the temporal existence. This construct of Tillich is significant as we make the case for nation-building. For example, as we are witnessing in history the current North Africa and Middle East democratic cry for freedom and choice, we can posit that as human the ordinary peoples’ desire for self-

¹³⁷ Paul Tillich. *Paul Tillich: Theologian of the Boundaries*. Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1989, 68.

¹³⁸ Paul Tillich. *The Protestant Era*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957, 27.

realization is an ultimate and realistic human impulse. This is the kairos moment of history, in which one is inwardly conscious of fate and destiny of time.¹³⁹

As Tillich points out, kairos is “found in the passionate longing of the masses; it can be clarified and take form in small circles of conscious intellectual and spiritual concerns; it can gain power in the prophetic word; but it cannot be demonstrated and forced. It is deed and freedom as it is also fate and grace.”¹⁴⁰

Justice also is one of those ambiguous terms where Tillich asserts that the legal meaning is contradicted by the ethical and the ethical is also in conflict the religious meaning. He writes, “Legal justice, moral righteousness and religious justification seem to struggle with each other.”¹⁴¹ This struggle is real and cause of many of the conflicts we faced. When every interest group seems to have its definition of justice, they fail to do due diligence to what Tillich calls the ontological meaning of the word. It is in this interpretation that we have a common understanding of the basic meaning of the word that all can relate to. For example, as observed, how does one spread democratic ideals as part of the global common good, when love and power are often contrasted in such a way that love is identified with resignation of power and power with a denial of love?¹⁴² Are they not compatible? Tillich writes, “Powerless love and loveless power are contrasted. This is unavoidable if love is understood from its emotional side and power from its

¹³⁹ Ibid., 48.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 9.

¹⁴² Ibid., 11.

compulsory side.”¹⁴³ Finding a realistic and balanced approach on these two ideals is crucial in Tillich’s view. For example, I certainly believe that Obama’s speech to the Muslim world in Cairo did inspire lots of young Muslims who for so long have been suppressed by the Mullahs and conservative religious leaders and tyrannical and brutal dictators who propagandized the rhetoric of America’s imperialism and Israel’s Zionism to perpetuate and perpetrate their brute force on their own people. These young people could now feel a sense of worthiness and dignity—knowing that if President Barack Hussein Obama, who looks like them and also bears similar Arabic name like most of them did, could become the leader of the free world, they too had reasons to be hopeful in experiencing the necessary changes in the political and social lives of their countries and regions.

Now, in such critical time, we ask, can America and all the freedom loving people and nations—especially Christians in these nations be in support of the use of smart power as a form of love by intervening in failed or collapsing states in Libya, Yemen, Syria, the Ivory Coast and many other nations who are now in need of just intervention? I assert, like Tillich and Niebuhr, we ought to be champions and intervening forces for realistic peace—which requires the use of smart power through force.

This position of reinterpretation of love and power in a realistic manner in my view, finds resonance with Reinhold Niebuhr and Tillich. As Tillich posited in his critique of Nietzsche and the idea of Christian radical love, both misconstrued the

¹⁴³ Ibid.

ontological understanding of love and power in their analysis and function in the real world, in which God is majestic, mysterious and ethical. Tillich concludes that “One could say that constructive social ethics are impossible as long as power is looked at with distrust and love is reduced to its emotional or ethical quality [because] such division leads to a rejection of or indifference to the political realm on the side of religion.”¹⁴⁴ In Tillich’s perspective, our ethical task is to be aware of the element of love in its affinity with “power and of the element of power without which love becomes chaotic surrender.”¹⁴⁵

It is the smart and realistic combination of these two—love and power that we as Christians ought to accept as the socio-ethical and theo-political task in being responsive and attentive to global issues as seen through the French, British, and Americans intervention in Libya. Their actions avoided the onslaught on Benghazi, the last stronghold of the protesters, who for weeks have demanded the end of a madman’s forty-one years of brutality and the suppression of freedom. So love and power were the means of implementing the humanitarian mission rather than to watch Assad or Ghaddafi kill their people while the world waits. Similarly, such comparison can be said of the relation between love and justice—in which the latter contributes to the cause of justice. As illustrated by Tillich, Justice which seeks equal distribution among heirs finds a

¹⁴⁴ Paul Tillich. *Love, Power, and Justice: Ontological Analysis and Ethical Applications*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954, 12.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 12.

compromise with love which transcends justice by one's "willingness to surrender fortune for the sake of others", as exemplified by King Lear.¹⁴⁶

As such, the powerful and influential nations through the backing of the United Nations realized that the world could not sit idly but must do something for the sake of the disenfranchised freedom loving citizens in Libya—and if for the sake of consistency, such moral and political will ought to be extended anywhere else on this planet. Hence, what we are witnessing is in essence a confirmation of a new era of global or collective sovereignty which transcends national sovereignty. In this new world order, the application of smart power as love and justice is the *sine qua non* for world socio-political reality for the sake of the common good. This means that we can no longer embrace friendly or unfriendly dictators with a sense of impunity. Tillich writes:

We can't free a criminal on the basis of love—that is injustice...through leniency, which is wrongly identified with love, a person may [choose a] criminal career...which is neither justice nor love but injustice, covered by sentimentality.

This view of justice in Tillich's construction, can be realized only if both the demand of the universal law and particular situation are accepted and made effective for the concrete situation as in the case of the humanitarian intervention in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Kosovo and now Libya, where a multinational forces acted with a show of force against the tyrannical rulers. This active and practical participation of the international community to justifiably use force against the enemy of peace and democracy is in essence the love of neighbor and the others, which transcends an abstract conception of justice. In a simple term, to understand justice or love one must know what

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 13.

is injustice or apathy. In concurrence, Tillich adds, “But it is love which creates participation in the concrete situation...so justice is just because of love which is implicit in it.” Moreover, Tillich raises another pertinent issue in understanding the correlation of power and justice for appropriating the common good. I believe that this argument raised here by Tillich is very crucial in dissecting nation-building especially where the applications of justice, love, hope and the common good are interwoven. Within his framework of our new narrative, how does one articulate law and order in the application of justice?

On this basis of the correlation between love, justice, and power, Tillich makes an inquiry:

Who gives the law in which justice is supposed to be expressed? To give a law is the basic manifestation of power. But if the group which has power gives laws, how are they related to justice? Are they simply the expression of the will to power of the group?¹⁴⁷

This moral view of justice as articulated by Tillich has relevance to international politics, relations, and laws. It exposes the hypocrisy of nations which Niebuhr strongly critiqued. Can the United States, the West, China and Russia abide by the same rule of laws in spite of their immense powers and global influences? It is on this very nature of world politics that we find so much inconsistencies and undermining of the United Nations by the very nations who at various times seek their own narrow minded self-interests within this world body. Sadly, these acts of reluctance, undermining and bureaucracy, have served as catalysts for many atrocities in our world even at times when the UN intervention forces have been involved. Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia,

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 13-14.

The Democratic Republic of Congo, and Haiti are recent cases that attest to the application of law and order in the application of justice. Nevertheless, the full engagement of all nations through this world body is the best organization for the promotion of justice peace, love, democracy, and the common good—through international collaboration. On this basis of socio-political engagement, collective responsibility, mutual cooperation and collaboration, an ethical world of realistic possibilities can be realized. For this international effort to succeed, Tillich cautions us to be aware of appropriate political action that takes into account cultural possibilities. Therefore, “to act without recognizing cultural limits is utopian. Politics then...is not just adjusting to culture; it may mean opposition to the dominant cultures...the drive to oppose culture arises from ethics and the ability to discern possibilities for changes.”¹⁴⁸

The articulation of our socio-ethical and theo-political responsibilities become the driving force for us to understand “practical activity toward the realization of the unconditioned”¹⁴⁹ as it affects the action of the people and their communities.

In summary of Tillich’s formulation of the ideal ethical community, there is three-fold structure in our quest for appropriating the common good—namely, ethics as agape which is known as the law of human nature, the second human wisdom is represented by the laws, moral principles and guidelines; and third it is within the concrete situation in which the actor takes upon his or herself the risk of making a moral decision. In essence, Christian realism resonates with Roman Catholic and Protestant’s views of the world in

¹⁴⁸ Mary Ann Stenger and Ronald H. Stone. *Dialogue of Paul Tillich*. Marcon: Mercer University Press, 161.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 162-162.

need of love, hope, justice, and the common good. We seek to (re)build communities, nations, and people that have been exposed to structural violence, evil, and corruption—all due to our sinful nature. Yet, we recognize that we can strive for the good life (personally and collectively) despite our own limitations.

CHAPTER FIVE

BUILDING A WHOLISTIC NATION-BUILDING TOOLKIT

An Application of a Realistic Nation-Building Toolkit

I paraphrase that “Neither was Alexandria built in one week nor Rome in a day.” Even in the two creation narratives of Genesis, the omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent God took time to create the universe and humanity out of chaos.¹ This maxim certainly serves as a reminder and a reality of the challenges of nation-building. Ravaged nations transitioning from chaos to order, need more time than it takes for peace conferences, signing ceremonies and photo ops. Initiating a country’s recovery requires many years and many resources, including large sums of resources from the international community. The basic structure of a country is the same: political, economic, and judicial systems; cultural, educational, and medical institutions.

In spite of the massive financial stimulus package of the United States in attempt to rescue the nation from depression almost four years ago, unemployment and economic fragility hovers over the USA. In Liberia, despite the goodwill of the international community for nearly eight years, and with the world largest direct foreign investments of nearly \$16 billion to date, the nation of 3.5 million people is relatively stable and

¹ The Genesis creation narrative (myth) presents two accounts of creation. In one God creates by spoken words in six days. Genesis ch.1:1-2:3 In the second account, God is more like a potter creating humanity from the dust. Genesis ch. 2:4b-25. In essence, God is involved in the universe-building.

peaceful but remains fragile.² Based on these realities and complexities, this work makes the case that a comprehensive model that goes beyond any theoretical framework, is the necessary common good that can bring about the creation of a workable, reliable, and sustainable nation (re)building programs. The ultimate goal of a successful nation-building is to create a recognizable and legitimate political authority that unites the diversity of its society by creating social cohesion which stimulates the (re)building of the broken state—drawing upon religious, secular, ordinary, and/or the amalgamation of various interest groups into this nation-building workforce.

Therefore, this agenda requires a realistic nation-building schema that I referred to as SIDE: Security, Institutional building, Democracy, and Economic reconstruction. Because these tasks are so interconnected, fitting them together into a unified, organic whole is a complex undertaking. The mixed results from prior nation-building ventures have played a role in the U.S. and the international community's retreat from their global neighbors and responsibilities to rethinking their roles in the process. In the last two decades, Somalia, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Rwanda became the focus of nation-building efforts. Later, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Haiti, The Democratic Republic of Congo, and other nations are also gradually experiencing the process of democratic change as fragile as it might be.

² *Africa Governance Initiative*. January 27, 2011. Many multinational companies like Mittel Steels, Chevron, Firestone, and others are now heavily investing in Liberia's extractive minerals or resources. Most Liberians and the international community await the prospect for Liberia or perils on how these resources will socially and economically translate to the ordinary people, <http://www.tonyblairoffice.org/africa/news-entry/liberian-president-government-and-people-are-partners-in-progress/> (accessed 02.10.12).

Endeavors in Somalia failed, and the United States withdrew. Haiti and Nigeria held contentious but modestly peaceful elections in 2011 respectively. Bosnia is a shaky work in progress. East Timor seems near the end of its own infancy since 2002 when it joined the community of nations after a hard fought struggle for independence from Indonesia in 2000, and elections were held on May 2007; so too is Southern Sudan, the newest nation admitted to the community of nations in July 2011. However, a threatening border war over oil resources is looming between Southern Sudan and Sudan. Liberia also held its elections producing Africa's first female and second term president in 2003 and 2011 respectively; Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Angola are now forging new paths toward nation-building, the situation in The Democratic Republic of Congo remains volatile as ethnic militias stir up troubles; and Haiti is in a slow state of recovery after the devastating earthquake and prior political chaos and a disputed runoff elections in 2011.

The biggest of all conflicts—Afghanistan and Iraq, where the United States had spent more than a trillion dollars, with significant loss of human lives on all sides of the conflict, in the last ten years, remains one of the most controversial wartime debates. The Ivory Coast held elections but disputes led to a bloody stalemate until ex-president Laurent Gbagbo was captured and arrested by French and UN soldier on April 11, 2011. We await the outcome of the Arab and Muslim wave for freedom and democracy, sweeping that region of the world, where Libya and Syria are gravely in a state of chaos and collapse. The attack on U.S. soil—on the morning of 9/11 forced the United States government under the leadership of George Bush out of isolationism. When the United States began bombing Afghanistan, many in the U.S. informally began an engagement in

just war theory—what justifies *jus ad bellum*, America’s right to go to war; the second establishing *jus in bello*, how would America conduct itself within and after the war.³

This was the challenge the Bush administration faced and now confronted by the Obama’s administration. As Bush said in 2000, during his presidential debate with Al Gore “we’re not into nation-building.” However, his entire years in office were spent on war which he claimed was the pursuit of justice and democracy. Bush understood that the threat to the United States would remain if a defeated Afghanistan seeks help from its neighbors—countries that support and harbor the same terrorist groups responsible for 9/11.

Is the international community or in particular, the United States, adequately equipped or ill-equipped in its governmental structures to take on the nation-(re)building mission, even when and where that is appropriate, since it does not have an operational arm proficient in nation-building in the way that it has a Department of Defense proficient in projecting military power? What we can assert is whether or not it is ready,

³ The Just war theory (*Bellum iustum*) is based on a Christian moral principle of war, well articulated by the Roman Catholic Church as espoused by St. Augustine, Aquinas, and Cicero. The basis of such principle is that war ought to be a last resort but when one engages in it, there must be certain basic standard observed by all sides in the conflict. The Roman Catholic Church in its *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, paragraph 2309, lists four strict conditions for the use of force 1. The damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain; 2. All other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective; 3. There must be serious prospects of success; 4. The use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated. The power as well as the precision of modern means of destruction weighs very heavily in evaluating this condition. For further information read Paul Ramsey, *The Just War*. New York: Scribners, 1969; and Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 4th ed., New York: Basic Books, 1977. Finally, others such as Brian Orend and Gary Bass are proposing for *Just post bellum*, the justice after the war, which is critical in nation-building. It concerns the issue of peace treaties, transitional justice, reconstruction and development, TRC, and good governance based on democracy.

the U.S., like the UN must begin to adequately strategize their role for nation-building so as to avoid hasty, costly, wasteful, and endless endeavors.

As stated earlier, the Bush administration paradoxically began its first term on the notion of pursuing a policy of isolationism when it declared an opposition to nation-building during the first election campaign in 2000. It can be argued that this isolationism was the direct cause of the United States losing significant global legitimacy and influences. How? It created a backlash at American own allies who saw its governmental policy as anti-internationalism and uncooperative towards pressing global concerns such as climate change, international justice, and commerce.

Furthermore, before the terrorist attacks, economist Jeffrey Sachs, director of The Earth Institute and Quetelet Professor of Sustainable Development, and Professor of Health Policy and Management at Columbia University, stated that the Bush administration's position on isolationism was unwise. "[P]oor economic performance abroad has the potential to translate into state failure that, in turn, jeopardizes significant U.S. interests." As Sachs wrote in an article titled, "The Strategic Significance of Global Inequality, "If the United States wants to spend less time responding to failed states, as the Bush administration has stated, it will have to spend more time helping them [failed states] achieve economic success to avert state failure."⁴

⁴ Jeffrey Sachs. "The Strategic Significance of Global Inequality." *The Washington Quarterly*, 2001. In his argument, Sachs illustrates that the economic success of developing countries enhances the well-being of the United States, which ought to be actively pursuing policies instrumental in helping support economic success abroad. He insists that the "economic success or failure of developing countries determines the gains from trade and investment that the United States" gains in its economic relations with those countries.

This critique of isolationism means that no nation is immune from global problems as the world is too interconnected in a multifaceted capacity that these problems would sooner or later be at its doorsteps. In another article, “GOP Nation-Building”, Justin Logan and Christopher Preble of the Cato Institute, succinctly critiqued the United States’ policy on nation-building, especially efforts led the Republican Party. For the authors, there is a great sense of hypocrisy and deceit on the part of these politicians. They write:

Throughout the 1990s, Republicans castigated the Clinton administration for conducting foreign policy like social work: vague, ill-defined missions in remote locales from Haiti to Bosnia to Kosovo. Republicans asked forceful questions about how these missions served the U.S. national interest. In November 1995 a clear majority of Republicans in Congress voted to stop Clinton from sending American forces to Bosnia as part of the Dayton Peace Agreement (a prohibition that Clinton flatly ignored). When a second Balkan crisis erupted in Kosovo, John Bolton had to point out to Bill O’Reilly that the United States had become “involved in a conflict where it has no tangible national interest, where it has no clear objectives in mind, and where the ultimate outcome could be very risky for what our real interests are...”⁵

The authors also believe that Mr. John Bolton, like most pre 9/11 conservatives of the Republican Party, viewed nation-building as a dangerous and dubious misuse of American power, whether in Kosovo, Haiti, Liberia or Somalia. Consequently, there was an overwhelming support for then candidate George W. Bush. This was well attested by Dr. Condoleezza Rice in 2000 when she asserted that “we don’t need to have the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten.”^{6,7} Bush himself unequivocally declared during

⁵ Justin Logan and Christopher Preble. “GOP Nation-Building.” *Cato Institute* (January 2006), <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/gop-nationbuilding> (accessed 01.30.06).

⁶ *The Washington Post* (October 23, 2000).

one of the presidential debates with Al Gore, that “I don’t think our troops ought to be used for what’s called nation building...I mean, we’re going to have some kind of nation-building corps from America? Absolutely not.”⁸

Nevertheless, there is an overwhelming recognition, that there is a need for the UN, NATO, or other continental organizations like the AU and EU to assertively take on the task of nation-building or forming an institute or unit for reconstruction and stabilization of potential hotspots or failed states. This effort, when seriously considered, can help alleviate or minimize the extremely poor track record of nation-building efforts. This unit will be able to build institutional knowledge about nation-building, allowing them to reverse the abysmal history of past nation-building failures. This unit must be supported by the United States and its allies, including the United Nations, and will help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a sustainable market economy.

The Importance of Social Cohesion

The ultimate goal of this schema-SIDE in this nation-building toolkit is the creation and sustainability of social cohesion. A successful nation-building process involves the cohesion or unification of a society from the loosely associated groups that existed previously (social integration).⁹ What this means is establishing an ongoing dialogue between the different groups rather than within them. All groups must be

⁷ *GOP Nation-Building* (January 2006), 2.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Jochen Hippler. *Nation-Building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation*. New York: Pluto Press, 2005, 8.

involved in all aspects of society, because the exclusion of any one group will only lead to further problems. As Hippler points out, this also serves a practical purpose. Nation-building needs a national infrastructure, with things such as transport and communication structures, the development of a national economy from regional or local economic areas, and a nationwide mass media for establishing a national political and cultural discourse as the fragile state seeks to build an enviable civil society.¹⁰ These assets must be accessible to all groups of the population and be used by them for transactions and communication.¹¹

In addition to this, an “active and open participation of civil society in the formulation of the country’s government and its policies is crucial.”¹² Furthermore, the leadership must do all it takes to inculcate in the general public, the importance of democratic values, of the civic culture and civil society that develop and sustain them. The overall goal then, is to promote and increase social, political, and economic equality, and of human development, rather than just economic development or state-building, which is pertinent in any successful strategy for long-term democratic nation-building.¹³

¹⁰ Ibid., 9.

¹¹ See U. Hopp and A. Klope-Lesch. External Nation-building vs. Endogenous Nation-forming—A Development Policy Perspective. 2005, 140. Also see Steven Van de Walle and Zoë Scott. *The Role of Public Services in State- and Nation-Building: Exploring Lessons from European History for Fragile States*. GSDRC Research Paper. Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 2009.

¹² John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan. “Toward Post Conflict Reconstruction.” *The Washington Quarterly*, 2002, 92.

¹³ Carolyn M. Stephenson. “Nation-Building,” *Beyond Intractability*, Ed. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. December 2005. Conflict Resolution Consortium, Boulder: University of Colorado, www.beyondintractability.org/essay/nation_building (accessed 01.10.05).

However, difficulties of achieving the aforementioned goals are compounded by the interference of disenfranchised groups (as we have been witness to with the ongoing insurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Pakistan). If civil society does not exist, then people who are faced with the collapse of the autocratic government will deal with their justifiable fear of what happens next by looking to form new associations to protect themselves.¹⁴

A major catalyst of nation-building (as characterized by Hippler) is the development of a functional state apparatus that can actually control its national territory (state-building).¹⁵ A state is more properly the governmental apparatus by which a nation rules itself.¹⁶ This can only really happen if the two factors have been achieved (legitimate political authority and social integration). We can argue that citizens are much more likely to become a part of the state security apparatus (through the armed forces, police, etc.) if they feel that they are part of the 'nation' and civil society. This civil participation avoids factional forces within the nation as seen through local or ethnic militias, exemplified in Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Afghanistan, and other fragile states.

This new and inclusive participation of all the people in its simplest formulation of the fragile nation has become the trend for state-building, especially as understood by the international community since the 1990s, where national and/or international actors

¹⁴ Noah Feldman. *What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, 73.

¹⁵ Jochen Hippler. *Nation-Building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation*. New York: Pluto Press, 2005, 9.

¹⁶ Stephenson. *Nation Building. Beyond Intractability*.

work together to establish, reform and strengthen state institutions that were seriously eroded or are missing.¹⁷

Through the nation-building process, national security, the establishment of the rule of law, effective delivery of basic goods and services through functional formal state institutions, and generation of political legitimacy for the (new) set of state institutions are paramount. The state must prioritize security for the citizens of said nation. After all, before a state “can become a democratic state, it must become a state, which establishes a monopoly over the means of violence.”¹⁸

Violence also undermines the political transition by making people too frightened to participate in the political process.¹⁹ Security is absolutely vital to the nation-building process. All other aspects of nation-building flow from it, and if it falters or fails, the nation-building project will certainly be a failure.²⁰ After this, other aspects of nation-building can begin, such as the establishment of a stable economy, legal system, and administrative apparatus. Let us now analyze the schema—SIDE.

Security

Security is a prerequisite for an effective nation-building campaign and as the pillar of all future development. If the most basic human needs such as security, food and

¹⁷ Richard Caplan. *International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

¹⁸ Larry Diamond. *World Religions and Democracy: A Journal of Democracy Book*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2005, 316.

¹⁹ Joan T. Phillips. *List of Documents and Web Links Relating to the Law of Armed Conflict in Air and Space Operations*. May 2006. Bibliographer, Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center Maxwell (United States) Air Force Base, Alabama.

²⁰ Noah Feldman. *What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, 72.

safe place for living are not met any democratization effort is waste of time and money.

Freedom from fear is a basic human right that guarantees the life without violence for the people.²¹ A government in a failed state does not possess the capabilities to secure the framework of safe development.

However, in certain cases the government is the source of violence. A failed state generates a security vacuum. Without minimal stability nobody will invest in development. The intervening power has to fill this gap. Creating stability means not only to stop the armed conflict but also to prevent humanitarian crisis. Securing the humanitarian aids is a basic goal.²² Somalia proved in 1992 that the aid supply also can be the aim of fighting.²³ That is why it is becoming obvious that in a failed state the only possibility for development is the presence of a foreign power.

The first task of the intervening actor after stopping the armed violence is disarming and demobilizing the combatants and help them to reintegrate into the society. Minimal requisite is to collect at least the heavy arms and break up the armed units by

²¹ Dirk Salomons. "Security, an Absolute Prerequisite." In: Junne, Gerd-Verkoren, Willemijn, ed.: *Post Conflict Development: Meeting New Challenges*. London: Lynne Rienner, 2005, 19-42.

²² William Zartman. *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995. Also see *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, United States Inst of Peace Press; Revised edition, October 15, 2007.

²³ See Robert Dorff "Managing National Security in the Information and Terrorism Age." *The Forum* 4, no. 1 (2006): Article 4. Herein Professor Dorff argues that the United States does not have a clearly defined national security strategy for the 21st century. This problem has its roots in a failure, which precedes 9/11, to come to grips with the fundamentally different nature of the global strategic environment. Stating that we are "at war with terrorism" may be correct at some levels, but it fails to identify an underlying strategic imperative around which we can build a comprehensive organizing framework to protect and promote America's security both at home and abroad. Terrorism and other critical threats emerge from a failure and weakness of legitimate governance. A grand strategy focused on the promotion of legitimate governance and the expansion of the global community of legitimately governed states would provide the organizing framework for managing national security.

offering alternative livelihoods for former combatants. This stage of intervention requires the deployment of troops, in the case of Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC, Haiti, Guatemala, Iraq, and Afghanistan. But nation-building requires generally the long-term commitment of ground forces to either depose or maintain the regime. The second is the use of American or the international mandated forces or military and civilian personnel in the political administration. In some cases, the U.S. and UN exercise decisive influence in the selection of leaders to head the new regimes.²⁴

Even though the most striking aspect of the American record on the more than 200 nation building attempts, since the 1900, is a mixed legacy in establishing democratic regimes, Japan and Germany are considered as the most successful outcomes. Nation-building is generally less challenging in small societies. Accordingly, the U.S. record is at worst dismal.²⁵ Further, due to the lack of an accountable and transparent system of governance and the failure on the International community to adequately make the case for these crucial elements, progress has been impeded in many of these countries.

Nevertheless, when international resources are adequately harnessed for the stabilization and eventual rebuilding process it is important the local people are in partnership with the international community. This requires the total involvement of the people in deciding their priorities in light of the pressing realities that the nation and the international community are confronted with. The nation and its people must not forge a path to eternal dependency but embracing the path to sustainability and interdependency.

²⁴ Ibid., 64-65.

²⁵ Fukuyama. See chart and explanation on pp. 66-67 of Fukuyama's book. It shows the index widely used in ranking democracy and authoritarian regimes: Polity IV dataset. The US overall success rate is 26% based on 17 nations the US had intervened in.

This requires reality check and constant transparency and openness to the media on progress and changes taking place.

During this transitional stage, the combatants need job opportunities more than other groups of the society. It seems to be a contradiction but in case we consider that ex-combatants are socialized to violence it becomes obvious that they will find means to survive. They will increase crime rate if nothing is done to remedy their problems. Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea or the Ivory Coast have shown very clearly that illegal (pejoratively called “black market”) economy, drug trafficking, terrorist groups or criminal gangs can provide “alternatives” for sustaining their life styles. Despite the fact that there is broad cooperation in the international community, the task of building up security in a war torn state and securing stability is never an easy undertaking.

For instance, the security in Afghanistan was mainly concentrated in Kabul in 2003 and its immediate surroundings. Building up the basic infrastructure, demilitarization, rebuilding the roads, bridges, hospitals, or the basic public services are also the part of the first step that aim to secure the basic human needs. Since the local government is incapable to guarantee these services the intervening power has the duty to substitute the state.²⁶ To maintain the basic duties of the state there is a need of

²⁶ Richard Caplan. *International Authority and State Building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina*. *Global Governance* 10:53-65 (January-March 2004). Herein Caplan argues that State building refers to efforts to reconstruct or in some cases to establish for the first time, an effective indigenous government in a state or territory where no such capacity exists or where the capacity has been seriously eroded, as of March 10, 2004. Third-party state building, as opposed to indigenous state building, is a relatively recent practice in international relations. The distinctive feature of an international territorial administration is both the scope of its interest in the governmental functions of the relevant state or territory and its authority over these functions. Third parties have been active before in areas of governance. The UN has functioned in areas ranging from human rights monitoring and the supervision of elections to the demobilization of armed forces and the reorganization of police forces, <http://search.ebscohost.com/direct.asp?an=12408509&db=aph> (accessed 05.10.05).

establishing of an interim authority. The UN seems to share this view by approving several Security Council resolutions. For example, the 1244 Security Council resolution in 1999 authorized the UN Mission in Kosovo to organize the rebuilding and to set up the interim authority. Considering the fact that NATO intervention in 1999 was labeled illegitimate, the resolution showed clearly the changed attitude towards post-conflict settlements. The interim authority has to set up police to secure public security in the long term. International military forces are able to stop armed struggles but incapable to gain the confidence of the society. Local police forces are best suited for this task.

The RAND has been publishing very considerable studies on nation-building, making the case that nation-building really matters and it is context dependent. As the RAND report cites, a post-conflict society requires at least two local police officers for every 1000 inhabitants.²⁷ Creating self-sustaining institutions is a crucial point of the rebuilding process since the institutions create the framework for the economic development and for the societal recovery.²⁸ The institutional needs of the rebuilding process are in essence part of peace-building and very crucial in determining the future of that nation.

In any stabilization, development and reconstruction efforts, there would have to be a military component. By definition, the target state will be emerging from conflict or collapse, and the UN, EU or American administrators will need to operate within a relatively secure environment as they initiate and implement stabilization and

²⁷ James Dobbins et al. *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*, RAND Corporation (MG-557), 2007.

²⁸ Frederick Starr. *Nation Building: Giving Economic Strategy a Chance*. Baltimore: JHU, 2011.

reconstruction programs. But based on the historical record, Preble and Logan are suggesting an absolute minimum of five foreign troops per 1,000 indigenous populations would be needed to be successful. Yet, there is an awareness of the difficulties of garnering such numbers of troops to dealing with the problems of ailed states:

But if we wanted to have a serious chance of success, the above figures suggest what would be required. Sending in a few bureaucrats and soldiers was the strategy in the 1990s. We know what kind of results that strategy yielded in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia.²⁹

Normatively, nation-building concerns the construction or reconstruction of a nation using the power of the state, typically in the wake of a devastating conflict. Nation building entails “both the formation and establishment of the new state itself as a political entity and the processes of creating viable degrees of unity, adaptation, achievement, and sense of national identity among the people.”³⁰ The goal is a stable state that can ultimately become a nation. This is usually a slow process that requires an extended transitional period of rule or the extensive support of the international community.³¹

Institutional Building

Another important factor in nation-building efforts is a broad amount of international support needed for institutional development—the heart and soul of a

²⁹ Ibid., 3.

³⁰ Etzioni, 13. Originally presented as a paper at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, September 02, 2004 (Not Available), http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60138_index.html (accessed 05.26.09). Also see Wendell Bell and Walter E. Freeman, ‘Introduction’, in Wendell Bell and Walter E. Freeman, eds, *Ethnicity and Nation-Building: Comparative International, and Historical Perspectives*. Beverly Hill: Sage Publisher, 1974, 11.

³¹ Larry Diamond. “Building Democracy after Conflict: Lesson from Iraq.” *Journal of Democracy* 16, No. 1 (January 2005). Also see Larry Diamond, *World Religions and Democracy: A Journal of Democracy Book*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2005, 2-3.

functioning state. The intervening power can influence institution-building externally and internally by helping in the creation of the interim authority for reshaping the body polity. It is very important that the sustainable development program gain loyalty towards the institutions of the society as seen in Germany and Japan after the World War II. However, sometimes the “good institutions” are not able to develop towards sustainability or they might lead to growing undemocratic phenomenon inside of the society. In a failed state it is easy to find groups that are interested in maintaining the “bad institutions.” The warlords’ or the corrupt civil servants’ main goal is to sustain the chaotic state.³²

Therefore, the three aforementioned aspects of nation-building characterized by Hippler and others are much more likely to sustain the institutions when they are supported by the international community in conjunction with the local actors. In particular, external actors are especially valuable in mediating a dialogue between the different groups in the social integration phase. Hippler’s third component (state-building) is also much easier to bring about when coupled with the economic, military, and political support of the international community. Multilateral nation-building is more complex and time-consuming but considerably less expensive.³³

If the cost of burden is eased by the external actors pushing the nation-building effort forward, they are more likely to see it through. This is important because nation-building efforts take at least 5 years, but usually end up being much longer. All actors

³² Georg Sorensen. *War and State Making —Why Doesn’t it Work in the Third World?* Nordre Ringgade: University of Aarhus, 2001.

³³ Dominique Vidal. “Reconstructing States: A Guide to Nation-Building.” *Le Monde Diplomatique*, 2003.

involved also need to share a unity of purpose for the nation-building effort, because "incoherence and competition among outside actors can destroy a local government and society."³⁴ Indeed, "burden-sharing and unity of command are the twin pillars of successful nation-building."³⁵ The five international communities that require coordination are nongovernmental organizations, donors/governments, multilateral organizations, militaries, and, significantly, the private sector.³⁶ Their ultimate goals should be "humanitarian relief, transitional security, rule of law, infrastructure reconstruction, economic development, and the political transition."³⁷ The NGOs can usually provide humanitarian support; governments provide the resources and human power, multilateral organizations such as the United Nations can serve to organize the international community, militaries ensure security (without which nation-building is impossible), and the private sector can offer employment which keeps the economy from becoming stagnant. Privatization of former state-owned industries also stimulates jobs and develops a tax base, but must take considerations of key assets such as the usage of water, which is a national security resource, where poverty and drought are persistent. This leads us to the role of economic reconstruction in nation-building.³⁸

³⁴ See Hamre and Sullivan, 2002, 93.

³⁵ See Phillips, 2005, 226.

³⁶ Karin von Hippel. "Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation Building." *The Washington Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (2000): 110.

³⁷ See Phillips, 2005, 226.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 232.

Democracy

Over the years nation-building has signified an effort to construct a government that may or may not be democratic, but preferably is stable.³⁹ At the very least, “the objective of nation-building ought to be the creation of reasonably legitimate, reasonably liberal democracies.”⁴⁰ But the democratization element of nation-building does not usually appear until later in the process. This is because “in order to have a democratic state, a country must first have a state.”⁴¹ Given this, nation-building should first make a goal of “providing and enhancing not only social and economic well-being and governance and the rule of law but also other elements of justice and reconciliation and, very essentially, security.”⁴² So basically, “nation-building opens up democratic potential, but not necessarily the door to actual democracy.”⁴³

However, seeking to build a democratic society is essential to fostering an authentic nation-building process. In fact the reason so many nations fail or collapse is due to the undemocratic nature of their leaders who are corrupt, despotic, unaccountable, and lacking transparency. These attitudes create a deeply rooted syndrome of failed state that Ghani and Lockhart pointedly argue for a democratic statecraft—one that recognizes state building as the central goal and accountability to citizens as the critical

³⁹ von Hippel, 95–112.

⁴⁰ Noah Feldman. *What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, 8.

⁴¹ Diamond. *World Religions and Democracy: A Journal of Democracy Book*, 23.

⁴² John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan. “Toward Post Conflict Reconstruction.” *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 4 (2002): 96.

⁴³ Jochen Hippler. *Nation-Building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation*. New York: Pluto Press, 2005, 11.

mechanism—required to understand and break these patterns.⁴⁴ For these scholars, the contrast between functioning and dysfunctional states is best captured by the notion of sovereignty gap.⁴⁵

The strategic vision in reversing the trends of failed states requires that states must perform a multiplicity of “interrelated functions that range from provision of citizenship rights to promotion of an enabling environment for the private sector. This multidimensional role stands in marked contrast to the 19th century when states were one-dimensional providers of security.”⁴⁶ The legitimate state, as portrayed, performs a series of important functions for its citizens, thereby becoming an instrument for collective mobilization, cooperation, and trust. It can then tackle both the immediate-term societal needs and the longer terms generational and environmental requirements.

In dysfunctional states, office holders focus primarily on personal aggrandizement while the state failed to provide or perform essential services. Such failures take a toll on citizens, as well as the wellbeing of its neighbors—economically, environmentally, and politically. Zimbabwe, The Democratic Republic of Congo, and Haiti are cases in point.⁴⁷ However, in democratic theory, it is said that the people are the principals and their government their agent. The dysfunctional axiom as Ghani asserts, turns this principle outside down—where the people become agents of unaccountable rulers. The absence of

⁴⁴ Ghani. 83.

⁴⁵ Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart, et al. *Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State-Building*. Working paper 253. London: ODI, 2005, 1-14. See Sovereignty Gap as the lack of the international community to focus on sovereignty strategies through state building.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 6.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 83.

an unaccountable government does not mean the lack of public opinion. Indeed, as Ghani writes, “it’s in the cafes; classroom, market places, and farms that complaints circulate.”⁴⁸

Henceforth, how do we make democracy pertinent in the nation-building process? Ghani and Lockhart provide ten realistic working frameworks. Firstly, the most crucial function of the state is law making. Law defines both the powers and limits of the state and the people within that state.⁴⁹ The rule of law is the glue that binds all aspects of the state, the economy, and society. Thus each function is defined by specific set of rules that create governance arrangements—right decisions, processes, accountabilities, freedoms, and duties—for that function.

The complexity of the tasks a state must perform requires internal mechanisms to monitor each branch of government—a check and balance approach. All societies have tensions; the key is whether these disputes are resolved through the process of law or are dealt with externally. By “finding existing rules exclusionary, both Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King called for fundamental change in those rules, which took place within the framework of the rule of law.”⁵⁰ When rule of law takes hold, it creates a reinforcing loop of stability, predictability, trust, and empowerment. First, rule of law stabilizes government and holds it accountable. Second, it sets a predictable environment which other players can make plans over the long term. Third, it creates confidence in the public, which trusts that, when change is necessary, it will take place within the framework of continuity. Lastly, it empowers those in civil society and the economy to

⁴⁸ Ibid., 84.

⁴⁹ Ghani, 125-126.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 25.

take initiatives, form associations, create companies, etc. It changes the nature of politics from divisive to a collective endeavor; people can disagree, but their disagreements are resolved through peaceful process. For example, the recent American Healthcare legislation and the debt ceiling debates are cases in point, where we saw the use of the existing laws and the ability to compromise led to the passage of such bills. In an undemocratic regime, such tension would most likely lead to bloodshed or to other forms of violence and intimidations.

A great example is Singapore, once a corrupt nation in the fifties is an example in which *Transparency International Corruption Perceptibility Index*, ranked among the most transparent nations. “Its patriarch, Lee Kuan Yew saw the rule of laws as the source of good governance in creating both wealth and social benefits. The result has been that Singaporeans identify with their legal system, transforming a small Island without any natural mineral resources in to a global powerhouse.”⁵¹

In contrast, distrust in the enforcement of formal rules increasingly leads to a universe of parallel rules that constitute the actual norms of society.⁵² Criminalization of the economy, informal judicial processes for property and other disputes, patron-client relationships as vehicles of entry to government service, and illegal natural resources concession and tax avoidance becomes the norm, public land and property are expropriated by officials, the state becomes predatory, rulers perceive themselves the law, and violence becomes the key mechanism for change. The poor feel hopeless and distrust

⁵¹ Ibid., 27.

⁵² Ibid., 127.

the system as they focus on survival.⁵³ But when political leaders claim and cede power through orderly processes, seeking mandates from citizens at regular intervals, they build trust in the legitimacy of state's power. However, throughout history, succession to high office has been the source of conflict.

Another changed reality is the globalization of economy, which requires a process of co-production of rules involving the states, firms, and citizens to produce rules that transcends boundaries. So global cooperate chains affect the entire globe and no longer an issue of a single nation. For example, environmental issues must be taken seriously. Beef from Argentina could contaminate the global food chain.⁵⁴ Sound management of public finances is the vehicle through which states can realize public goods. Efficient collection and allocation of resources among contending priorities turn ideas and aspirations into concrete outcomes.

Therefore, the record of state activities lies most clearly in its budget, which is both medium and message. As Ghani argues, the budget brings the rights and duties of citizenship into balance. Each entitlement must have a line of expenditure being matched with a source of revenue. The discipline of preparation, implementation, and alteration of budgets allows the translation of public goals into measureable programs and project. Hence, "public expenditure takes place through rules for the procurement of goods and

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 128.

services, accounting and auditing. Adherence to these rules is critical indicator of the state's effectiveness and accountability.”⁵⁵

To achieve this outcome it will be an immense challenge that requires serious attention from nations recovering from wars particular circumstances and lessons from the experiences, including the mistakes of other nations. The guiding principle of the change that these nations need to undergo, in my view, is that stable political systems rest on the consent of the people and that this consent is generated through performance of core state functions on behalf of citizens. The challenges of building states that can perform these core functions in post-war regimes will be immense. But a dedicated leadership that can inspire its people and hold itself accountable can make a significant impact in the process of nation-building. In particular, a state that works in these nations requires the creation of a national leadership and an efficient aid system.

Nonetheless, we must be cognizant of the fact that the departure of a dictator however and whenever that occurs, does not remove the negative stigma of the decades of bad governance. To overcome this legacy, new successors will need to combine dedication to the common good with imaginative leadership and management skills, underpinned by an ethic of collective team service. This would entail a refreshing departure from the stifling effects of the cult of personality, and from entrapment by ties of kinship, friendship, patronage and the perks of office.

These can be alluring on first sight, and perhaps regarded as part of the spoils of victory in the aftermath of a change of regime. But to give in to such temptations would

⁵⁵ Ibid., 135-136.

also perpetuate the old evil regime's divisive legacy. A break from the past ought to move the country to a new path which combines technical and human expertise with moral commitment in forming a recognizable polity and economy. It's my hope that Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya in the wake of the Arab awakening can forge such optimism but with a realistic sense of the struggle and growing pain of their newly found freedom that ought to be balanced with responsibility.

We must also be cognizant of the fact that nation-building is typically not only concerned with transforming a country so that it can become stable or economically viable (a concept the Bush-Cheney regime originally pursued in Iraq) and competitive on the world market. Truly, nation-building is principally about political reconstruction and transformation that pursue a democratic agenda.⁵⁶ This falls in line with the concept of nation-building as defined by Hippler.

According to Hippler, "nation-building is on the one hand a process of sociopolitical development, and on the other hand it can be a political objective as well as a strategy for reaching specific political objectives."⁵⁷ As he points out, these two definitions of nation-building can be viewed as being descriptive or analytical versus the normative strategic process. Both of these definitions will be vital to understanding the entire process, because you cannot have one without the other. "A nation is widely understood to be a community invested in a state, and the concepts mentioned below

⁵⁶ Vidal, 2003.

⁵⁷ Hippler, 6.

reflect as much.”⁵⁸ Given this, there are certain key elements in every nation-building endeavor that are vital to making the process work. These are the recognition of political authority, social cohesion, and the (re)building of all apparatuses of the state.

The first of these elements is the concept of an ideological and realistic integrative policy. What this fundamentally entails is enabling the citizens of said nation to come to regard themselves as some kind of collective identity affecting the political common good—by drawing upon their shared but diverse historical narratives.

This is a sociocultural structuring and integration process leading to shared characteristics of identity, values, and goals. It is not the homogeneity of these characteristics that is relevant, rather the recognition of heterogeneity and facilitating inclusion.⁵⁹

In the case of Rwanda, the nation through its political authority is fostering an agenda that regards its people beyond Tutsi and Hutus, and finding a new shared identity for fostering healing, reconciliation and progress. Yet, the task may remain arduous. In fact, ethnicity might remain socially relevant within in the private sphere. The same can be said of Iraq, where the task of the government is to recognize that the nation is composed of Sunni Muslims, Shi’a Muslims, and Kurds. But until they all come to regard themselves under a primary national identity as Iraqi, while at the same time holding their respective ethnic, religious, or cultural identities as Sunni, Shi’a, or Kurdish as secondary, a successful and stable state is unlikely to be achieved.

⁵⁸Etzioni. 13.

⁵⁹ U. Hopp and A. Kloeke-Lesch. “External Nation-Building vs. Endogenous Nation-Forming—A Development Policy Perspective. In J. Hippler, ed., *Nation-Building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformatio*. London: Pluto, 2005, 140. Also <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/21/34242656.pdf> (accessed 05.14.10).

As long as the primary identity and loyalty lies with the tribe, clan or an ethnic or ethno religious group and the national identity level remains subordinate or missing, a nation-state will continue to be precarious.⁶⁰ This is why “the United States has failed to install viable democracies in Somalia, Haiti and Afghanistan, and Iraq because all four countries are divided ethnically, socio-economically or tribally.”⁶¹

Economic Development and Reconstruction

Economic reconstruction is essential to nation-building and comes after security has been established. In relation to Hippler, economic reconstruction is intertwined with the state-building phase, and by providing employment contributes to the building of a national infrastructure and civil society, both of which are vital to the social integration phase. Judging by past examples, “the level of a country’s economic development had proved to be one of the best predictors of a durable democracy.”⁶² However, there is a difference between economic development and economic reconstruction in the context of nation-building. Economic reconstruction assumes that there was a well-functioning economy, but that some catastrophic event undermined it and the economy must be put back on its feet.⁶³ This is opposed to economic development, which refers to “building a modern economy where none previously existed.”⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Hippler, 8.

⁶¹ Vidal, 2003.

⁶² Diamond, 19.

⁶³ Etzioni, 4.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 40-56.

Obviously, economic reconstruction is the much easier option for the nation-builder, but which task is undertaken, reconstruction or development, depends entirely on the country in question. But if the case is economic reconstruction, it is much more likely that the nation-building effort will be successful because most of the factors of a stable economy were already in place. Money also needs to find its way into the local economy, so “contracts to rebuild utilities, roads, and bridges should give preference to local firms and contractors that meet local hiring quotas.”⁶⁵ Given this, in nation-building efforts it is vital to get the economy back on track with the local populations in partnership with the international community.

Apart from the establishment of the basic administrative and institutional building processes, there ought to be rigorous shaping of the legal frame of the body polity, rule of law, the market, or the civil society.⁶⁶ Surprisingly, the international community—thanks to the spread of neoliberal philosophy in the international economy—envisioned the state as the biggest enemy of global free trade and obstacle in strengthening the weak states—through deregulation, decentralization, and liberalization. But the last two decades have experienced a growing gap between the rich and poor which are clearly being manifested even in the United States. Such a trend has the propensity for rolling back any gains for nation-building especially amongst fragile states.

Now it is obvious that a failed state with a none-existing economy is more dangerous for free and fair economic activities than a functioning but less liberalized and

⁶⁵ See Phillips. 2005, 232.

⁶⁶ Richard Caplan. *International Governance of War-torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction*, Oxford: OUP, 2005, 43-60.

less open one. After satisfying the basic human needs it can be differentiated by at least three phases of institution building. Firstly, beyond the basic administration the mechanism of political consultation has to be built up. It means that there is a need of party formation and political participation of the society on the local and national levels.

In essence, democracy has to be a grass roots initiative taking place in the village and town councils, community blocks, the schools, and other civic organizations. In the second phase it has to create – via local political consultations – the frame of polity, i.e. government, parliament, jurisdiction and constitution. Finally, the local society has to create the institutions to make them self-sustaining.⁶⁷ The International NGOs are very active in this area. The promotion of “good governance,” anti-corruption programs, training of civil servants, security sector reform, election observation are the most relevant tasks that these NGOs and international organizations such as the EU, the World Bank or the IMF can initiate or provide good practices.⁶⁸

The Importance of Transitional Justice

A significant factor in nation-building is the task of transitional justice. This is essential to realizing all three aspects characterized by Hippler, because it is difficult for a divided nation to come together until it has dealt with past injustices between the

⁶⁷ Jose Luis Herrero. “Building State Institutions.” In Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren, eds. *Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005, 55-56.

⁶⁸ Stephen Krasner. *Addressing State Failure*. Published in *Foreign Affairs* by The Council on Foreign Relations, 2005. Krasner makes the case that the international community is not, however, adequately organized to deal with governance failures. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the United States and the rest of the world to develop the tools to both prevent conflict and manage its aftermath when it does occur. Such efforts he believes will entail not just peacekeeping measures, but also influencing the choices that troubled countries make about their economies, their political systems, the rule of law, and their internal security. As we have witnessed throughout history weak countries are unable to take advantage of the global economy not just because of a lack of resources, but also because they lack strong, capable institutions.

different groups. Oftentimes the nations being rebuilt were under the rule of an oppressive or corrupt regime, and it is important to bring the greatest perpetrators of criminal acts to justice.⁶⁹ This is needed for a variety of reasons. The goal is to hold accountable the perpetrators of human rights violations so that victims believe that justice prevails. It is difficult for a nation to move towards the future when it has yet to deal with its past. The intended effect is to address and deal with the underlying causes of conflict within a society, and with that break the circle of violence that often characterizes such conflicts.

Not only do these procedures prevent the recurrence of conflict, they also provide a valuable forum for individuals and communities to feel a sense of closure (which may never happen) and to begin healing old wounds.⁷⁰ So until indigenous capabilities can be reconstituted, an interim criminal-justice system is just a stopgap measure and must not replace efforts by local actors to work towards a long-term permanent judicial system steeped in the tradition of universal human rights.⁷¹ Therefore, the ultimate goal of any nation-building effort should be “an impartial and accountable legal system for the future, in particular, creating an effective law enforcement apparatus, an open judicial system, fair laws, and a humane corrections system.”⁷²

⁶⁹ Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu. *Global Justice. The Politics of War Crimes Trials*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008, 104-112. Also see Joan T. Phillips. *Just War Theory*. Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center Maxwell AFB, AL, April 2009.

⁷⁰ Michèle Flournoy and Michael Pan. “Dealing with Demons: Justice and Reconciliation.” *The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2002).

⁷¹ Moghalu, 3-8ff.

⁷² John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan. “Toward Post Conflict Reconstruction.” *The Washington Quarterly* (2002): 93. Also see “Toward Postconflict Resolution,” 169-183 in A. Lennon, ed.

Furthermore, a just nation-building ethic that embraces transitional justice must be aware of wide range of approaches that states or nations may use to address past human rights abuses. They include series of actions and policies, resulting in the creation of institutions through policies in times of political transitions from violence and repression associated with armed conflicts, military regimes and authoritarian rule to peace, societal stability and democracy.⁷³

These policies and the institutions may include both judicial and non-judicial approaches. Transitional justice is informed by a society's desire to rebuild social trust, seek 'reconciliation', repair or create a broken justice system so as to prevent future human rights violations, and build a democratic system of governance.

As well noted by many practitioners and experts on just peace building, especially after a protracted conflict, transitional justice ought to be approached generally in at least six primary lenses that are all context driven to meet each particular society's needs.

They are:

Trials: policy of retributive justice through national or international courts/tribunal for criminal prosecutions of individual perpetrators. *Truth-Seeking/Fact Finding Mechanisms*: a non-retributive justice approach to promote truth seeking of past abuse and clarify history. Often pursued through truth commissions and other investigative institutions. *Reparations*: a restorative policy approach through the provision of material and sometimes non-material compensation to victims of human

The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003.

⁷³ See works of Louis Bickford. 'Transitional Justice', an entry in *Macmillan Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity* 3 (2004): 1045-1047, <http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/> (accessed 02.17.10); Neil J. Kritz, ed., *Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes*, Volume 1 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995); Ruti G. Teitel, *Transitional Justice*. Oxford University Press, 2000; and A. James McAdams, ed. *Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in New Democracies*. Notre Dame & London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997.

rights violations. *Reform of Abusive Institutions*: a policy directed towards the reform of democratic and governance institutions. These reforms may include vetting and lustration. *Memorialization*: policies and institutions of remembering the past to establish 'collective memory.' Memorialization meets victims' demands to 'never forget' and assist in generating dialogue and discussion about the past and establishing accurate historical record. *Community-based and/or Traditional/Religious Initiatives*: the use of traditional and/or religious reconciliation practices to promote justice, accountability, reintegration of former combatants and foster national, individual or community reconciliation.⁷⁴

Therefore, justice and reconciliation appear to be the running themes in transitional justice approaches. They seem to be fundamental goals for transitional justice processes. In post-conflict societies, for instance, there appears an increasing international currency in shared experiences in promoting peace through justice and reconciliation.⁷⁵ It is widely held that societies making a transition away from a period of violent conflict, civil war and/or severe political repression and authoritarianism toward a better present and future government, that is accountable and has respect for human rights, justice, human security, and national unity must embark on a journey of reconciliation.⁷⁶ This is because reconciliation can be an important factor in preventing recurrence of violence and ensuring continued democratization. In this sense,

⁷⁴ Franklin Oduro. *A Review of the Literature on Reconciliation: What Do We Understand by 'Reconciliation'? (Emerging Definitions of Reconciliation in the Context of Transitional Justice)*. Canada: The International Development Research Centre, 2007, 17. See IIDEA. *Reconciliation After a Violent Conflict*. Stockholm, Sweden: IIDEA handbook Series, 2003, 5-19. Desmond Tutu summarizes the essence of the notion of reconciliation in the transitional justice process, stating that "there is no handy roadmap for reconciliation nor a short cut or simple prescription for healing the wounds and divisions of a society in the aftermath of sustained violence." The reality is the difficulties and challenges in creating trust and understanding between former enemies. Yet, it is an essential factor to addressing past wrongs and building a sustainable peace if a nation or society is to survive and chart a better future.

⁷⁵ Donna Pankhurst. "Issues of Justice and Reconciliation in Complex Political Emergencies: Conceptualizing Reconciliation, Justice and Peace." *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (1999.): 239.

⁷⁶ Alex Boraine. 'Transitional Justice', in Charles Villa-Vicencio and Erik Doxtader, eds. *Pieces of the Puzzle: Keywords on Reconciliation and Transitional Justice* (Cape Town: Institute of Justice and Reconciliation, 2004).

reconciliation seems to be the ultimate goal of transitional justice. Such an understanding has often diluted transitional justice processes and outcomes. Both the concepts of justice and reconciliation have often been joined together as constituting transitional justice outcomes, whereas the two are distinct.

Transitional justice is premised on a belief that the demand for justice is important but not an absolute one: instead criminal justice must be balanced with the need for peace, reconciliation, democracy, equitable development and the rule of law. Transitional justice therefore represents an attempt to pursue justice with a keen eye on sustainable national reconciliation. Thus, there is a linkage between transitional justice processes and reconciliation. The truth, however, is that due to the contested nature of the concept of reconciliation, the reconciliation goal of transitional justice processes has often been subsumed with that of justice, resulting in, sometimes, false reconciliation.⁷⁷ However, reconciliation must be seen as the only possibility for people in conflict to account for the past (back-ward looking) and seek a new path for the future (forward looking). Ideally reconciliation seeks:

To prevent, once and for all, the use of the past as the seed of renewed conflict. It consolidates peace, breaks the cycle of violence and strengthens newly established or reintroduced democratic institutions. As

⁷⁷ The use of 'false reconciliation' in this review is synonymous to Michael Ignatieff's use of the term and expatiated on by Juan Mendez and Charles Lerche. The tension between justice and reconciliation, as represented by the conditions of knowledge of truth and granting of amnesty, is highlighted as a subject of concern in the reconciliation debate. These authors raise the alarm regarding placing emphasis on truth and, sometimes, on granting of amnesty to perpetrators of human rights as often practice by the truth commission approach of transitional justice process as a clear misconception that 'truth' and denial of 'justice' always lead to reconciliation. In other words reconciliation via the route of truth acknowledgment and granting of amnesties must not be construed as justice served. See the works of these authors: Michael Ignatieff, "Articles of Faith," *Index of Censorship* 5 (1996): 110-122; Juan E. Mendez, "Accountability for Past Abuses," *Human Rights Quarterly* 19, no. 2 (1997): 255-282; and Charles Lerche, "Peace Building through Reconciliation," *The International Journal of Peace Studies* 5, no. 2 (Autumn/Winter, 2000): 2. 2000.

a backward-looking operation, reconciliation brings about the personal healing of survivors, the reparation of past injustices, the building or rebuilding of non-violent relationships between individuals and communities, and the acceptance by the former parties to a conflict of a common vision and understanding of the past. In its forward-looking dimension, reconciliation means enabling victims and perpetrators to get on with life and, at the level of society, the establishment of a civilized political dialogue and an adequate sharing of power.⁷⁸

If the international community and Christians who desire to see in this temporal world—the full restoration of human dignity and flourishing of all people and the environment as a whole—irrespective of race, religion, gender or creed, we must then promote and work assiduously for the promotion of transitional justice as it relates to nation-building.

Balancing Reconstruction with Development

Nation-building encompasses two different types of activities, reconstruction and development. Although the distinction between the two is often blurred, it has always been present to nation-builders of earlier generations dealing with post-conflict situations. The official title of the World Bank is the *International Bank for Reconstruction and Development*. Most of its early work focused on reconstruction or the restoration of war-torn or damaged societies to their pre-conflict situation. Development, however, refers to the creation of new institutions and the promotion of sustained economic growth, thereby transforming the society into something that it has not been previously.

Clearly, there is a huge conceptual difference between reconstruction and development. Reconstruction is what historically intervening nations have shown they are capable of doing. Post-war Western Europe benefited significantly from US

⁷⁸ IIDEA. *Reconciliation after a Violent Conflict*. Stockholm: IIDEA Handbook Series, 2003, 19.

reconstruction programs. This effort was in complete contrast to the Balkan's intervention, where we witnessed uncoordinated, political and economic mismanagement. "Reconstruction is possible when the underlying political and social infrastructure has survived conflict or crisis; the problem is then the relatively simple matter of injecting sufficient resources to jumpstart the process, in the form of supplying food, roads, buildings, infrastructure, and the like."⁷⁹

Development is however, much more problematic, both conceptually and as a matter of pragmatic policy. This was what America came to realize after its own success of the New Deal projects and the Tennessee Valley Authority, where it domestically transformed lives. On the international front, "the early American self-confidence in its ability to promote development came crashing down under the pressure of a variety of factors in the 1970s and 1980s. State-building, done without regard for the democratic legitimacy of the governments involved, implicated foreign donors in human rights abuses of recipients and failed to prevent coups, revolutions, and wars that led to political breakdown."⁸⁰

In recent years, attention has now moved from the Harrod-Domar neoclassical growth model,⁸¹ which argues that the path to development meant sufficient capital

⁷⁹ Francis Fukuyama. *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004, 4.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 5.

⁸¹ According to the Harrod-Domar Growth Model, which was introduced in the 1930s, states that the growth rate of an economy is depended on two factors: the savings ratio and the savings level and capital-output ratio of the economy. Let us take an example to explain the model. If the capital equipment worth \$10 is responsible for producing each \$1 of annual output, then capital-output ratio is 10 to 1. The Harrod-Domar model tries to address two problems that have the possibility of occurring in the economy. The first problem deals with the relationship between the natural growth rate and actual growth rate. The

investment, followed by emphasis on education, population growth, debt relief, and [the infamous structural] adjustment as panacea for development.”⁸² Now, attention has ethically been placed on institutions and governance as critical factors in development.

But Fukuyama believes that this is open to its own evolution. He writes,

But any honest appraisal of where the “state of the art” lies in development today would be important, we know relatively little about how to create them; they are, in any case, only one part of a much more complicated set of necessary strategies.⁸³

In light of this, Fukuyama sees the temptation to let nation-builders stick to reconstruction and avoid development. “The problem is that this bifurcation is usually not possible in developing countries with weak or absent state sectors.”⁸⁴ As we are aware, many of these conflicts have destroyed basic institutions, obliterating the distinction between reconstruction and development. The examples of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia, speak to this issue. Therefore, to get them back to some form of normalcy, it requires both development and reconstruction.⁸⁵

The development function is a critical nation-building task—it is the ability to create and maintain self-sustaining indigenous institutions that permit outside powers to

natural growth rate is determined by the factors like culture, birth rate or general tastes while the propensity to consume or save affects the actual growth rate. The problem is that, given population growth, it is not certain that the economy will achieve enough output growth to support total employment. The Harrod-Domar model also addresses the problem of the relationship between warranted and actual growth. When it is expected that there will be growth in output, investments also need to be increased. But problems occur when the actual growth fails to meet the expectations of the warranted growth.

⁸² Fukuyama, 6.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

formulate an exit strategy. A lack of conceptual clarity on how to promote institutional development makes it extremely difficult to transition out of reconstruction phase of nation-building. For example in Bosnia, the European High Representatives functioned as a vicar of Europe since the Dayton Accord. They overturned local elections, and takes on the governance task of the land, in their effort to fight corruption and promoting good governance and human rights. But these approaches undercut the Bosnian capacity to self governance. What such acts generate is resentment against the intervening power and or dependency syndrome by the local populations. A departure anytime soon would plunge these people back into the same internal conflict. A similar attitude prevails in Afghanistan and Iraq, where private US contractors are creating tensions and resentments amongst the local populations—doing jobs that the local populations could be doing.

In certain respects, Fukuyama asserts that reconstruction can even become an impediment to development in the long run. Reconstruction requires rapid and massive outside intervention to stabilize conflicts, rebuild infrastructure, and deal with humanitarian issues. The local government is, by definition, unable to provide these basic functions itself. And is often bypassed for the intervening forces of NGOs, peacekeepers, and other aid agencies—often time being highly paid than the local officials in government.

The development phase on the contrary, requires the eventual weaning of local actors and institutions from dependence on outside aid. This is conceptually straightforward, but extremely difficult to implement in practice. First, it is seldom the case that local institutions are actually strong enough to do all the things that they are

intended to do. This could be detrimental in weakening some basic functions of the state. Secondly, the outside nation-builders get in the habit of ruling and making decisions, and they are reluctant to allow their local protégé to make their own mistakes. The United States is an example in the early phase of the war in Iraq. Thirdly, nation-builders often lack clarity about their own impact on local populations. They chant the mantra of institution or capacity-building and they fail to understand how their continuous presence in the country tends to precisely weaken those institutions they are seeking to strengthen.⁸⁶

Iraq and Afghanistan present two different models of intervention. Afghanistan had a larger support from the international community with indigenous players involved. In Iraq, it was different. Tragically, the Bush administration failed to capitalize on the support structures that could have increased the possibilities of flushing or stamping out the insurgency and moving the country to a genuine nation-building—with institutions and self-governance as key to a democratic transition. Instead, the new leadership under Hamid Karzai was so corrupt that the basic service for its people could hardly be delivered.

The Taliban saw the weakness of the Karzais's government and enforced its own autonomy in the countryside with drugs (heroin) as its cash crop. With the Bush administration more focused on Iraq, the Taliban and its sympathizers gradually regrouped and now posed a threat to the country's future and for that matter, to the US administration under President Barack Obama and the so-called war on terror. Sadly, the

⁸⁶ Ibid., 7-8.

local populations and young American and NATO soldiers seem to be caught in a continuous quagmire. Such unfortunate incident on December 18, 2009 claimed one of my best friends and soccer buddy in Afghanistan when he, Sgt. Albert Ware and six other soldiers were fatally ambushed. The young man who ironically escaped the Liberian civil war as a refugee in America, moved by the devastation he saw on 9/11, joined the Illinois National Guard and subsequently the United States' Army.⁸⁷

Even as President Obama accepted the controversial Nobel peace prize for 2009, in the midst of US led coalition's troop surge, the US has still not defined its mission as being either nation-building or a war on terror. What we see is actually the combination of both. In Iraq, due to the long held suspicion Iraqis felt about the Americans, based on the first Gulf war when Saddam was subdued, and an American supported insurgency brutally was quashed by his regime, there was a lurking fear of another brutal insurgency from the defeated Sunni-led Barth party supporters. The majority Shiites were reluctant to exert any form of legitimate claim to power. Owing to the deep ethnic division like that of Balkans, Iraq was left in the hands of the American led coalition.

⁸⁷ *The Chicago Tribune* wrote: "On the soccer field, Sgt. Albert Dono Ware of Chicago played goalie because he was trustworthy, dependable and willing to endure being hit with the ball to protect his team, his friends and family. Some of those same qualities carried over into his relationships and military career, helping establish him as a leader," said Artemus [G]aye, Ware's soccer teammate. *The Chicago Tribune* and Channel 7 News covered this story captioned "Family Friends Honor Chicago's Soldiers," January 9, 2010. I was fortunate to offer a tribute, where I wrote and read an ode honoring Sgt. Ware... "We knew you had another duty... We eagerly awaited your return for another season..." We also saved the last soccer ball Ware played which I offered to our fallen player and soldier's family. As the *Tribune* wrote, "Then he (Artemus) looked at Ware's casket and chanted, "Play, Albert, play," drawing tears and moans from the audience. The service was held at Freedom Temple Church of God in Christ on the South Side of Chicago, graced by then acting Governor Pat Quinn, <http://archive.chicagobreakingnews.com/2010/01/family-friends-honor-chicago-soldier.html> (accessed 03.25.11).

Finally, a coalition government based on ethnic politics came into existence and later an election with its own complexities. The question now is when will the US end its nation-building efforts in the Middle East? How much influences will the Palestinian-Israelis conflict affect the US mission? How about the wave of protest and demands of the ordinary people in North Africa and the Middle East? Further, how has America portrayed itself in this aspect of nation-building where the issue of war and peace significantly affect the outcome of nation-building? I will not answer these questions in this work because they could form a whole new corpus that is distinct from my focus.

However, this aspect of American engagement is described in the following ways:

First, the practical effect is not the declared goal, of U.S. intervention must be a regime change or the survival of a regime that would otherwise collapse. Regime change or survivability is the core objective of nation-building, because an outside power, such as the United States, must overthrow a hostile regime or maintain a friendly indigenous regime to be able to implement its plans.⁸⁸

It is worth noting that the primary goal of early American nation-building efforts was, in most cases, strategic—but narrow self interests based on power politics. In the first efforts, Washington decided to replace or support a regime in a foreign land to defend its core security and economic interests, not to build a democracy. The idea of transplanting democracy as sustained political ideals is most recent to the goals of nation-building—as seen in Liberia, Tunisia, Sierra Leone, Egypt, and other Muslim nations still in the process of demanding their rights as seen in Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Iran.

⁸⁸ Fukuyama. *Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2005, 64.

Reexamining the International Aids System

Another significant factor in nation-building is the prospect and perils of foreign aids. Firstly, what task is the aid system currently performing, and what capabilities does it have to performing them? Examining the aid complex from a design perspective reveals the way its people, processes, resources flows, and mental models results in different outcomes and level of wastes. Such an analysis is prerequisite for answering two questions: is the aid system in fundamental need for reform? And to what extent is it relevant to addressing the issues of poverty and stability in the rebuilding of failed state? The tasks usually is handling money, preparing projects, engendering change, providing advice as well as producing (as well as substituting) for state functions.⁸⁹ This task usually involves number of organizations (WB, IMF, NGOs, UN, etc.). Then there are countries with their development agencies such as USAID, ECD, etc) that carry on these tasks on global level.

However, the old system is realistically outdated and must be reformed. The first premise of the aid system is that states lack financial capital and secondly, that there is a need to build infrastructure. The aid then generated is in the hands of the agencies who assume the role of the weakened state to perform such tasks. As a result, they address symptom but not the root causes of the dysfunctionality. What the aid should instead do as its central function is generating prosperity by bringing a global knowledge of stocks

⁸⁹ Ibid., 84.

and flows to countries without it. Instead, what these countries get is an extractive and exploitative side of capitalism, leaving the countries with less entrepreneurial activities.⁹⁰

Historically, development aids went to Cold War camps, which was a tragedy for full nation-building since 1945. Europe benefited but not the rest of the world. There was emphasis on primary education for girls, but the skills required for full national development for management and leadership requires first rate higher education. College education provides the wherewithal for management, operation, and maintenance. However, the World Bank was reluctant to fund education and health, doubting the economic return from these institutions. They even failed to articulate Adam Smith's concept of human capital, which he defined as the "acquired and useful abilities of all inhabitants or members of society."⁹¹ However, the focus under Robert McNamara of the World Bank shifted to education and health especially for rural populations.⁹² He realized that first rate education also develops skilled citizens who support development for the economy and polity. As Ghani asserts:

Such an approach links investments in human capital to the goal of forming a large middle class, which has historically been the vehicle for consolidating democracy. Moreover, it generates a demand for the rule of law and provides a solvent for ethnic, gender, and class tensions.⁹³

⁹⁰ Ghani, 86.

⁹¹ See Gary Stanley Becker. *Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

⁹² Ibid., 88.

⁹³ Ibid., 89.

For example, “Africa spends annually \$4b on one hundred thousand expatriates according the Commission for Africa.”⁹⁴ USAID gives millions to a few firms, with minimal consultation with the host country. These are works that Africans themselves could be doing to rebuild their continent. Sadly, this is one of the reasons of the deep resentment between the local population and the international partners, where a contrasting lifestyle permeates, with a new bourgeois class being the UN and NGOS.

As observed, when these nations are in transition, there exists the aid rush, as both a process and outcome. Unfortunately, it carries the same kind of dangers as any form of political and social activism. It can become an anti-catalyst for the creation of institutional capacity, as well as instrument of division, resentment and corruption.

Even though the United Nations and its agencies may try to ensure equality, the apparent randomness of allocations often feeds a sense of unfairness among citizens and tensions between the country’s regions and groups. The cascade of distributive schemes spreads a sense of entitlement without legal foundation, as it is not rooted in legal and policy frameworks. Consequently, the unintended consequences can include severe inefficiencies, arising for example from staffing hundreds of project-units where redundant or duplicate layers of management are paid exorbitantly to oversee costly and/or misdirected projects. The result is that both government and citizens are bypassed, and the government loses the capability to respond to its citizens’ complaints. The aid agencies managing the projects are based in capitals far away, beyond the reach of domestic citizens and with no direct legal responsibilities to recipients. There is a double

⁹⁴ Fukuyama. *Nation-Building*, 101.

loss of accountability, as citizens in the newly liberated countries have no official recourse and those in the aid agencies' own countries are too remote from the facts on the ground to hold those agencies accountable.

What happened in many of these recovering nations like Afghanistan and Haiti, have parallels with other many other post-conflict zones. Their lessons are multiple and relate alike to donors and recipients, external agencies and internal authorities, global citizens and local actors –realizing that in failed state situations, these categories are often interwoven. For the international community, Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, and Somalia teach that parallel organizations do not result in creation of functioning states; that technical assistance is often wasteful; and that coordination among donors remains elusive.

In short, aid can become as much part of the problem as of the solution. It can work, as many examples show—the United States' Marshall Plan in Europe—Post World War II the assistance provided by the European Union to Ireland and Spain, the World Bank-administered trust fund's support for Japan, Korea, China and Singapore. There are a range of positive lessons from international responses to recovery, ranging from rapid settlement of debts (in the most recent case of Liberia), to the establishment of multi-donor trust funds with strict rules for disbursement, and establishment of licensing and tendering control mechanisms to ensure careful stewardship of the country's assets. But to overcome its current dysfunctionality, the international aid system must have the vision and the courage to create a new approach animated by a spirit of partnership and working through larger, more integrated programs.

Narrative and Nation-Building

I hold that narrative is a powerful human communicative element that helps us make sense of the world of the past as reinterpreted by the present. As such, many contemporary thinkers have argued that structurally human thought is deeply embedded with narrative.⁹⁵ Psychologist Jerome Bruner argues that “it is through narrative that we create and recreate selfhood, that self is a product of our telling and not some essence to be delved for in the recesses of subjectivity.”⁹⁶ Narratives are not just a matter of individuals creating their inner and social “self”; narratives are also what bind societies and cultures together. Narratives are how we integrate events and actions through time into meaningful patterns. Narratives specify cause-and-effect relationships and organize these into coherent wholes.

Narratives tell us which events and actions are significant and which can be ignored. The inter-relationship of events in our lives is explained by these narratives. Our sense of meaning and purpose, our values and motivations are based on these narratives. Humans are deeply storied creatures. We bring our mini-narratives that are joined together into larger stories within stories. But for all these narratives to make sense to all, we must recognize what Ricoeur’s refers to as the meta-narratives.⁹⁷ These are the

⁹⁵ See Charles Taylor’s *Sources of the Self, the Making of Modern Identity*. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1989. Also read Paul Ricoeur’s *Time and Narrative*, Volume 1. Trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.

⁹⁶ Jerome Bruner. *Making Stories: Law, Literature, and Life*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002, 13.

⁹⁷ Paul Ricoeur. *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. See *Time and Narrative (Temps et Récit)*, 3 vols. trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. Also see *Essays on Biblical Interpretation*. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980.

most valuable stories that are told, retold, and reframed and seen as objective or absolute truth. So how do we mitigate between these competing narratives and avoid arrogance, pride and superiority complexes of nations, tribes, races, and regions? It is incumbent upon us to accept our limitations within our various narratives and seek a dynamic and reasonable hermeneutic⁹⁸ of interpretation that forces us to suspend our judgment and willingness to shift our standpoint so to avoid a dogmatic reading or interpretation of history. This hermeneutical process definitely can lead into a hermeneutical spiral.⁹⁹

There are various reasons why the concept of narrative is especially appropriate for considering the relation of Christian response to world affairs and for that matter to the process of nation-building. Humans are storytellers and story makers. We live self-consciously in a present that has come from somewhere and leads somewhere. Stories are bound up with this human awareness of time, with living in the present, remembering the past and anticipating the future. In relating what has happened in the past and what will or may happen in the future, stories help humans make sense of present acts and events. Narratives allow humans to see the fragments of our finite lives within larger, meaningful wholes. Stories, with their own arches, tell of particular people in particular times and places, captures our moral imagination in ways that theoretical or abstract concept rarely do. They captivate people in their pre-reflective consciousness, and they give rise to new

⁹⁸ Hermeneutics is the philosophy of interpretation. Paul Ricoeur, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Jürgen Habermas have written several seminal works and debated this subject matter.

⁹⁹ See Grant Osborne. *The Hermeneutical Spiral*. Westmont: Intervarsity Press, 1997. Hermeneutic spiral is an interpretative modification of what we seek to understand in order to form a new engagement with the new interpretation. The reality is what we seek to know has a historical root within a tradition, based on authority, from the viewpoint of the person seeking to understand. So we never understand something as given, but always as something, having a pre-understanding or anticipation of what it is we engage with or are looking upon.

reflection, thoughts and insights. Narratives speak to us as whole persons, evoking our emotions, intellect and will.

Therefore, we as human persons live within many narratives—through and within family story, a refugee story, an ethnic story, a war story, a gender story, a transitional story, a national story, an education story, a work story, a friend story, a place story, a time story and a religious or a secular story. Our stories tell us who we are and offer structures and meanings to our lives by linking us with others. We learn our roles in life that enable us to carry out our tasks, account for institutional structures, identify prescription and proscription—informing us of the sacred and profane the good and the evil.

Our own personal story is a unique and complex composition of the shared stories of the groups or communities to which we belong. To know a person or a community is to know that person or community's story. To know the Christian community is to know its narrative. In essence our particular narrative is what Gene Outka calls "the Particularist Turn in Philosophical and Theological Ethics."¹⁰⁰ Outka identifies a movement that "turns away from formalist and universalist ethical theories and toward some particular historical-ethical community."¹⁰¹ Universalist ethical theories claim that basic moral beliefs are known through reason alone, are available across cultures and

¹⁰⁰ Gene Outka. "The Particularist Turn in Theological and Philosophical Ethics," in *Christian Ethics*, ed. Lisa Sowle Cahill and James F. Childress. Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1996, 94. Another significant work of Outka is *Agape: An Ethical Analysis*. Hartford: Yale University Press, 1977. He examines in depth *Agape* from Roman Catholic and Protestant writings in particular those of D'Arcy, Niebuhr, Ramsey, Tillich, and Karl Barth. He brings clarity on the subject of love as it relates to Christian or theological ethics with a secular understanding.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 96.

historical periods, are entirely justifiable without recourse to particular beliefs and practices that distinguish communities, and apply to all humans.

The particularist ethical theories challenge these claims and insist that moral beliefs are historically and contextually situated. Human thinking and living are usually driven by traditions and culturally conditioned. We should therefore view our traditions borne by communities “not as mere milieus but as repositories, not accidental but essential to the moral knowledge on whose basis we ought to live our lives.”¹⁰² Such an understanding means that “the most fitting way to view our individual human lives is to narrate our histories.”¹⁰³

Alasdair MacIntyre is a leading proponent of the particularist tradition. In his ground-breaking work *After Virtue*, MacIntyre writes,

I can only answer the question, what am I to do? if I can answer the prior question, Of what story or stories do I find myself a part? The moral agent exists in a narrative context, the bearer of a particular social identity. . . . I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point.¹⁰⁴

In this understanding of the moral agent—the individual in this view “regard[s] the self as being detached from the entanglements of society, history, and even its own past...as serene and autonomous, float[ing] freely in the rarefied atmosphere of

¹⁰² Ibid., 96.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 98.

¹⁰⁴ Alasdair MacIntyre. *After Virtue*. Fort Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, 216.

Reason.”¹⁰⁵ In essence, MacIntyre polemically takes aim at individualism or any form of narrow self-interest. Individualism in this direction is understood to mean self-centeredness. I am what I am because I choose to be without regard to the others. It is based on total rejection of others in the name of false freedom without responsibility. Instead, MacIntyre argues that the moral agent is dependent on traditions that are born by communities through reasons, experiences, and Scripture—the quadrilateral within Methodism.

MacIntyre’s focus on narrative relates with his argument of the importance of tradition, community, character, virtues, and vision for living the good (moral) life. To this view, MacIntyre writes, “A living tradition then is a historically extended, socially embodied argument and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition.”¹⁰⁶ In this regard, our Christian narrative, which ties my personal narrative with this global narrative, belongs to such a living tradition of our world in its diversity and relatedness.

The coherence of Christian narrative is further shaped by the work of Stanley Hauerwas, in his essay, “A Story Shaped Community.” He writes, “The social significance of the Gospel requires recognition of the narrative structure of Christian convictions for the life of the church.”¹⁰⁷ The reality of Hauerwas’ argument is that if we

¹⁰⁵ Paul Nelson. *Narrative and Morality: A Theological Inquiry*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987, 10.

¹⁰⁶ MacIntyre, 220-222.

¹⁰⁷ Stanley Hauerwas. *A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, 9. The thesis of this work, *A Story Formed Community: Reflections on Watership Down*, is that Christian communities, like the rabbit warrens, are

are striving to live the Christian life in solidarity with others, hermeneutics ought to be of significance in attempting to interpret Scripture in the context of the many genres of stories, in light of history, politics, social relationships, and future possibilities.

This understanding of narrative opens us up to be active participants and attentive to realities and our own limitations as we work towards creating a better world. Whilst, Hauerwas posits that “every social ethic involves a narrative, whether it is concerned with the formulation of basic principles of social organization and/or concrete policy alternatives.”¹⁰⁸ We then ought to leave the Sunday’s pews and the academic world of theories and debates towards a broken world of shattered dreams and communities to construct or shape communities by approximating justice, yet aware of our own limitations. However, our attentiveness and participation must in no way be seen as an attempt to control the world and meta-narrative. Rather, we are there to offer an alternative.

Thus Hauerwas is right to critique our *modus operandi*—“In [which] our attempt to control our society Christians in America have too readily accepted liberalism as a social strategy appropriate to the Christian story.”¹⁰⁹ He therefore conjectures that the

story formed communities. This means that Christians need to be true to their story (i.e., story of the Hebrew people and its culmination in the story of Jesus) and live in such a way that they can really hear its truth (rather than distorting this truth). To do so Christians must develop the skills or virtues called for by their story, they must tell, retell, and enact this story in new ways, test their interpretations of the story for their truthfulness, and organize Christian community (politics) according this story. The remainder of his argument focuses on the content of the Christian story in relation to the story of *Watership Down* and what this implies about Christian morality. Character is also story formed because stories fundamentally mediate and shape the relation between self and world that character names.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 10. In Hauerwas’ critique, he polemically sees the unapologetic acceptance of liberalism in America’s political and economic philosophy. Liberalism (not the label Conservatives call Democrats on

church does not exist to provide an ethos for democracy or any other form of social organization, but stands as a political alternative to every nation, witnessing to the kind of social life possible for those that have been formed by the story of Christ.”¹¹⁰

Nevertheless, what system does offer us better political and economic system? I believe that democracy does offer us a better approach to collective consensus and as such, the church must be an advocate for such system that gives consent to the people. It is this very concept that Niebuhr makes the case for democracy as a realistic system for global cooperation. But this system usually gets compromised on global affairs as seen through the UN when opposing voices make their cases for or against various issues. This was the recent situation in Libya in time of crisis or urgency. To this Niebuhr cautioned:

[That the] preservation of a democratic civilization requires the wisdom of the serpent and the harmlessness of the dove. The children of light must be armed with the wisdom of the children of darkness but remain free from their malice. They must know the power of self-interest in human society without giving it moral justification. They must have this wisdom in order that they may beguile, deflect, harness and restrain self-interest, individual and collective, for the sake of the community.¹¹¹

It is based on this very conviction that I bring my personal mini narrative interwoven with others and the globalized meta-narratives on the issue of failed states in need of nation-building, premised on the notion that democracy is indeed at the core of

the far left (liberals) is a theory in economics emphasizing individual freedom from restraint and usually based on free competition, the self-regulating market, and the gold standard. As a political philosophy it is based on belief in progress, the essential goodness of the human race, and the autonomy of the individual.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 11. Hauerwas like Niebuhr, is against Christian ethic that seek to legitimize a particular political system especially democracy—even though Niebuhr prefers it better than communism. In Niebuhr’s work, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (1944), he stated: “Man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary” (p. xiii).

¹¹¹ Reinhold Niebuhr. *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness*. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1944, 40-41.

rebuilding broken nations. It is a historical experience and analysis of human history that even challenges our Christian meta-narrative demanding our attention and action on this very least discussed subject of the problem of failed state in need of a genuine nation-building within a Christian context. Since the civil war finally ended in my little West African nation of Liberia in 2003, and general and presidential elections ushered in Africa's first and only female president, Madam Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in 2005 and 2011 respectively, I have vivid memory of the evils of wars, the narrative of others and how the majority of the world population and powerful nations stood back while the carnage consumed us. But we were not the only victims—Rwanda, Angola, Sierra Leone, and The Balkans were in chaos and anarchy.

My personal account is tied to Liberia, founded by freed American slaves. It has had a unique and controversial beginning since 1822 when freed American slaves returned to Africa to form a colony. My own ascendants Prince Abdul Rahman and Isabella who were enslaved in Natchez, Mississippi for nearly forty years were trailblazers to the new colony of Liberia, encouraged directly to forming a Christian nation, naming its first capital Christopolis and later renaming it Monrovia, in honor of James Monroe, the fifth president of the USA. This adventure was done through a grant given by the United States Government in collaboration the American Colonization Society and the US Navy to halt the slave trade in Africa. Their story is told as a PBS documentary called *Prince Among Slaves*.¹¹²

¹¹² Terry Alford. *Prince Among Slaves*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 30th anniversary edition (September 19, 2007). The inspiring true story of an Abdul Rahman, African prince who survived 40 years of enslavement in America before finally regaining his freedom, first aired nationally on February 4, 2008, as Prime time on PBS. The documentary, part of PBS' tribute to Black History Month. It is also based on

The settlers of Liberia, like their European-American counterparts in North America, sought to an extent, in building a nation by paradoxically committing the same inhumane treatments they suffered in Europe and the Americas, to the native inhabitants they met in Africa. It must also be noted that some of the natives themselves were still caught in the act of war and the slave trade, which rightfully infuriated the emancipated Americans in Liberia. A class and racial hierarchical division manifested itself in the order of the Mulattos, the dark skin Southerner, the repatriated Africans known as the Congoes and the Natives—with a shift of power to the darker skin, the so-called Americo-Liberians in alliance with the Congoes for an unbroken 130 years since Liberia independence on July 26, 1847.

It was April 12, 1980 that ushered in the first native Liberian leadership in a bloody military coup led by uneducated and semi literate Non-Commissioned Officers trained by US military personnel. Prior to the coup d'état, the late president William Tolbert, whose father fought in the American civil war and resided in Charleston, South Carolina, had argued for Liberia's self determination—in choosing its friends of nations

Dr. Terry Alford's biography of the same name. As a historical narrative, the film has inspired a large audience to understand how important their own narratives are joined by the one big human narrative. We learned that what matter most is family, culture, right relationships-our ability to love others and do no harm. This was a story drawn out of my own history of my family, ethnicity, religion, and global affairs. Since 2007, I've traveled to more than fifty cities in the USA sharing this unique narrative and its effect for finding healing and reconciliation in the midst of discrimination and miseducation. Two important historical factoids I tell the many audiences are that my great grandfather (7th generation) was the main flash point of the Jackson's Democratic Party, for inciting religious and racial biases and slurs in the elections of 1828 against the incumbent Quincy Adams' support for the prince. He was described even by Mark Twain as a blood thirsty Muslim who would cut off the heads of southerners to free the slaves. Additionally, the United States government was interested in setting him free because they thought he was a prince from Morocco(rather from West Africa), United States' oldest diplomatic Ally—whose freedom and return to Morocco, would help ease the piracy and naval blockade both Morocco and Tripoli enforced on American ships enroute to the Mediterranean Coast. The wars were known as the Barbary Coast War or the Tripolitan War. Read Michael B. Oren. *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: The United States in the Middle East, 1776 to 2006*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2007. This work details in full America's role in the Muslim world.

rather than being solely aligned to USA and its Cold-War allies. Tolbert, who was also a Baptist prelate, went so far, as being the first Sub-Saharan African president to openly criticize Israel in 1979 at the UN General Assembly, as a Zionist state denying the Palestinians their rights to self determination. Many Liberian historians and observers consistently argue that President Tolbert and other assassinated African and world leaders such as Patrice Lumumba of the D. R. Congo, and the bloody overthrow of the Allende's government on Sept. 11, 1973 in Chile, were inner workings of the invincible hands of the US government through the CIA and other domestic actors. It was a perilous time in world history—the bi-polar world under the canopy of the Cold-War eon.

For example, my father, Borbor Gaye, a former soccer star and captain of the Liberian national team, returned home in 1981 from Europe where he studied in Romania for six years. The military junta immediately interrogated and branded him a communist. That experience forever changed him. My dad never revealed this incident to me until 2008 in Chicago, Illinois. Prior to this intimate conversation, my own experiences and narrow escape in the 1990s from two wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia, forever made an imprint on my mind—where I witnessed the destruction and dehumanization of minds, body, and spirits, the interplay of internal and external actors for exploitive natural resources, the staggering poverty, rapes, trauma, collapse of state institutions, and the lack of basic social services. Poignantly, I lived through a failed state! I knew then and now that the only remedy was an authentic nation-building agenda through collective efforts, hard work, and perseverance by a great majority.

My hopes in the early 1990s in the midst of tragedy was imbued by an indefatigable American Catholic nun, Dr. Shirley Kolmer, my high school principal and patroness of my drama group at St. Patrick's Catholic High School in Monrovia, who constantly reminded me and my colleagues "that education, with a strong sense of morality was the key for us rebuilding our lives and that of our nation." On October 15, 1992, the overcrowded city of Monrovia was invaded by Charles Taylor and his marauding rebel forces of child-soldiers and adults. My home and others were being bombed and looted while we fled the outskirts and surrounding suburbs.

At a major junction at the Freeport and Gardnerville road, in Liberia, Dr. Kolmer heading in the opposite direction to their convent, stopped and recognized me in the midst of the large crowd, while driving her white hatched back Subaru with four other American nuns. With more than five thousands civilians trekking, she and her fellow sisters lovingly greeted and counseled us, offering bottles and cups of water to civilians.

In her eyes I saw a deep spiritual and human connection—the *umbuunti*, letting me and my people know that she and her colleagues were walking and feeling every bit of our sorrows, fears, frustrations, and tears of our failed state. In silence, she held my hands warmly and tightly—as if to say "take courage— this nation [Liberia] shall rise again!" Sadly, Sister Kolmer and four other nuns, namely, Sisters Barbara Ann Mutra, Mary Joel Kolmer, Kathleen McGuire and Agnes Mueller, all in their 50s and 60s, nurses and teachers, who spent years in Liberia, helping its development and sharing the lot of

its people,¹¹³ were brutally murdered on that same day by Taylor's rebels, under the command of "General Mosquito", Mr. Christopher Vambo.¹¹⁴ It was around that same period that peacekeepers from Senegal interrogated, humiliated, and falsely accused me of being a child soldier.

The lesson learned from my own personal narrative in relation to the larger historical narrative is that failed state generates tremendous angst and regression—trampling the human spirit for cooperation, justice, love, compassion and genuine development. However, to reverse such painful trend, there is a need for a balanced and strategic approach to nation-building with appropriate method for enabling the global common good which restores social order and instituting the democratic processes.

The doctrine of the common good teaches that the individual person is a member of a larger body. Just as the goal, or end, of each individual member of a community is the common good of that larger community, so also the goal, or end, of each organ and muscle in our body is the common good of the overall person. This effort requires close attention to the moral concern for justice in global affairs, with recognition of global responsibilities of nations today, especially powerful nations in preventing genocide and the obligation to protect rights and lives. It is a task that calls us beyond our comfort zones, to new to uncomfortable and uncharted territories—of sustainable nation-building.

¹¹³ I lived through that painful loss of those nuns, who personally touched my life. For example, Sister Agnes Mueller came to our class on a daily basis to help us through the trauma. It was the first time I heard the word carthesis in 1991, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1992-11-06/news/1992311209_1_liberia-monrovia-gbarnga (accessed 06.10.10).

¹¹⁴ Read *The TRC* report on Liberia, http://www.the-liberian-group.com/murder_of_the_five_american_nuns.htm (also accessed 10.10.10); also <http://www.ictj.org/static/Africa/Liberia/TRCReport.pdf> (accessed 10.10.10).

General Conclusions

This Christian socio-ethical and theo-political task for appropriating the common good ought to be realistic and wholistic, informing our ideas and participation in the global public sphere—as exemplified through the personal narratives and writings of St. Augustine, Aquinas, John Wesley, the Niebuhr’s brothers, Novak, Hollenbach, and the hosts of other scholars and writers. They each taught us that faith in the public square is very different from imposing strict religious values; rather, it is putting to practice those principles espoused by Jesus and the Saints of Christianity. This means tuning our senses into a frequency that sees the world as a landscape that God can transform—as articulated by Loyola’s favorite phrase, *Ad maiorem Dei gloriam*. Translated: For the greater glory of God.

This transformation is one that is prescribed in the Bible: turning society away from dominance, hypocrisy, pride, “greed, malice, deceit, envy, slander, arrogance and folly” (Mark 7: 22-23) and towards Christian principles that espoused justice, peace, love, compassion and goodness. In the process of nation-building, we then set out to do precisely that—to build nations based on very concrete values already articulated by our Christian faith. This is an eschatological hope for God’s “Kingdom to come on Earth.”

Our actions become intrinsically linked to the values we uphold and the vision we desire for all of God’s creation. Our task as Christians is not to hold back and be indifferent to others, but to be genuinely prophetic witnesses and builders of nations and broken lives, in our quest to fight and speak against all forms systemic evils, with love and justice without prejudice of the other. It is therefore important that Christians make a

strong case for being actively involved in nation-building. However, one should be open for disagreements as to how these values should be translated into practical terms.

This act of participation requires openness to dialogue in resolving these differences. As well articulated by *Pacem in Terris*, we draw further strengths by knowing that our task obligates us to establish universal peace in truth, justice, charity, and liberty. This document clearly sets the basis upon which justice is grounded, laying the premise that God created all men and women equal, and as such we have rights and duties that are universal, inviolable and inalienable. Therefore, human has economic, political, cultural, and moral rights and duties. In detail, “every human being has the right to live, to bodily integrity, to the means necessary for development of life, to be respected, to worship God according to one’s conscience, to choose freely one’s state in life, (and) to freely meet and associate.”¹¹⁵

In our call to be universal or global citizens, we ought to draw from our own Christian root of being united through the Eucharist or the African spirit of *umbuunti*—our collective humanity. We share a history with all peoples knowing that we are intricately linked. If one nation goes down we all go down and if one rises, we also rise. In Niebuhr’s assertion,

Genuine community, whether between men [and women] or nations, is not established merely through the realization that we need one another... Genuine community is established only when the knowledge that we need one another is supplemented by the recognition that “the other,” that other form of life, or that other unique community is the limit beyond which our ambitions must not run and the boundary beyond which our life must not expand...It also includes a religious sense of the mystery and greatness of

¹¹⁵ *Pacem in Terris*. Encyclical of Pope John XXIII on Establishing Universal Peace in Truth, Justice, Charity, and Liberty, 1963, Para.15, 20, & 23.

the other life, which we violate if we seek to comprehend it too simply from our standpoint.¹¹⁶

In simple terms, we do not do the good to or for others to be rewarded here or in the afterlife. We do it because it's our moral obligation to reach into our *umbuunti* by recognizing the humanity in others and our responsibility to the greater environment or society. In terms of political, economic, social, and cultural transformations, the voice of the Christian person ought to be driven not by any desire to demonstrate the credibility or value of any socio-political or economic ideology, but by a commitment to the dignity of all people, particularly the poor, vulnerable, and disenfranchised. This places the onus on the gatekeepers of the church—the Pope, bishops, pastors, theologians, and laypersons to rearticulate and reinterpret matters of socio-economic and political affairs in light of reality as they portend to the creation of stable nations and breaking the curse of failing/failed states.

In the tradition of Methodism, we are called to effectively tie together these aspects of scripture, tradition, and experience through the gift of reason as we endeavor to participate in the arduous task of nation-building. As children of God, we have not been created to blindly love God, but to choose to love God, and with certainty, the only way for us to come to this choice is to use reason to put together scripture with tradition and reason in a way that makes sense for us individually and collectively through our personal and collective experiences. Using this gift of reason, we can assess whether our experiences fall in line with what we read in scripture; we can discern whether the

¹¹⁶ Reinhold Niebuhr. *The Irony of American History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008, 120.

traditional practices of our faith make sense in our current context and our own experience; we can examine our reading of scriptures in light of our tradition and experiences. In this way, the Wesleyan Quadrilateral helps us to more fully experience God's divine purpose in our lives and as it affect the social-political conditions of ourselves and the others. Wesley's practical approach is in essence, an appeal to bringing the world together in working for the common good, in a universalistic and communitarian worldview, as articulated by Martha Nussbaum, in her case against patriotism as well as other vices such as ethnocentrism, in favor of a universalistic allegiance "to the worldwide community of human beings."¹¹⁷

Moreover, the way to apply the Quadrilateral to the current issue of failed state and nation-building is a proactive reaction to injustices and crimes against humanity committed by governments who failed to protect their people and the international neglects those people have endured through the lack of will by the international communities.

When Jesus was asked about the most important commandment—written in the canonical Gospels—he cites Leviticus 19:18, saying that we should not only love God but that we should love our neighbors in the same way that we love ourselves. In Luke, Jesus follows with the parable of the Good Samaritan—who reason and tradition tell us would have been considered in that context to have been stranger and an outcast—who acts out of love and compassion. In the Gospel of John, Jesus gives the disciples a new commandment: to love each other just as Jesus has loved them.

¹¹⁷ Martha C. Nussbaum. *For Love of Country: In a new Forum on the Limits of Patriotism*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1997.

As I reason through these scriptures, I assert that one of the core values of the Christian faith is love. Is it possible to love our brothers and sisters in Christ if we are more concerned about selective issues like abortion, homosexuality, and the ordination of women than the full restoration of love, hope, justice, and the common good of the down trodden, the brokenhearted and those living in failed states? I don't think so. Further, the same chapter of Leviticus also adds, "When an alien resides with you in your land, you shall not oppress the alien. The alien who resides with you shall be to you as the citizen among you; you shall love the alien as yourself, for you were aliens in the land of Egypt."¹¹⁸

This passage reminds us of the Israelites in Egypt and Babylon. The people of God have been aliens in strange lands, and tradition reminds us of inhumane treatment, murder, and the unyielding injustice of those who have been under such oppression. I am also reminded of my family and people's own history in the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade in which John Wesley poignantly wrote,

If, therefore, you have any regard to justice, (to say nothing of mercy, nor the revealed law of God,) render unto all their due. Give liberty to whom liberty is due, that is, to every child of man, to every partaker of human nature... Be gentle toward all men; and see that you invariably do unto every one as you would he should do unto you.¹¹⁹

Moreover, experience teaches me that we have been called to *Koinonia*, a place of active participation in the world. In my experience, this participation is not only a place for my immediate family and next door neighbors, but a place for security, stability, and

¹¹⁸ Leviticus 19:33-34.

¹¹⁹ John Wesley. *Thoughts upon Slavery*, <http://gbgm-umc.org/umw/wesley/thoughtsuponslavery.stm> (accessed 06.10.11).

peace for all of people. It is a place of diversity made whole by our common human dignity and stewardship of God's creation. This socio-political action is rooted on the experience, tradition, drawn from Scripture, and tested through our sense of reasoning—acknowledging that we live in tensions and must find a balance approach to dealing with social, political, economic or religious issues that confront or challenge us all.

Therefore, putting Niebuhr's argument into my own words, I maintain that every global citizen has a duty to try to form an intelligent opinion on every social, political, economic, and cultural issues of our world—knowing that the world we live in ought to be approached from realism, in which reason, experience, tradition and Scripture are interplayed. It's a world informed by two forms of laws that correlate with our God given purpose—namely the natural law (natural justice) and the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love (original justice).¹²⁰ This is the way we ought to be and do—that is, challenged to approximate justice; to do good to and for our neighbors and the strangers; and to work for the common good of all people, even in the midst of our own self-interest.

¹²⁰ See part I, "General Essays on Love and Justice," in *Love and Justice: Selections from the Shorter Writings of Reinhold Niebuhr*, ed. D. B. Robertson (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1957).

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